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The New European Union Trademark Law
LUIS-ALFONSO DURAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the goals of the Treaty of Rome1 , which created the European
Union, was to establish within the European countries that belong to this
Union,' a single market without internal barriers that might restrict the
free movement of goods and services.
To this end, one of the most ambitious projects initiated by the Com-
mission of the European Union was the creation of the so-called "Com-
munity Trademark".
The objective of the project was the development of a trademark re-
gistration system that would grant to the holder of the trademark an ex-
clusive right of protection on that trademark in all the countries of the
European Union simultaneously. This right was to coexist with the na-
tional trademark rights already granted under the current trademark laws
of each Member State.
For specialists in trademark law, it is evident that this objective was
not an easy one. First, the existence of the different languages, cultures
and degrees of development among the European countries creates signif-
icant difficulties. Second, the national trademark laws in the various
countries of the European Union differ in many aspects. Each has differ-
ent application and registration requirements, varying timeframes, and
distinct conflict resolution criteria. Most significantly, however, the exis-
tence of a trademark office in each country of the European Union per-
mits some trademarks to be registered in the names of different owners in
different countries. Since the national laws grant each trademark an ex-
clusive right to that mark in the granting country, obvious trademark
ownership problems result among countries.
To resolve these problems, thirty years of intensive work and discus-
sions were needed. From 1964, when the first text of the Community
Trademark Regulation was available, until December 20, 1993, when the
Council of the European Union approved the new regulations, the draft-
* Partner of DurAn-Corretjer, S.L. (Barcelona, Spain); Spanish and European Patent
and Trademark Attorney; Visiting Professor of Trademark Law at the Universities of Barce-
lona and Alicante; Member of the Council and 2nd Vice-President of the European Commu-
nities Trade Mark Association (ECTA); M.S. in Spanish and European Patents, Univ. of
Barcelona 1990; Dipl. Engineer, Polytechnic University of Barcelona 1977.
1. Treaty of Rome of March 25, 1957 creating the European Economic Community.
2. 15 countries, as of January 1, 1995, including: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal,
Spain and Sweden [hereinafter Member States].
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ers of the Community Trademark Regulation met to negotiate and evalu-
ate solutions. This hard work yielded two legal instruments: 1) a Direc-
tive, promulgated so that Member States' trademark laws might be
harmonized, and 2) a Regulation, created to enable registration and pro-
tection of Community Trademarks. The purpose of this article is to dis-
cuss these instruments and to describe, for legal practitioners around the
world, how to use them. To do this, Section II details the Directive, while
Section III discusses the Regulation. Section IV describes the application
and registration process and Section V outlines potential ways in which
one can be denied or lose a Community Trademark. Section VI then dis-
cusses the exhaustion of rights and use requirements, while Section VII
describes Community Trademark conflict resolution, including the newly
named Community Trademark Courts. Section VIII reiterates the effects
and characteristics of the Community Trademark and Section IX con-
cludes the article.
II. THE DIRECTIVE
The Trademark Directives, approved on December 21, 1988, orders
all European Community Countries to adapt their national trademark
laws to certain specific harmonized concepts within a set time limit. The
time limit expired on December 21, 1992. Most of the Member States
have adapted their national trademark laws to these harmonized criteria,
although not all within the time limit prescribed. For example, in the
United Kingdom, the new Trademark Law was only brought into force on
October 31, 1994; the new German Trademark Law was enacted on Janu-
ary 1, 1995. The Spanish Trademark Law, on the other hand, was the
first to be harmonized. It was approved on November 10, 1988 and came
into force on May 12, 1989. The only problem is that the Spanish Trade-
mark Law was approved one month before the final text of the Directive,
so small discrepancies exist that must be adapted. According to the Span-
ish Patent and Trademark Office, these changes will be made in the near
future.
The harmonized concepts include the: 1) definition of what can be
registered as a trademark; 2) rights conferred by a trademark; 3) condi-
tions on use of a trademark, especially, cancellation for lack of use; 4)
exhaustion of the rights; and 5) grounds for refusal, invalidation, or revo-
cation of a trademark. The Directive, however, does give a certain degree
of freedom to the national countries to legislate in different ways some
aspects of their trademark laws, such as, the procedural system.
This Directive was absolutely necessary in order to coordinate two
existing alternative routes for protecting trademarks within the European
Union: 1) the national systems and 2) the Community system; and to
avoid discrimination against applicants following one or the other route.
3. Council Directive 89/104 of December 21, 1988, to approximate the laws of the Mem-
ber States relating to trademarks, 1989 O.J. L40 (February 11, 1989).
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III. THE REGULATION
The European Council's Regulation on the Community Trademark
was approved on December 20, 1993, and came into force on March 15,
1994. However, because the system requires the creation of an Office to
deal with Community Trademark applications, it is not possible to apply
for these registrations until the Office becomes operative. The anticipated
date of operation is January 1, 1996, although all trademark applications
filed during the first three months will have the same filing date, i.e.,
April 1, 1996.
A. Location of The Office
The first step in the establishment an Office to facilitate the trade-
mark system was the selection of the site of the Office. The location of the
Office was a political issue because the countries of the European Union
had to choose not only the site of the Trademark Office, but also the site
of several other Community offices as well. Understandably, the different
countries wanted to have an equal distribution of these Community of-
fices, so each site selection relied on all other site selections.
This problem was solved in a meeting of the Presidents of the Mem-
ber Countries which took place in Brussels on October 29, 1993. During
this meeting, the site of several offices of the European Union was de-
cided, including the decision that the office for the Community Trade-
mark, called the f'Office for the Harmonization in the Internal Market"
(OHIM) (Trademarks and Designs) would be located in Spain. On No-
vember 5, 1993, the Spanish Cabinet decided to locate the new office in
the City of Alicante.
The OHIM is already proceeding with its initial steps of organizing
the administrative and legal bodies needed to deal with the Community
Trademark applications. A provisional building has been inaugurated in
Alicante, which will be replaced by a new 4000 square meter building to
be constructed in the neighborhood of the Alicante International Airport.
The new building will allow sufficient space for the OHIM to deal not
only with Community Trademarks but also with Community Designs.5
4. Council Regulation 40/94 of December 20, 1993 on the Community trademark, 1994
O.J. LI1 (January 14, 1994), [hereinafter EEC Regulation].
5. An issue that parallels Community Trademarks is that of Community Designs. One
of the most important issues to be decided is the protection granted by Community Designs
for spare parts. A dispute exists between manufacturers of motor vehicles and manufactur-
ers of spare parts. The manufacturers of motor vehicles want the spare parts to have the
same degree of protection as any other design, while the spare parts manufacturers wish to
restrict this exclusive right to three years.
The OHIM will deal with both Community Trademarks and Community Designs, since
the steps to be used for each are similar. A draft of the Designs Directive, to harmonize the
pertinent national legal systems in the various Member States has already been prepared,
anticipating a Regulation establishing a Community Design. The drafts of these texts are
already being discussed in the European Parliament and several proposals for amendments
1995
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B. Staff
The already appointed President of the Office is Mr. Combaldieu,
former President of the French Patent Office. Two Vice Presidents have
also been appointed, Mr. von Mdihlendahl from Germany, for legal mat-
ters, and Mr. Casado from Spain, for administrative matters. The Presi-
dent of the Administrative Council is Mr. Mota Maia, current Director of
the Portuguese Patent Office. As far as the other personnel of the Office is
concerned, in 1994 there were 32 persons working in the Office and the
budget for 1995 approved an increase up to 75 people.
C. Languages
A second problem in establishing the OHIM, was "what languages
were to be used in the Office?" It was considered too expensive and com-
plicated to have the Office dealing with applications in all of the official
languages of the European Union, now 11, but no country wanted to re-
nounce the use of its own language.
This problems was also solved at the meeting of the Presidents of the
Member Countries in Brussels on October 29, 1993. It was decided that
the Office would deal in five official languages: English, French, German,
Spanish and Italian.
According to the provisions of the Council's Regulation on the Com-
munity Trademark, an applicant will be able to file their applications in
any language of the European Union, called the first language of the ap-
plication. However, applicants will also be required to designate a second
language, selected from the five official languages. If the language selected
by the applicant as its first language is not one of the five official lan-
guages, the Office will then correspond with the applicant in the selected
second language.
Opposition, revocation or invalidation proceedings must also be filed
in one of the five official languages. However, if the language selected by
the opponent or the plaintiff does not coincide with the first or second
language of the challenged Community Trademark, the opponent will be
required to submit a translation into the first or second language desig-
nated in the application and this language shall become the language of
the proceedings.
D. Official Fees
The Commission also has prepared a draft proposal for the official
fees to be charged by the OHIM. These include fees for: 1) filing, 2) regis-
tration, 3) opposition, 4) appeal and 5) renewal of a Community Trade-
mark. Using a conversion rate of one European currency unit (ECU) to
$1.27 U.S., the filing fee for a trademark, including up to three classes,
have been made. Decisions are yet to be made.
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will be approximately $900 U.S., with an extra fee of $250 U.S. per each
additional class.
The registration fee for a Community Trademark of up to three clas-
ses will be approximately $1,400 U.S., with an extra fee of $250 U.S. per
each additional class. The opposition fee will be around $450 U.S., the
appeal fee will be approximately $1,000 U.S., and the renewal fee will be
about $2,200 U.S. for a trademark up to three classes, with an extra fee of
$640 U.S. per each additional class.
IV. THE APPLICATION AND REGISTRATION PROCESS
As mentioned before, the first applications for a Community Trade-
mark could be filed on January 1, 1996, but all applications filed within
the first three months of opening the Office will bear exactly the same
filing date, i.e. April 1, 1996.
In anticipation of these applications, the European Commission is
currently preparing the final texts of the: 1) "Implementing Regulations",
2) "Fees Regulation", and 3) the Guidelines for Examination. Drafts of
these texts are actively drawing comments from interested circles. The
final results will be critical because they will define the requirements for
Community Trademark registrations in areas such as descriptiveness, risk
of confusion and association between two trademarks.
A. Who Can File Community Trademarks
The Community Trademark will be available for applicants who are
natural or legal persons and citizens of countries: 1) in the European
Union, b) in the Paris Convention, 3) in the Agreement establishing the
World Trade Organization, or 4) that provide reciprocity to the European
Community countries as far as trademark registration is concernedo. This
means that this is an open system, in contrast to the Madrid Agreement
system or the Protocol. It will also be available to applicants from the
United States as an alternative system of protection to the existing sepa-
rate national systems.
B. Representation
The system provides7 for representation, to be undertaken by profes-
sional representatives who should be legal practitioners qualified in one of
the Member States and having their place of business within the Commu-
nity. Applicants not having their domicile or principal place of business
or a real and effective industrial or commercial establishment in the Eu-
ropean Union should be represented by a professional representative.
6. EEC Regulation, art. 5. The inclusion of parties to the Agreement establishing the
World Trade Organization occurred in an amendment to the EEC Regulation, Council Reg-
ulation 3288/94 of 22 December 1994, 994 O.J. L349 (December 31, 1994).
7. EEC Regulation, arts. 88 and 89.
1995
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
C. Claim of Seniority
It will be possible for an applicant of a Community Trademark to
claim seniority of its earlier trademarks registered in different Member
States, including a trademark registered in the Benelux countries or
under the Madrid Agreement, whenever the trademark registration is
identical and has been applied for in respect to the same or a part of the
same goods or services.8
The seniority shall have the sole effect that when the proprietor of
the Community Trademark surrenders the earlier trademark or allows it
to lapse, he shall be deemed to continue to have the same rights as he
would have had if the earlier trademark had continued to be registered.
The claim of seniority of earlier national registrations can be made either
at the moment of filing the application, during prosecution or even after
the Community Trademark has been registered.
D. Different Approaches to Obtain a Community Trademark
The combination of the claim of seniority with the Community
Trademarks makes it possible for applicants to use, for example, the fol-
lowing approaches to obtain a trademark registration:
1) One approach to trademark application is to first file separate
applications for national registrations in each or several European Union
countries, or for an international registration under the Madrid Protocol.
Once the registration in all or most countries of the European Union has
been obtained, then to apply for a Community Trademark application
claiming seniority of these older registrations. In this case, it is to be ex-
pected that few problems will arise in connection with the Community
Trademark application.
2) The second approach is to apply initially for a Community
Trademark. This approach allows applicants to make a single application
for a trademark, valid in all the countries of the European Union, rather
than having to make separate applications in each country, as was neces-
sary in the past. However, it risks the possibility that the trademark ap-
plication could be rejected if the owner of another identical or similar
trademark for identical or similar goods existing in any of the countries of
the European Union opposes the Community Trademark application.
The applicant could then be forced to convert the Community Trade-
mark into national registrations. This is not a risk if the applicant already
owns trademark protection in all the European Union countries and
claims seniority from them.
E. Grounds for Refusal: Absolute and Relative Grounds
Two basic groups of "grounds for refusal" exist. One is called "abso-
8. EEC Regulation, art. 34.
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lute grounds for refusal"9 , and consists of grounds where the trademark is
not intrinsically registrable, as for example, when the trademark is devoid
of distinctive character, or when the trademark designates or indicates
the kind, quality, or quantity of goods. The second is known as "relative
grounds for refusal"10 which includes reasons for refusal, such as, the ex-
istence of older Community or national trademarks or other exclusive
prior rights.
F. The Registration System
Once the Community Trademark is filed, which can be done either at
the OHIM office in Alicante or at the national offices of the European
Union countries," the application will be subjected to an examination of
its formal aspects. If the application is found to be in order, the Office
will proceed to its examination based on absolute grounds for refusal. If
objections are raised in this connection, they will be communicated to the
applicant by means of an official action and a term will be given for reply.
When the application is considered in order and ready to be regularly
processed, the Office makes a search among earlier Community Trade-
marks, and prepares a search report for the applicant stating those Com-
munity Trademarks which might constitute an obstacle for the registra-
tion of the new one. At the same time, national offices wishing to do so,
are able to make a search of their national trademarks. The OHIM will
transmit to the applicant, the results of both the Community and na-
tional search reports. Subsequently, the Office will publish the Commu-
nity Trademark application in the Official Gazette, and inform the pro-
prietors of any earlier Community Trademarks cited in the search report,
of the new Community Trademark application so that they are able to
oppose the new application, if they wish to do so.
This notification is not compulsorily made for the registrations lo-
cated through national searches.
V. POTENTIAL DENIAL OR Loss OF A COMMUNITY TRADEMARK
A. Observations and Oppositions
After publication of the application in the Official Gazette, any third
party may file observations, relating absolute grounds for refusal.12 For a
period of three months after publication, any third party may also enter
an opposition to the application on the grounds that the opposer holds
9. EEC Regulation, art. 7.
10. EEC Regulation, art. 8.
11. EEC Regulation, art. 25. If the application is not filed at the OHIM in Alicante but
rather is filed at a national office, the national office will have to send the file to the OHIM
in Alicante within two weeks. If the file is not received at the OHIM in Alicante within one
month after its filing at the National Office, the Application is deemed to be withdrawn
(article 25, section 3).
12. EEC Regulation, art. 41.
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earlier rights on the trademark sought to be registered. 18 The system thus
requires that the holders of existing national rights watch new Commu-
nity Trademark applications for opposition purposes. It is, therefore, very
important for holders of trademarks to establish proper monitoring ser-
vices so they will not miss the opportunity to defend their existing rights.
Whenever oppositions are entered, the Office (OHIM) will transmit
the corresponding opposition briefs to the applicant giving him a set time
for reply and, after the reply, a decision will be made on the application.
The decisions of the Office will be subject to appeal before the Board of
Appeals of the OHIM and the Board's appellate decisions may, in turn,
be brought before the Court of Justice of the European Communities for
a final decision.
If a Community Trademark does not receive any opposition or if the
opposition has been withdrawn or dismissed, the Trademark is registered.
B. Revocation and/or Invalidation
The system also provides for the possibility of applying for the revo-
cation and/or invalidation of a Community Trademark.1 4 The period for
requesting the invalidation on absolute grounds of refusal has no time
limit, while actions on relative grounds, such as prior rights, have a limi-
tation as a consequence of acquiescence"5 . Where the proprietor of a
Community Trademark has acquiesced for a period of five successive
years to the use of a younger Community Trademark in the European
Union, while being aware of such use, he shall no longer be entitled, on
the basis of his earlier trademark, either to apply for a declaration that
the trademark is invalid or to oppose the use of the trademark in respect
of the goods or services for which the trademark has been used, unless the
registration of the Community Trademark was applied for in bad faith.
C. Costs
The system provides 6 that the losing party in opposition, revocation
and invalidation proceedings shall bear all of the costs and fees incurred
by both parties. "Costs" are defined as all expenses essential to the pro-
ceedings, including travel and subsistence, and the remuneration of an
agent, adviser or lawyer, within the time limits and rates set for each cat-
egory, under the conditions provided in the Fees Implementing
Regulations.
13. EEC Regulation, art. 42.
14. EEC Regulation, arts. 50 to 52.
15. EEC Regulation, art. 53.
16. EEC Regulation, art. 81.
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VI. EXHAUSTION OF RIGHTS AND USE REQUIREMENTS
A. Exhaustion of Rights
The Regulation provides for the exhaustion of rights conferred by a
Community Trademark, 17 establishing that the Community Trademark
shall not entitle its proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods
which have been put on the market in any Member State under the
trademark by the proprietor of the same or with his consent.
B. Use Requirements
The Regulation further provides that if a Community Trademark is
not used within five consecutive years, it will be open to cancellation for
lack of use1". This rule is also included in the Directive, so that all the
Member States will have the same obligation as far as the "use require-
ment" is concerned.
There is, however, a main difference between the "use requirement"
for national rights and for the Community Trademark. Statement 9 on
article 15 of the Regulation provides that the Council and the Commis-
sion consider that genuine use in one country of the European Union
qualifies for genuine use in the whole territory of the European Union.
This means that it is not required that a Community Trademark be used
in all of the Member States. This is an important advantage of the Com-
munity Trademark because use in one Member State might be sufficient
to avoid cancellation for lack of use in other European Union countries.
VII. TRADEMARK CONFLICT RESOLUTION
A. Community Trademark Courts
The Regulation provides that member countries shall designate in
their territories a limited number of national courts and tribunals of first
and second instance that will be called "Community Trademark
Courts".19
These Courts will be the only courts entitled to deal with20 :
1) Infringement actions relating to Community Trademarks.
2) Actions for declaration of non-infringement, if permitted by the
national laws.
3) Actions requesting damages under the provisional protection
granted by a Community Trademark application between publica-
tion and registration.
4) Counterclaims for revocation or invalidation of Trademarks. This
17. EEC Regulation, art. 13.
18. EEC Regulation, art. 15.
19. EEC Regulation, art. 91.
20. EEC Regulation, art. 92.
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means that the Community Courts can only deal with revocation
or invalidation actions as a consequence of counterclaims filed by
the defendant of an infringement action. Otherwise, the actions
for revocation or invalidation must be filed with the OHIM in Ali-
cante who will be the only body entitled to deal with these
actions.
B. Jurisdiction
Infringement actions should be filed before the Community Trade-
mark Courts of the country of the defendant or of any country where he'
has an establishment. If the defendant does not have a domicile or an
establishment in a Member State, the action should be filed in the coun-
try of the plaintiff, provided it is a Member State.
If neither the defendant nor the plaintiff have a domicile or an estab-
lishment in a country of the European Union, the action should be filed
with a Community Trademark Court in Spain, where the OHIM is lo-
cated. This means, for example, that a U.S. company wishing to sue a
Japanese company, neither of which are domiciliaries in a Member State,
should file and prosecute the action in a Spanish Community Trademark
Court.
VIII. EFFECTS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COMMUNITY TRADEMARK
The Regulation grants the owner of a Community Trademark the
privilege of: 1) enjoying an exclusive right on the trademark in all the
countries of the Community, 2) preventing other parties not having his
consent from using the trademark in the course of trade,21 and 3) grant-
ing license rights in some or all of the community countries on the trade-
mark for some or all of the goods or services for which it is registered.
The license may be exclusive or non-exclusive. The legal effects of an as-
signment or a license derives only vis-a-vis third parties in all the Mem-
ber States after entry in the register. Nevertheless, they have effect even
before it is so entered, vis-a-vis third parties, who have acquired rights in
the trademark after the date of the assignment or license, but who had
notice of the acts at the date on which the rights were acquired.
A. Unitary Character
As mentioned, the Community Trademark Regulation establishes a
single trademark valid for all the countries of the European Union. The
trademark will be granted by a single organism, the OHIM, and be main-
tained, renewed and revoked at the same time for the full Community.
This Community Trademark shall have a "unitary character" and "equal
effect" for the whole Community, and "shall not be registered, trans-
ferred, surrendered or the subject of a decision revoking the right of the
21. EEC Regulation, arts. 9 to 14.
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proprietor, or declaring it invalid, nor shall its use be prohibited,"2 2 ex-
cept for the whole Community.
Article 106 of the EEC Regulation allows for a related exception.
Under this Article, the owner of a national trademark in one European
country will be allowed to invoke national law to stop the use of a Com-
munity Trademark in his country without the need to request the cancel-
lation of the Community Trademark.
B. Coexistence with National Systems
The Community Trademark will coexist with the existing national
trademarks, as well as with other regional and international trademark
systems, including the International Trademark according to the Madrid
Agreement and the Madrid Protocol. In fact, because of the links between
the Community Trademark and the Madrid Protocol, as soon as all the
Member States ratify the Protocol, it will be possible to designate the
Community Trademark within a Madrid Protocol International
Trademark.
C. Conversion into National Trademarks
At the same time, it will be possible to convert the Community
Trademark application or registration into a set of national trademark
applications or registrations if the Community Trademark cannot be reg-
istered because of the existence of prior rights in some of the Member
States.2 8 Out of respect to the laws of the Member State, these national
trademarks will retain the same date of filing or date of priority as that of
the application for the Community Trademark.
IX. CONCLUSION
With the final approval of the Trademark Directive and Regulation,
the European Union resolved years of problems with trademarks in Eu-
rope. It has made significant progress toward its goal of creating a Com-
munity Trademark to remove internal barriers that might restrict the
free movement of goods and services among the European Community
countries.
Although the system is not yet functional, and must prove itself
under the realities of trademark practice, the holders of trademarks in
the Member States must take note. The Community Trademark system
will be operative in 1996, providing exciting opportunities for foreign and
domestic trade within the European Union.
22. EEC Regulation, art. 1.
23. EEC Regulation, arts. 108 to 110.
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The International Telecommunications
Union: 130 Years of Telecommunications
Regulation
GEORGE A. CODDING, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the oldest in-
ternational organization in the world. In the beginning, it had no proto-
types to emulate and thus was forced to create its own structure and
method of functioning. It thus has been the model on which most other
international organizations have been based.
Over the years, the ITU has modified its structure and operating pro-
cedures to respond to world economic conditions and international polit-
ics. In this role, it continues to lead the way in modeling how smaller, less
developed countries can participate as equals to more developed nations.
Its one-country, one-vote process has helped to define the future
processes of all international organizations. For this reason, a review of
the ITU's history is useful in the study of all modern international
organizations.
II. BACKGROUND
For one hundred and thirty years the International Telecommunica-
tion Union has worked to guarantee that telecommunications are used in
the most efficient manner throughout the world. The four major periods
in the existence of the ITU include: 1) the creation of the International
Telegraph Union in 1865; 2) the merger of the International Telegraph
Union with the semi-official International Radiotelegraph Union in 1934;
3) the reorganization of the ITU at the Atlantic City Plenipotentiary
Conference in 1947; and 4) the reorganization of the ITU at the Nice
Plenipotentiary Conference in 1989, the 1992 Extraordinary Plenipotenti-
ary Conference, and the Kyoto Plenipotentiary Conference in 1994. This
article will examine each of these time periods and highlight the events
that have formed the ITU as it is known today. One of the more interest-
ing aspects of the evolution of the ITU has been the emergence of a de-
veloping country majority and its willingness to use the voting power it
wields at ITU conferences and meetings.
* George Codding is a professor of Political Science, Director of the International Af-
fairs Program for 25 years and member of the Executive Committee of the Interdisciplinary
Telecommunications Program at the University of Colorado. He can be contacted through
the Department of Political Science, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado, 80309.
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III. THE BEGINNING
The ITU was created in 1865 when representatives of twenty Euro-
pean states met in Paris to attempt to organize the European telegraph
network. The 1865 International Telegraph Conference drew up a Con-
vention and a Telegraph Regulation. In addition to creating the Interna-
tional Telegraph Union, the international Morse code was designated the
preferred code for telegrams, the hours for telegraph offices were fixed,
and the French franc was chosen as the monetary unit for the settlement
of international accounts. A system of uniform rates for all member coun-
tries was proposed, but never finalized."
It was also suggested at the conference that the new organization
have a secretariat at the location of the last conference. This would help
plan for future conferences and make general investigations into the
problems of the international telegraph network. This suggestion was ig-
nored for fear that it would place the secretariat under the control of
Napoleon III and France. A secretariat was created at the second Interna-
tional Telegraph Conference in Vienna. It was entrusted to the Swiss and
was placed in Berne, the capitol of neutral Switzerland. Membership in
the International Telegraph Union increased steadily as more and more
countries created their own telegraph networks and connected them to
the European network.
The United States never joined the International Telegraph Union.
This was on the basis that telecommunications in the United States was
carried out by private enterprises and the government had no authority
to regulate these entities.
The telephone, when it was perfected, was not received with the
same enthusiasm as the telegraph. There was a language barrier, espe-
cially in Europe. In addition, the telephone was considered to be a com-
petitor of the telegraph. An English study, for example, found that where
the telephone was introduced, people tended to use the telegraph less. In
the United States it was different. There was no language barrier and the
telephone was less expensive that the telegraph, as an experienced tele-
graph operator received a higher salary than a telephone operator.
The telephone changed the structure and method of operations of
the International Telegraph Union. This process began in 1924 with the
creation of the International Consultative Committee for Long Distance
Telephony,' later known as the International Telegraph Consultative
Committee (CCIF). This committee consisted of a group of individual ex-
perts who exchanged views concerning technical and operational
problems in the international telephone network. The Committee did an
1. Much of the history of the ITU comes from GEORGE A. CODDING, THE INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATION UNION: AN EXPERIMENT IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (1952).
2. Comit6 consultatif international des communications tlkphoniques a grande dis-
tance in French.
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excellent job and, as a result, the Paris Conference of the International
Telegraph Union in 1925 voted to bring this new committee under the
auspices of the International Telegraph Union. This decision gave the In-
ternational Telegraph Union standards-making authority for the first
time.
The 1925 Paris Conference also decided to create a similar organ to
undertake an investigation of the international telegraph network. This
was an effort to bring standardization to the world's telegraph network
and to investigate the many operational questions that existed at the
time. This organ was given the name of the International Telegraph Con-
sultative Committee (CCIT).8
Radio needed immediate regulation because of its ability to generate
harmful interference. In addition, there was the desire to end the Marconi
practice of forbidding Marconi operators to communicate with operators
of other equipment types. This was interfering with the ability to commu-
nicate, one of the primary reasons that radio was an important new
technology.
The regulation of radio came under the auspices of another group of
interested nations, informally called the International Radiotelegraph
Union. Conferences of this group were held in Berlin in 1903 and 1906,
and London in 1912. The major purpose of these conferences was to con-
vince Marconi to allow its operators to communicate with operators using
equipment other than the Marconi type. This was finally accomplished at
the London Conference of 1912. The 1927 Washington Radiotelegraph
Conference also created an International Radio Consultative Committee.
These three consultative committees brought the International Tele-
graph Union and later the International Telecommunication Union into
the mainstream of telecommunication standardization. Although the deci-
sions of these committees were in the form of recommendations and were
not legally binding, the high quality of the recommendations caused the
administrations that made up the International Telegraph Union and the
International Telecommunication Union to adopt them for their national
networks. The CCIF and the CCIT were merged in 1965 to create the
CCITT.4
IV. MERGER TO FORM THE ITU
Because the telegraph, telephone, and radio were all regulated by the
same ministry in most countries, it was not long before pressure built up
to merge these organizations. This was accomplished by holding an Inter-
national Telegraph Conference and an International Radiotelegraph Con-
3. Comite consultatif international des communications tglgraphiques in French, the
official language of the International Telegraph Union. It was also known as the Interna-
tional Telegraph Consultative Committee and given the acronym CCIT.
4. For an account of the merger, see GEORGE A. CODDING & ANTHONY M. RUTKOWSKI,
THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION IN A CHANGING WORLD, 89-90 (1982).
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ference simultaneously in Madrid in 1932. Through the use of joint com-
mittees and plenary meetings a new international organization, the
International Telecommunication Union, was created on January 1, 1934.
The word "telecommunication" was supplied by the French.
The new organization did not have long to carry out its mandate
before World War Two occurred. Technology, especially that of telecom-
munications, is heavily impacted by wars. Many new advances occurred,
such as Loran, Radar, micro-wave communication, and international
broadcasting.
V. 1947 REORGANIZATION OF THE ITU
The first post-war ITU conference, which was held in Atlantic City in
1947, was confronted with a number of important tasks. It was necessary
to bring the new technologies under the auspices of the ITU, and it was
necessary to prepare the ITU for its relationship with the new United
Nations organization. An additional problem was that of radio frequen-
cies. During the war, the victors appropriated the radio frequencies of the
vanquished. Certain countries had continued to register frequency usage
with the ITU secretariat during the conflict, while others did not. The
international frequency list was in a chaotic state.
Among the accomplishments of the Atlantic City conferences was the
rearrangement of the frequency allocation table to reflect the new tech-
nologies and the creation of an Administrative Council to provide liaison
with the new United Nations. The secretariat was moved from Berne,
Switzerland, to Geneva, Switzerland, the home of the European head-
quarters of the United Nations. The United States was able to convince
the delegates to begin the process of creating a new "engineered" interna-
tional frequency list. ("Engineered" was the buzz word of the times.)
This new list would allocate frequencies to all members of the ITU to
satisfy their present and future needs. To keep the new list organized, the
United States suggested the creation of an International Frequency Re-
gistration Board (IFRB). Despite a tremendous amount of effort, the cre-
ation of a new international frequency list proved to be impossible. There
were too many requests for frequencies. India, for instance, thought that
radio would be essential for its future and asked for numerous frequen-
cies for future use. This was the era before computers, so that the records
of frequency use and request were contained on long strips of paper that
at one point were allegedly misplaced. In addition, the Cold War started
about this time, and the USSR refused to cooperate. The International
Frequency Registration Board continued to operate.
In the years between this time, it was agreed to discontinue the crea-
tion of a new "engineered" frequency list, and in the 1980s, the IFRB was
reduced from eleven members to five.
VI. REORGANIZATION IN THE 1980s
A notable change occurred in the membership of the ITU from one
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that was dominated by the developed countries to one in which the vast
majority of members were developing countries. These new countries had
different needs and requirements. Starting about 1965, the developing
countries began a campaign to involve the ITU in development, including
a special ITU fund, a regional presence, and a special ITU organ devoted
to technical assistance. All of this was to be financed from the regular
ITU budget. In general it was desired to place development assistance on
an equal level with the standards-making and radio communications reg-
ulation of the ITU. None of these requests were met at the 1965 Plenipo-
tentiary Conference. About the only decision was to exclude South Africa
from ITU conferences and meetings because of its policy of apartheid.
Little by little, however, the developing countries attained their
goals. The 1973 Malaga-Torremolinos Plenipotentiary Conference created
a development assistance fund from voluntary contributions. The request
for development assistance from the regular budget caused the head of
the U.S. delegation to state that if a regular budget fund was created "the
U.S. would not be able to contribute to it." It was pointed out that "an
allocation from the regular budget would raise very serious problems for
the U.S. Administration." In addition, the delegate warned that "the ac-
tions of many of the developing countries caused many members to doubt
whether it was worthwhile to continue to furnish the union with major
support."6 The voluntary fund did not become a primary source of in-
come for developing countries.
The developing countries were not deterred by the U.S. warning and
made a new effort to achieve their goals at the next plenipotentiary con-
ference in 1982 in Nairobi. Not only were the developing countries better
prepared, but their cause was reinforced by the fact that the conference
was being held in a developing country. All of the 1965 Montreux propos-
als were put forward again at Nairobi.
The developed countries defeated a proposal to create a telecommu-
nications technical assistance fund financed through the regular ITU
budget. Instead, it was agreed to create a new voluntary fund to replace
the old voluntary fund, which received little financial support from ITU
members. The new fund, which was to be called the Special Voluntary
Program for Technical Cooperation, was to be financed through "contri-
butions in currency, training services, or in any other form to meet as
much of the telecommunication needs of developing countries as
possible."'
5. See OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE UNITED
STATES DELEGATION TO THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOM-
MUNICATION UNION, MALAGA-TORREMOLINOS, SPAIN, SEPTEMBER 14 - OCTOBER 25, 1973, 43
(1973).
6. Id. at 9.
7. See International Telecommunication Union, International Telecommunication Con-
vention, 1982, Res. No. 19. This text can be found at: Nov. 6, 1982, S. TREATY DOC. NO.
99-6, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 252 (1985), microformed on CIS No. 85-S385-6 (Congressional
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Only the request for an ITU regional presence achieved a partial de-
gree of acceptance at Nairobi. The conference hesitantly agreed to re-
quest that the Secretary-General "carry out the necessary cost/benefit
and organizational studies with the objective of achieving a strengthened
regional presence which will be as economical as possible and at the same
time improve the effectiveness of the Union's activities. ..
The developing countries achieved two important victories at Nai-
robi, one primarily symbolic and the other practical. The symbolic victory
was the decision of the conference to make the first paragraph in the ITU
Convention to read; "to maintain and extend international cooperation
between all Members of the Union for the improvement and rational use
of telecommunications of all kinds as well as to promote and to offer tech-
nical assistance to developing countries in the field of telecommunica-
tions." The practical victory was the listing of more than a dozen devel-
opment assistance activities that could be financed from the regular ITU
budget.
The decision of the Nairobi Plenipotentiary that received the most
attention, however, was the one to create an International Commission
for World-Wide Telecommunications Development. This was comprised
of individuals "of the highest international reputation" to examine the
entire issue of existing and future technical cooperation and to recom-
mend methods for stimulating telecommunications development in the
developing world.10
The Commission issued a report, "The Missing Link," in December
1984. The Commission came to the conclusion that good telecommunica-
tion systems are essential in modern society.
Our study of the role that (telecommunications) can play has per-
suaded us that telecommunications can increase the efficiency of eco-
nomic, commercial and administrative activities, improve the effec-
tiveness of social and emergency services, and distribute the social,
cultural and economic benefits of the process of development more
equitable throughout a community and a nation."'
However, in a majority of developing countries the telecommunica-
tions systems are inadequate to sustain essential services. In many areas,
there is no system at all. "Neither in the name of common humanity nor
on grounds of common interest," states the report, "is such a disparity
acceptable." 12 To bring the developing world up to the standards set by
Info. Serv.). For an account of the funds contributed to the 1972 and 1982 funds, see George
A. Codding, Jr., Financing Development Assistance in the ITU, 13 TELECOMMUNICATION
POL'Y 22 (1989).
8. Id. at Res. No. 26.
9. Id. at ch. I, art. 4, 1.
10. Id. at Res. No. 20.
11. REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION FOR WORLD-WIDE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, THE MISSING LINK 10-12 (1984).
12. Id. at 3.
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the Commission would require a total investment of US $12 billion a
year.18
Development assistance had received a great deal of publicity as a
result of the Maitland Report. In the months prior to the 1989 Plenipo-
tentiary Conference in Nice, Secretary-General Richard Butler made a
number of speeches concerning the need to reorganize the ITU in order to
meet the needs of the future. He also commissioned a study of the chang-
ing telecommunications environment and its impact on the ITU to be
conducted by a group of experts chosen by the Secretary-General. This
report was distributed widely and was made an official document of the
1989 plenipotentiary conference."'
The developing country majority was well prepared for the plenipo-
tentiary, having held a series of meetings prior to and during the confer-
ence. Ethiopia proposed the creation of a new organ in the ITU structure,
a Telecommunication Development Bureau, which would be devoted to
development assistance and would be financed from the regular ITU
budget. Development assistance, according to the Ethiopian delegate, was
one of the three major functions of the ITU, but had never been given the
status that had been given to standardization and radio regulation."5 The
proposal was immediately opposed by the developed countries. However,
this issue was so important to the developing countries that it almost
brought the conference to a complete halt.
The stalemate was ended when the chairman of the conference sub-
mitted a compromise on June 22, eight days before the conference was to
end, that he had worked out with representatives of both sides."6 The
four interrelated parts of the compromise were as follows:
1. The new Telecommunication Development Bureau would be cre-
ated immediately. The Bureau would take over the Technical Coopera-
tion Department of the General Secretariat and would have an initial
budget of 15 million Swiss francs, which would increase in five years to
22.5 million Swiss francs.
2. The Nice Plenipotentiary would not make any additional changes
to the structure of the ITU.
3. A high level committee would be formed to study the structure
and operation of the permanent organs of the ITU. If necessary, a special
13. Id. at 57.
14. See INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, THE CHANGING TELECOMMUNICA-
TION ENVIRONMENT: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE ITU (1989).
15. See INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE,
Doc. 66-E, 2 (1989).
16. The compromise, which became Document 388 of the Conference, had the support
of ninety countries including France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Scandina-
vian countries. The United States, United Kingdom, the USSR, and Japan remained op-
posed. See OFFICE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE UNITED
STATES DELEGATION TO THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOM-
MUNICATION UNION, NICE, FRANCE, MAY 23-JUNE 30, 1989, 4 (1990).
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conference would be held to consider changes suggested by this
committee.
4. The Nice Plenipotentiary would be permitted to complete the re-
mainder of its work, including the election of the directors of the Interna-
tional Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) and CCITT along with the
members of the IFRB, which had been postponed pending a decision on
the Telecommunications Development Bureau.
A new committee was formed, which became known as the High
Level Committee, and made its report on April 26, 1991.1' In this report
the committee recommended that the ITU's functions be grouped under
three sectors; a Standardization Sector, a Radiocommunications Sector,
and a Development Sector.
The IFRB would be replaced by a part-time board that would meet only
as needed. All three sectors would work through regional and world-wide
conferences, study and work groups, an elected director, and a specialized
secretariat.
The extent of the recommendations of the High Level Committee
persuaded the ITU Administrative Council to schedule an additional
plenipotentiary conference. This was to be held in Geneva in December
1992 to make the necessary changes in the ITU's basic documents.
The 1992 Geneva Additional Plenipotentiary Conference was held in
the record time of only two weeks and restructured the ITU along the
lines suggested by the High Level Committee. 8
A. The Radiocommunication Sector
The new Radiocommunication Sector was given the responsibility of
"ensuring the rational, equitable, efficient and economical use of the ra-
dio-frequency spectrum by all radio services, including those using the
geostationary-satellite orbit. . ." and "carrying out studies without limit
of frequency range and adopting recommendations on radiocommunica-
tion matters."' 9
The Radiocommunication Sector was to carry out its functions by
means of a world and regional radiocommunication conference, a part-
time Radio Regulations Board, radiocommunication assemblies, radi-
ocommunication study groups and a Radiocommunication Bureau headed
by an elected director.
17. See INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, HIGH LEVEL COMMITTEE TO REvIEw
THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE ITU, TOMMORROW'S ITU: THE CHALLENGES OF
CHANGE, ITU Doc. No. 145-E (1991).
18. See Figure 1.
19. INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, FINAL ACTS OF THE ADDITIONAL PLENI-
POTENTIARY CONFERENCE 11 (1992).
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B. The Telecommunication Standardization Sector
The Telecommunication Standardization Sector was assigned the re-
sponsibility of "studying technical, operating and tariff questions with a
view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis. 2
0
The Telecommunication Standardization Sector carries out its func-
tions by means of world telecommunication standardization conferences,
telecommunication standardization study groups and a Telecommunica-
tion Standardization Bureau headed by an elected director.
C. The Telecommunication Development Sector
The Telecommunication Development Sector has the responsibility
of discharging the Union's responsibility as an executing agency for
projects under the United Nations development system and "offering, or-
ganizing and coordinating technical cooperation and assistance
activities. '
The Telecommunication Development Sector carries out its responsi-
bilities by means of world and regional telecommunication development
conferences, telecommunications development study groups and a Tele-
communication Development Bureau headed by an elected director.
The Additional Plenipotentiary Conference also created advisory
groups for all three sectors made up of representatives of recognized oper-
ating agencies, scientific and industrial organizations, and other inter-
ested parties. The Secretary-General was also provided with a World
Telecommunications Advisory Council, made up of the chief executive of-
ficers of various telecommunication entities.
VII. THE 1994 KYOTO PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE
The last stage in the reorganization of the ITU came at the 1994
Kyoto Plenipotentiary Conference. Probably the most important decision
was the creation of a strategic plan for the period between 1995-1999.22
This plan provided many provisions for the future.
The first was the increased participation of the private sector. The
strategic plan recognizes the changing nature of the telecommunication
administrations in many countries. Although the ITU is an intergovern-
mental organization, and its members wish it to remain so, "great advan-
tage" can be derived from the increased participation of the private
sector.
The ITU's role as an international organization and the achievement
of its purposes as set out in the Constitution fundamentally depend
20. Id. at 15.
21. Id. at 17.
22. See INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, FINAL ACTS OF THE ADDITIONAL
PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE 49-68 (1994).
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on the enhanced participation of non-administration entities and or-
ganizations. This in turn requires continued consultation with indus-
try participants to ensure that their contributions are rewarded by ef-
fective results. The need to enhance the ITU's character as a
partnership between the public and private sectors is therefore a fun-
damental strategic premise. 13
The second item is the recognition of telecommunications as
an important element in the world economy.
This may require adaptation of the Union's traditional strengths. In
phrticular the interplay between activities of the ITU and the WTO
(World Trade Organization) on telecommunication matters will have
to be considered. Some adjustments in jurisdiction or procedures may
ultimately be necessary. The Union should establish immediately ef-
fective liaison with the WTO to identify issues at an early stage and
avoid duplication or inconsistent activities. More generally, to main-
tain ITU's claim to global technical pre-eminence in matters relating
to telecommunications, the Union should continue to keep pace with
developments in the areas of telecommunication policy, law, regula-
tion and trade.2"
The next provision is to increase alliances with other international
organizations with an interest in telecommunications.
Strategic alliances should be developed with other international and
regional organizations which have an important influence on the de-
velopment of telecommunications. At the international level, coopera-
tion with the new WTO, OECD, the World Bank and UNESCO
should be priorities. At the regional level, telecommunication stand-
ardization, development and financial organizations are of increasing
importance.2 5
The last provision is for the better use of information resources.
There is a huge and growing demand for information about telecom-
munications. By capitalizing on the technical information available
through its radiocommunication, standardization, and development
study groups, the data collected by the Standardization and Develop-
ment Sectors, and the telecommunication indicators programme, the
ITU could respond to this demand and increase revenues from its
publications Programme. In developing an ITU information resource
strategy along these lines, the terms and conditions under which
members should obtain access to ITU information resources must be
carefully considered, and care taken to avoid policies which would cre-
ate incentives for companies simply to purchase ITU information
products and services instead of becoming Sector members."
23. Id. at 54.
24. Id. at 53.
25. Id. at 56.
26. Id. at 56.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
As the oldest international organization, the International Telecom-
munication Union has had an interesting and tumultuous history. It has
survived two world wars, a cold war, and at least one major depression.
With the beginning of the privatization of telecommunication minis-
tries in the 1980s it became apparent that the ITU was in serious need of
revision. The ITU accepted the challenge and went to work to revise its
structure and methods of operation to meet the needs of the changing
times. The Nice Plenipotentiary of 1989, the Additional Plenipotentiary
of 1992, and the Kyoto Plenipotentiary of 1994 were all parts of this pro-
cess. As a result of these conferences, the developing country majority has
achieved all that they have demanded. It is also now obvious that the
developing countries have the power to continue to reshape the ITU as it
wishes in the future.
From a general perspective, it looks as though the ITU has been suc-
cessful. Whether it will actually meet the needs of its member states will
only be known in time. If deficiencies are discovered; they can and will be
addressed at the next plenipotentiary conference scheduled for 1999.
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A Competitive Framework for Pricing
Interconnection in a Global
Telecommunications Market
MARK A. JAMISON*
In the late 1960s, managers of Ford Motor Company met in California
to watch Ford employees disassemble and reassemble a Toyota truck
- twice. The managers were speechless. American auto makers al-
ways needed rubber mallets to assemble their own cars and trucks be-
cause the parts did not fit. The Ford employees did not once need a
mallet for the Toyota. The managers looked silently at the truck until
the division general manager cleared his throat and said, "The cus-
tomer will never notice." Everyone excitedly nodded assent and left.'
This was a defining event in the decline of the U.S. automobile in-
dustry. Faced with global change in the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. auto-
mobile industry turned inward and continued its traditions of big cars,
poor quality, high prices, and incremental change even though these tra-
ditions no longer matched reality.
These mistakes provide lessons for the telecommunications industry2
and its regulators. In many instances, telecommunications providers and
regulators are holding to traditions of market control, conventional ser-
vices and networks, prices based on cost recovery,3 and incremental
change. These traditions treat competition as the exception and monop-
oly as the norm. As a result, most regulatory issues are about how to regu-
late a monopoly that happens to have some competition, instead of how
to treat a competitive service provider that happens to have a monopoly
in some markets.
* Manager, Regulatory Policy and Coordination, Sprint Communications L.P. Portions
of this paper are adapted from M. Jamison, Impacts of Access Policies on Interexchange
Competition, presentation at the 25th Annual Conference of the Michigan State University
Institute of Public Utilities (December 13, 1993) (available from author). The author would
like to thank Richard Go, Mark Sievers, Peter Stapp, and J. Manning Lee for their helpful
suggestions and information. The author would also like to thank Carol Weinhaus, Sandra
Makeeff, and Dan Harris for numerous discussions on competitive and pricing issues. The
opinions expressed are those of the author. The author is responsible for all errors and
omissions.
1. D. KEARNS & D. NADLER, PROPHETS IN THE DARK 81-2 (1992). This rendition also
appeared in Changes in Technology, paper distributed at the National Association of Regu-
latory Utility Commissioners' Keystone Communications Policy Conference (May 26-28,
1993).
2. From a global perspective, the "telecommunications industry" includes private com-
panies and government owned telecommunications providers.
3. Prices are based on "cost recovery" when prices are designed to cover a service pro-
vider's accounting costs. This is the traditional pricing model in the U.S.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Treating competition as the norm will be necessary to allow rivalry
and diversity between service providers to build an advanced infrastruc-
ture and new services. Experience has taught us that competition results
in lower costs and in innovations that customers want. Competition is
essential for implementing significant technological changes because it is
difficult for institutions to make fundamental changes to themselves.
4
Also, telecommunications is becoming a commodity to be used by infor-
mation services coming from the publishing, computer, and broadcasting
industries.5 Trying to control information markets by controlling telecom-
munications markets may result in telecommunications playing only a mi-
nor role.
Structural changes in industry and public policy are necessary for
changing the industry paradigms.' The U.S. has used stringent line-of-
business restrictions, such as those in the Modification of Final Judge-
ment (MFJ),' to ensure fair and equal interconnection and access pay-
ments' for competitors. Since 1984, the divested Bell Operating Compa-
nies (BOCs) have had little incentive to favor their former parent, AT&T,
over its interexchange carrier (IXC) rivals. Other countries are using
privatization and liberalization to shift paradigms.
This paper discusses implications of adopting a competitive para-
digm to one public policy issue - prices for interconnection." It refers to
these prices as access charges. Competition has significant implications
for traditional telecommunications pricing because, typically, pricing
problems have been addressed through reallocation of costs - simply
moving money from one place to another. This practice is in conflict with
competition. Cost reallocation results in costs being allocated away from
competitive markets and to noncompetitive services. Implicit in this is
4. Bailey, Price and Productivity Change Following Deregulation: The US Experience,
96 ECON. J. 1, 13-16 (1986); Kamien & Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation: A Sur-
vey, 12 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 33 (1975); Winston, Economic Deregulation: Days of Reck-
oning for Microeconomists, 31 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1263, 1274 (1993). A related point is
that rapid technological change decreases the desirability of large firms because economies
of scale become less important. See Winston, supra note 4, at 1267.
5. C. WEINHAUS, T. MONROE, ET. AL., THE INFORMATION STUDIO 9-11 (1995).
6. N. TICHY & S. SHERMAN, CONTROL YOUR DESTINY OR SOMEONE ELSE WILL 303 (1993).
For a discussion of utility regulatory reform efforts. see Trebing, Public Control of Enter-
prise: Neoclassical Assault and Neoinstitutional Reform 18 J. EcON. ISSUES 364 (1984).
7. United States v. Western Electric Company, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 1336, 1353-7 (D. D.C.
1981) [hereinafter MFJ].
8. "Access" is the U.S. term for interconnection service provided by local telecommuni-
cations carriers to other carriers for completing calls. The prices for this service are called
access charges. Interexchange carriers are the primary customers for access. Traditional lo-
cal exchange carriers are the primary providers of access. This traditional U.S. definition of
access is too restrictive for this paper. For purposes of this analysis, access is the service
provided by any local carrier to other carriers for completing calls or other telecommunica-
tions transmissions.
9. For a general discussion of public policy changes necessary to match the new market
realities, see C. WEINHAUS, T. RALSTON, ET. AL., BREAKING THE MOLD: CHANGING POLICIES TO
MEET CUSTOMER NEEDS (1993).
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that regulated companies do not risk loss as a result of competition -
i.e., they are made whole. This is inconsistent with the profit and loss
mechanisms necessary for effective competition.1"
This paper describes markets and policies in several countries and
draws policy conclusions. The U.S. situation is analyzed in detail. The
first section of this paper describes the current market structures. The
second section describes existing price structures, with particular empha-
sis on the U.S. This section also explains how existing price structures
affect competition. The third section proposes a general structure for ac-
cess pricing that is more consistent with competitive market structures
than are the existing structures. The last section is the conclusion.
I. THE MARKET STRUCTURES FOR INTERCONNECTION
This section describes the market structure for interconnection. Mar-
ket structure refers to the types of companies involved in a market, in-
cluding their sizes, influence, and interactions.
Monopoly is the traditional market structure for local telephone net-
works. Even today, most countries restrict competition in local telecom-
munications. Where competition is allowed, it has only recently been au-
thorized and competitive inroads are modest. As a result, new entrants
seeking interconnection are generally faced with the problem of seeking
interconnection with an incumbent monopoly.
Most countries in Europe still have monopolies for telephone service,
but the trend is to open these markets. The European Union adopted a
directive that all domestic markets are to be opened by 1998. There are
exceptions. Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland were given an extra five
years to prepare their traditional telephone monopolies for competition.
Belgium and Luxembourg were given two extra years."
The most notable exception to monopolies in Europe is the United
Kingdom (U.K.). The U.K. opened its domestic markets to competition in
1984. At that time, British Telecom (BT) was privatized and a duopoly
market structure was established. The competitor, Mercury Communica-
tions LTD, began operations in 1986. Mercury is owned by Cable & Wire-
less. The duopoly structure did not result in much competition for BT, so
in 1991 the U.K. decided to open markets to more competitors. Today BT
faces competition from at least 50 companies, including U.S. companies,
cable television companies, and electric utilities. Still, BT continues to
dominate the U.K. market - BT's U.K. revenues are nine times larger
than Cable & Wireless's (BT's nearest competitor) revenues in all of
10. See, e.g., C. WEINHAUS, M. JAMISON, ET. AL., NEW WINE AND OLD WINESKINS: MODEL-
ING EFFECTS OF COMPETITION AND EXPANDED INTERCONNECTION IN THE LOCAL EXCHANGE 30
(1992).
11. THE YANKEE GROUP, EUROPEAN INFRASTRUCTURE COMPETITION: THE FINAL FRONTIER
ES-1 (1995).
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Europe. 12
New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and Japan are other countries that
have opened their telecommunications markets to competition. New Zea-
land began its deregulation process in 1987, but the incumbent carrier,
Telecom, still dominates the market. s Clear, Telecom's primary competi-
tor, began operations in 1991 and gained an 18% market share in toll by
the middle of 1993. Clear's and other competitors' entry into local mar-
kets has been slowed by negotiations with Telecom over local intercon-
nection. "' In November 1991, Australia opened its markets for a second
carrier, Optus Communications, to compete with the recently privatized
incumbent, Telecom Australia or Telstra. A third carrier, Vodafone,
started providing mobile services in September 1993. Canada opened its
long distance markets to competition in 1992, but initially limited entry
to only one competitor, Unitel. Japan's telecommunications markets have
been open to competition for several years, but the incumbent carrier,
NTT, still dominates the market."6
U.S. local exchange companies (LECs) also continue to dominate
their local markets even though there are other network providers. Prov-
iders of two-way communications in U.S. local markets include LECs,
competitive access providers (CAPs), and cellular companies. CAPs pro-
vide local fiber optic networks in competition with LECs, although some
CAPs are beginning to install local exchange switches.' The total size of
all local markets in the U.S. in 1993 was $93 billion. 7 LEC local wireline s
revenues were $81.9 billion, all cellular company revenues were $10.8 bil-
lion, and CAP revenues were $350 million.'9
Wireless services and wireline services form separate markets, 0
meaning that customers do not see them as substitutes. LECs have a
12. ELSEVIER ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, PROFILE OF THE WORLDWIDE TELECOMMUNICA-
TIONS INDUSTRY TO 1997 100-104 (3rd ed. 1994);THE YANKEE GROUP, supra note 1.
13. ELSEVIER ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, supra note 12, at 109-10; M. MUELLER, ON THE
FRONTIER OF DEREGULATION: NEW ZEALAND TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF IN-
TERCONNECTING COMPETING NETWORKS 11 (1994).
14. MUELLER, supra note 13, at 13-18; Blanchard, Telecommunications Regulation in
New Zealand, 19 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL. 465-7 (1995).
15. ELSEVIER ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, supra note 12, at 73, 104-5, 108-10.
16. MULTICHANNEL NEWS, ALT. ACCESS INDUSTRY CAPS OFF STRONG YEAR 1 (1994).
17. All currency references to U.S. industry are in U.S. dollars.
18. "Wireline" refers to telecommunications services provided over networks consisting
of fiber optics, copper, coaxial, and microwave facilities. These are also called landline.
"Wireless" refers to radio-based services such as cellular and paging.
19. UNITED STATES TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION, 1994 STATISTICS OF THE LOCAL EXCHANGE
CARRIERS FOR THE YEAR 1993 9 (1994); NORTHERN BUSINESS INFORMATION, CELLULAR SER-
VICES REPORT 1994/1995 Exhibit 3-12a (1995); Multichannel News, supra note 16, at 1.
These revenues are not adjusted for CAP access payments to LECs. CAPs pay access
charges to LECs when CAPs connect to LEC networks and when CAPs put traffic on LEC
networks. These access charges are generally significant compared to CAP revenues.
20. Affidavit of Jerry A. Hausman on behalf of the Regional Bell Operating Companies
at 3; MFJ, 525 F. Supp. at 1336.
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strong position in wireless markets where LEC-affiliated cellular compa-
nies accounted for $5.5 billion, or 52%, of cellular revenues in 1993.21
Their largest competitor, AT&T, accounted for 15% of the market.22
LECs had 99.6% of the local wireline market. CAPs had the rest of this
market. For all local markets, LECs had $87.5 billion (combined wireline
and wireless), or a 94% market share. Non-LEC cellular companies had
between 5% and 6% of the combined markets, and CAPs had less than
1%. 23
U.S. LECs also dominant their access markets.24 IXCs are the largest
customers of access. IXCs paid large LECs approximately $20 billion for
access services in 1993.25 CAPs are the primary competitors of large LECs
in this market and had revenues of only $350 million in 1993. "
Market share is only one factor in market dominance. Other factors
include barriers to entry and exit, customer costs for changing suppliers,
21. Personal Communications Services, or PCS, is another form of wireless service. PCS
is like cellular, but has a different place in the radio spectrum and PCS licenses are granted
through auctions. PCS license auctions in the U.S. were completed in March 1995. The
largest winners in the auction were the Sprint-Cable venture, AT&T, PCS Primeco L.P.,
and Pacific Telesis. The Sprint-Cable venture licenses cover 182.4 million people. AT&T's
licenses cover 107.1 million people, PCS Primeco L.P.'s licenses cover 57.2 million people,
and Pacific Telesis's licenses cover 31.0 million. The Sprint-Cable venture includes Sprint,
TeleCommunications Inc., Comcast Corporation, and Cox Communications. PCS Primeco
L.P. includes Nynex, Bell Atlantic, Air Touch Communications (the former Pacific Telesis
cellular company), and U.S. West. On average, purchasers of PCS licenses paid $15.54 per
person for the licenses. These companies are now in the process of building their PCS
networks.
22. This includes all BOC-affiliated cellular companies and GTE. Pacific Telesis's
divested cellular operations are not included even though this new company operates in
alliance with other BOC cellular companies. Sprint's cellular company is also excluded be-
cause Sprint's IXC operations are comparable in size to Sprint's LEC operations. Also,
Sprint is spinning off its cellular operations.
23. These revenue figures include cellular long distance revenues. Except in cases when
cable television companies also own CAPs, cable television companies are not included in
these numbers because they are only beginning to provide two-way communications. Cellu-
lar revenues are not adjusted for access payments to LECs. These payments are generally
small compared to cellular revenues.
24. Access markets are not independent of other local markets. Access is simply one
type of transmission on a local network that provides numerous other services, including
local exchange service. As a result, competition in access markets is necessarily tied to com-
petition for local networks in general.
25. Large LECs received $20.9 billion in access revenues in 1993. Large LECs are LECs
that have more than $100,000,000 in annual revenues. 47 C.F.R. § 32.11(a)(1) (1994). Large
LECs also paid $1.3 billion in access expenses in 1993, primarily to smaller LECs. FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 1993/1994 STATISTICS OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMON CARRIERS
31, 35, 39 (1993).
26. The other competitors in this market are primarily the IXCs themselves. IXCs may
use their own facilities or customer-provided facilities to avoid using LEC access services.
Public data are not available on the extent of IXC-provided and customer-provided access;
however, the amount should be smaller than CAP-provided access because CAPs should
have scale economies that stand-alone IXC-provided and customer-provided access would
not have.
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and control of essential or bottleneck facilities. Indeed, these market
share data may overstate LECs' future market power because in 1993
very few states allowed CAPs and others to compete with LECs. This is
changing. Once legal, technological, and economic barriers to entry are
removed, LECs should lose some of their control over local markets. This
expectation is reflected in projections that CAP revenues will grow sub-
stantially in the next few years. Consultant estimates vary greatly, but
put future CAP revenues in the range of $1 billion by 1996 to $10 billion
by 1999.s"
II. ACCESS PRICES AND COMPETITION
This section describes problems with existing telecommunications
pricing. The U.S. access price structures and pricing subsidies are de-
scribed in detail. Next, this section explains how these U.S. prices are
inconsistent with competitive markets. Lastly, this section describes how
these pricing problems also exist in other countries.
A. U.S. Price Structures for Access
The U.S. price structures for access vary depending on the type of
service and the type of customer. There are two types of access -
switched access and dedicated access. Switched access applies to calls
that go through a LEC local switch." Dedicated access is a dedicated line
between the customer and the carrier.
Access is paid by IXCs, cellular carriers, enhanced service providers
(ESPs)29 and potentially by new competitors in the local exchange. LECs
may also pay access for long distance services that they provide. The ac-
cess charges for these types of access customers are:
1. IXCs.
IXCs pay access charges to LECs on both ends of long distance
calls 0 - on the originating end of the call if the customer placing
the call uses a LEC network (e.g., a local telephone line), and on
the terminating end of the call if the customer receiving the call
receives it via a LEC network.
2. Cellular.
Cellular carriers pay access charges only when they send calls (i.e.,
terminate calls) into a LEC network. Cellular carriers do not origi-
27. THE YANKEE GROUP, A CAP MARKET UPDATE: No FUTURE FOR THE INDEPENDENTS?
61 (1993); MULTICHANNEL NEWS, supra note 16, at 1.
28. A local switch is used to connect customers together for local calls, and to connect
customers to long distance networks to place and receive long distance calls.
29. ESPs are companies that provide information services, primarily over data
networks.
30. The calls may be local calls in some instances, but customers would generally be
charged long distance prices for these local calls.
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nate calls on LEC networks.
3. ESPs.
ESPs are treated like business local service customers. ESPs pay
the same prices for interconnection that normal business custom-
ers pay.
4. New local competitors.
Charges paid by new competitors in local exchanges are still in the
developmental stage. Some companies propose that new local ex-
change carriers be treated like existing LECs which generally do
not charge each other for exchanging traffic." This is called a biil-
and-keep arrangement. Some traditional LECs propose that new
local exchange carriers pay existing IXC access prices. Others pro-
pose that lower prices be used. It is too early in the process to
determine how U.S. regulators will ultimately resolve these issues.
5. LECs.
In some instances, a LEC may also pay access to other LECs when
the LEC is acting as a long distance carrier. Generally, the LEC
long distance carrier pays the same prices as IXCs, but there are
exceptions. In some instances, the LEC will simply share its long
distance revenues with other LECs instead of paying access
charges. This arrangement is called a toll pool. In arrangements
called extended area service, calls that would otherwise be long
distance calls are treated as local exchange calls. With extended
area service, the LECs generally do not charge their customers
long distance prices, and the LECs do not charge each other for
completing the calls. In other instances, the LEC long distance
carrier may develop a contract with other LECs that give the LEC
long distance carrier special prices for access services.
IXCs pay the highest switched access prices. IXCs pay LECs for
processing calls through the LECs' local switches (called Local Switch-
ing), for carrying calls from the local switch to the IXCs' networks (called
Local Transport), and for allowing use of the lines that connect customers
to LEC local switches (called Carrier Common Line Charge or CCLC).32
31. See, e.g., G. BROCK, THE ECONOMICS OF INTERCONNECTION (April 1995).
32. The CCLC is the largest component of access, approximately $6.6 billion to $7.1
billion annually nationwide, including Long Term Support (LTS). (LTS is an amount col-
lected by some large LECs through their CCLCs, and transferred to some small LECs. LTS
is approximately $323 million annually.) The next largest component is the Residual Inter-
connection Charge (RIC), which is estimated to be approximately $3.8 billion annually if
implemented by all jurisdictions. The RIC resulted from an allocation of costs away from
LEC Local Transport markets that are becoming competitive. Together, the CCLC and the
RIC make up approximately 45% of all access charges collected by LECs. Amounts are from
M. SiEvERs, ACCESS SUBSIDIES, LONG DISTANCE COMPETITION AND THE ELIMINATION OF THE
INTERLATA RESTRICTION 10 (February 23, 1994); Comments of the United Telephone Asso-
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The prices for IXC switched access are generally regulated and contained
in LEC tariffs on file with regulatory commissions. Cellular carriers do
not pay CCLC. In addition, access prices charged to cellular carriers are
generally kept in contracts rather than tariffs.
Access prices are generally marked up far above the cost of providing
access. According to a study sponsored by the United States Telephone
Association, the costs to LECs for providing IXC access services is ap-
proximately $0.026 per minute. LEC revenues from IXC access services
are approximately $0.1053 per minute.38 This means the mark-up in these
access prices is approximately 300%.
Tables 1 and 2 summarize access price structures. Table 1 describes
which kinds of carriers pay access to other carriers. The column on the
left lists retail service providers. Retail service providers are carriers that
are providing service directly to the retail customers. The other three col-
umns show who retail providers pay for access. For example, Table 1
shows that IXCs pay access to traditional LECs, pay no access to cellular
carriers, and generally pay access to new local carriers.
Table 1. Who Pays Who for Access Services in the U.S.
Receiving Carriers: Wholesale Network Providers
Paying Carriers:
Retail Service
Providers Traditional LEC Cellular New Local Carrier
IXC Yes No Yes'
Traditional LEC -
Local No No Too early to tell
Traditional LEC -
Long Distance Traditional LEC Cellular New Local Carrier
Traditional LEC -
Extended Area Serv. No No Too early to tell
New LEC Varies No Too early to tell
ESP Yes N/A Too early to tell
Cellular Yes No Too early to tell
ciation, In the Matter of Amendments to Part 36 of the Commission's Rules and Establish-
ment of a Joint Board, CC Docket No. 80-286, Notice of Inquiry, Attachment 1 (October 28,
1994). Rules can be found in 47 C.F.R. §§ 69.108, 69.111, 69.124, 69.501, 69.603, 69.612
(1994).
33. C. MONSON & J. ROHLFS, THE $20 BILLION IMPACT OF LOCAL COMPETITION IN TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS app. 2 (1993).
34 This is true for CAPs. It is too early to tell what the pattern will be for new local
service competitors.
VOL. 23:3
1995 GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS PRICING
Table 2 outlines the kinds of prices carriers pay to LECs for access
services and when these prices are paid. The first column lists paying car-
riers. The paying carrier is the retail service provider. The next two col-
umns show which access prices are paid. The middle column indicates
that some prices are tariffed. The column on the right indicates that some
prices are under contract, which means that prices may vary among cus-
tomers. Table 2 also differentiates between prices paid for originating
calls and terminating calls. The top portion of Table two shows payments
for calls that originate in LEC networks. The bottom portion shows pay-
ments for calls that terminate in LEC networks. If calls both originate
and terminate in LEC networks, both payments are made.
Table 2. Who Pays What for LEC Access Services in the U.S.
Paying Carriers: Retails Service Prices Paid to LECs
Providers Tariffed Contract
FOR ORGINATING CAuLs
IXC CCLC, LS, LT Rare
Cellular NA (See Note 1) NA (See Note 1)
New LEC Varies(See Note 2) Varies (See Note 2)
ESP Local service N/A
Traditional LEC for
long distance Generally CCLS, LS, LT Sometimes (See Note 3)
local No charge No charge
extended area service No charge No charge
FoR TmMINATINO CaLs
IXC CCLC, LS, LT Rare
Cellular Rare LS, LT
New LEC Varies (See Note 2) Varies (See Note 2)
ESP Local service N/A
Traditional LEC for.
long distance Generally CCLC, LS, LT Sometimes (See Note 3)
local No charge No charge
extended area service No charge No charge
Acronyms:
CCLC Carrier Common Line Charge. Charged for use of lines that connect customers to LEC local
switches.
LS Local Switching. Charged for processing calls through LECs' local switches.
LT Local Transport. Charged for carrying calls from an LEC's local switch to the IXC's network.
Notes:
1. All cellular retail services originate on cellular networks.
2. Access arrangements vary for new LECs vary. Sometimes they are treated like traditional LECs,
and there are no charges. This is called bill and keep. At other times, special prices are developed
either through negotiation or by tariff. Some LECs propose to charge IXC access prices to new
LECs.
3. Some LEC long distance carriers share toll revenues with LECs instead of paying access. Sometimes
LEC long distance carriers negotaite access prices with other LECs.
Access prices vary with regulatory jurisdiction. Calls that originate
and terminate in the same state are called intrastate calls. State public
utility commissions regulate the access prices for intrastate calls, and
prices vary from state to state. Calls that cross state boundaries are called
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interstate. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates ac-
cess prices for interstate calls.8 5 ESPs are the exception to this arrange-
ment. The FCC allows ESPs to purchase state local exchange service and
use that service to originate and terminate interstate calls.
B. Subsidies in the U.S. System
The current U.S. regulatory pricing system is based on cost allocation
and cost recovery: LECs record their costs according to regulatory ac-
counting rules, allocate these costs among services and jurisdictions, and
then recover the costs through prices.3 6
This cost allocation system contains numerous subsidies or support
mechanisms that are often associated with universal service. 7 Many of
the mechanisms are explicit and can be quantified. Others, such as charg-
ing averaged prices to both high cost and low cost customers, are more
nebulous.
Almost all of the explicit subsidies are funded by prices for access
services. There are three basic types of explicit subsidies:"
1. Credits to customer bills
Federal and state Lifeline Assistance programs provide approxi-
mately $165 million annually to LEC low income customers.
2. Payments to targeted LECs
Approximately $984 million in subsidies are targeted to small
LECs and high-cost LECs annually.
3. Untargeted subsidies
Most of the subsidies are provided without any qualifying criteria
or targeting. These are $10.1 billion to $10.5 billion annually.
Table 3 provides details on how these subsidy mechanisms work. The
mechanisms are categorized according to the three types. The first col-
umn lists the names of the subsidy mechanisms. The next column shows
the size of the mechanism, on an annual basis, in the 1993-1994 time
frame. The middle column shows which type of carrier pays the subsidy.
The next column lists who gets the subsidy. The last column describes
35. C. WEINHAUS & A. OETTINGER, BEHIND THE TELEPHONE DEBATES 49-50 (1988).
36. Id. at 33-69. Federal policies are defined in 47 C.F.R. §§ 32, 36, 65, 69 (1994).
37. For purposes of this paper, a financial support mechanism or subsidy is defined as
any payment that would not exist if networks were unbundled and fully competitive, and/or
if government regulations did not require the payments. Also in this paper, unbundled
means that local loops, switching, and local transport are purchased separately.
38. Amounts are from M. Sievers, supra note 32, at 10; Comments of the United States
Telephone Association, supra note 32, at Attachment 1. Table 3 provides a summary of the
amounts. For an explanation of these systems, see generally C. WEINHAUS, S. MAKEEFF, ET.
AL., WHO PAYS WHOM? CASH FLOW FOR SOME SUPPORT MECHANISMS AND POTENTIAL MODEL-
ING OF ALTERNATIVE TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICIES (1992).
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how the payments get from the payer to the recipient.
Table 3 shows that these explicit subsidies make up approximately
50% of the access payments by IXCs. Sievers and Monson-Rohlfs esti-
mate that all subsidies make up 60% to 75% of access payments by
IXCs. s "
Table 3. How the Explicit Subsidies in Access Work in the U.S.'0
Credits to Customers' Bills
Subsidy Amount Who Pays Who Gets How Dollars Move
Lifeline/Linkup $165 million IXCs Low income N IXC pays per presubscribed line
customers N Customer receives credit on bill
Payments to Targeted LECs
Subsidy Amount Who Pays Who Gets How Dollars Move
Universal Service $725 million IXCs LECs with high U IXC pays per presubscribed line
Fund loop costs U LEC receives based on loop costs
Long Term $323 million IXCs and Small LECs U IXC pays to large LECs
Support (LTS) CAPs in U Large LECs send dollars to small LECs based
large-LEC on loop costs
exchanges
Dial Equipment $259 million IXC low Small LECs U IXC pays to medium-size LECs
Minutes Weighting cost U Medium-size LECs send to small LECs based
customers on size and switch costs
Untargeted Subsidies
Subsidy Amount Who Pays Who Gets How Dollars Move
Carrier Common $6.3 - 6.7 IXCs and LECs E IXC pays per minute of access
Line (less LTS) billion CAPs U LEC receives per minute of access
(nationwide)
Residual $3.8 billion IXCs and LECs U IXC pays per minute of access
Interconnection (nationwide) CAPs U LEC receives per minute of access
Charge (less
tandem)
C. Effects of U.S. Access Price Structures on Competition
The current U.S. system for pricing access services hinders competi-
tion in four ways. First, the system gives LECs the opportunity and in-
centive to harm competition in downstream markets. Downstream mar-
kets are markets that rely upon local networks as an input for producing
a final product or service. Long distance is an example of a downstream
market and will be used to describe this effect. The second effect of the
current system is that it hinders LECs' ability to compete in access mar-
kets that are subject to competition. The third way that the current ac-
cess system harms competition is that it discriminates against some types
of companies and in favor of others. The fourth way is that is provides
39. M. Sievers, supra note 32, at 1; C. Monson & J. Rohlfs, supra note 33, at app. 2.
40. Rules can be found in 47 C.F.R. §§ 36.125, 36.601-.741, 69.108, 69.111, 69.116-.117,
69.124, 69.501, 69.603, 69.612 (1994). Sources of amounts are M. Sievers, supra note 32, at
10; Comments of the United States Telephone Association, supra note 32, at Attachment 1.
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opportunities for arbitrage.
The current pricing system for access services can hinder inter-
exchange competition for two reasons: (1) the high mark-up above cost
gives LECs the ability and incentive to vary prices among IXCs; and (2)
access is the largest cost that IXCs have for providing their services.
LECs have the ability to vary access prices among IXCs because ac-
cess prices are high compared to the underlying costs - the mark-up
above cost is 300% according to the United States Telephone Association
study. This high mark-up gives LECs the ability to have wide variances
in the access prices they charge to different customers. For example, a
LEC could offer a 50% discount to select access customers and still have
a 100% mark-up above cost. In this instance, the price difference between
customers would be large, but all access prices would still be profitable to
the LEC.
LECs have an incentive to discount access prices to select customers
in at least three situations: (1) when competition has entered only some
access markets (discussed later in this section); (2) if these select custom-
ers are large enough to exert buying power on the LECs;4'1 and (3) if the
customer is the LEC itself.42 LECs have begun advocating volume dis-
counts for access services. This could be a response to buying power of
some access customers, an effort to discourage large customers from using
competitors by lowering the marginal price of access, 4s or both. LECs also
have an incentive to reflect lower mark-ups in their own prices for long
distance - i.e., when the LEC is its own access customer. These lower
mark-ups would allow LECs to gain greater market share in downstream
markets. Ameritech once proposed this as part of its plan to enter the
interLATA long distance market.4 4
Varying access prices between customers in downstream markets can
harm competition if access is a significant cost to the downstream com-
petitors. This is the case for interexchange markets. Access payments to
LECs are approximately 45% of IXCs' cost of providing long distance
41. The ability to exert market power as a buyer is known in economics as monopsony
power (when there is only one buyer) or oligopsony power (when there is more than one
buyer). K. COHEN & R. CYERT, THEORY OF THE FIRM 267 (2nd ed. 1975).
42. LECs also have an incentive to charge different access prices between markets
where LEC costs for access are different. However, this generally would have no uneconomic
effect on competitive markets and so is not discussed in this paper.
43. The "marginal price" of access refers to the price for additional access minutes. For
example, if the price per minute for access was $0.05 for the first 1 million minutes, and
$0.03 for minutes beyond 1 million, the marginal price would be $0.03 for a customer buying
more than 1 million minutes.
44. The Wall Street Journal (Midwest Edition), December 7, 1993, at A3. The MFJ
divided the U.S. into 160 local access transport areas or LATAs. Under the terms of the
MFJ, BOCs are generally prohibited from carrying calls across LATA boundaries. (MFJ,
552 F. Supp. at 229, §IV.(K).) Ameritech's plan allows competition in its local markets in
exchange for being allowed to carry interLATA calls.
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services.'5 Indeed, access is the single most significant determining factor
of IXCs' cost structures. If LECs were to give one IXC the 50% price
discount described above, this carrier would have a 22.5% artificial cost
advantage over its competitors. Since IXC margins are only 11% on aver-
age,' 6 the IXC with the advantage may easily dominate the market. If
LECs were to give discounts down to the price of a common form of dedi-
cated access called DS1, the artificial cost advantage would be over40% .47
The high mark-ups in access prices also make it difficult for LECs to
compete in access markets where there is effective competition. New busi-
nesses tend to enter markets first where mark-ups are highest and cus-
tomer concentration is the greatest. This is how the U.S. telephone indus-
try first developed in the late 1800s, and is how CAPs have entered the
access market.4 According to a 1993 Bellcore survey, requests from CAPs
and others to locate facilities in LEC central offices " were concentrated
in only 14% of LEC offices, but these offices addressed nearly 80% of all
IXC access traffic. 0 This exposure - high access prices in densely popu-
lated markets - puts LECs in a bad competitive posture should access
markets become competitive.
LECs face difficulties in responding to this competition. A natural
reaction for LECs will be to vary access prices between competitive and
non-competitive areas."' This reaction faces some regulatory hurdles be-
cause it runs counter to the traditional regulatory practice of charging
high prices in urban areas to cover costs of services in rural areas. Be-
cause of this practice, LEC costs in general in rural areas are 35% higher
than LEC revenues in rural areas.5 2 When IXC costs are included, costs
in rural areas are 39% higher than LEC and IXC revenues." So ending
this regulatory practice could result in higher rural prices for telecommu-
45. Weinhaus, Ralston, et. al., supra note 9, at 16.
46. SIEVERS, supra note 32, at 16.
47. Estimate of DS1 price is $500 per month. C. WEINHAUS, T. PITTS, ET. AL., BEYOND
FUTURE SHOCK: THE NEED FOR A NEW REGULATORY RESPONSE TO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 17
(November 13, 1993). Minutes are assumed to be 9600 per month. DS1 is a dedicated circuit
capacity that is equal to 24 simultaneous voice calls.
48. Mueller, Universal Service in Telephone History: A Reconstruction 17 TELECOM-
MUNICATIONS POL. 352, 356-7 (July 1993); THE YANKEE GROUP, A CAP MARKET UPDATE,
supra note 27, at 6-17.
49. A central office is the place where local telephone lines connect to a LEC telephone
switch.
50. F. W. NOLTE, LETTER TO R.O. CAULKINS (July 19, 1993).
51. LECs have been allowed to do this in some instances through a policy called "zone
density pricing". This policy allows LECs to deaverage some access prices according to
whether a market falls into a high density, medium density, or low density zone. "Density"
in this case refers to the density of telephone usage in the area. See, e.g., Transport Rate
Structure and Pricing, CC Docket No. 91-213, 7 FCC Rcd 7006 (1992).
52 C. WEINHAUS, S. MAKEEFF, ET. AL., REDEFINING UNIVERSAL SERVICE: THE COST OF
MANDATING THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY IN RURAL AREAS 10 (1994).
53. C. WEINHAUS, S. MAKEEFF, ET. AL., WHAT IS THE PRICE OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE? IM-
PACT OF DEAVERAGING NATIONWIDE URBAN/RURAL RATES 11 (1993).
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nications services. 54
Another LEC response could be to lower access prices, but this hin-
ders LEC profitability. Access charges provide over 25% of LEC revenues
on a nationwide basis.55 And much of the mark-up in access prices re-
sulted from allocations of local exchange line costs to access and long dis-
tance services. So from the perspective of traditional regulatory account-
ing, large and unilateral decreases in access prices could have large,
negative impacts on LEC profits. For the time being, the need for a LVC
pricing response is dampened somewhat because CAPs also pay access
charges to LECs."
The third way that the current access system is inconsistent with
competitive markets is that the system discriminates against some types
of companies and in favor of other types - the system has different pric-
ing arrangements for different types of customers. Tables 1 and 2 illus-
trate this. Prices are different for IXC access and cellular access. New
local carriers may pay a third set of prices. LEC retail customers (i.e.,
residential and business customers) pay yet another sets of prices, and
ESPs pay the same as the business retail customers. Also, LECs receive
special pricing treatment from other LECs for local service, extended area
service, and sometimes long distance service.
Tables 1 and 2 also illustrate that there are differences in when ac-
cess is paid. For example, IXCs pay access when their customers use LEC
networks to complete calls, and cellular carriers pay access to a LEC
when a cellular customer calls a customer that is connected to the LEC
network. However, a LEC pays no access to a cellular carrier when a LEC
customer calls a cellular customer. 5 Also, traditional LECs generally pay
nothing to each other when they complete local and extended area service
calls - i.e., they have a bill-and-keep arrangement. As was indicated
above, it is too early to tell whether new local competitors will also have
bill-and-keep arrangements with traditional LECs, or have some other
payment arrangement.
The fourth reason that the U.S. access system is inconsistent with
competition is that it gives companies an incentive to arbitrage between
the different access pricing plans. For example, some IXCs provide wire-
less services such as cellular. These IXCs pay IXC access charges to LECs
for long distance calls, and pay the lower cellular access prices to LECs
54. The FCC has begun allowing LECs to vary access prices between urban and rural
areas. 47 C.F.R. § 69.123.
55. WEINHAUS, RALSTON, ET. AL, supra note 9, at 16.
56. For switched access, CAPs pay basically the same access charges that an IXC would
- CCLC, RIC, Local Switching, and either a collocation fee or an entrance facility fee.
57. LECs have been ordered by the FCC to pay cellular companies for terminating
calls. See Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act Regulatory
Treatment of Mobile Services, Federal Communications Commission GN Docket No. 93-
252, FCC 94-31 232 (March 7, 1994) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 20.11). This has not been
implemented.
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for cellular calls. It would be difficult for LECs to know if an IXC is pay-
ing the appropriate price for terminating calls if the IXC were to combine
its long distance and cellular trunks for terminating calls.56
LECs have the same problem with interconnection with new LECs.
New LECs may have the ability to terminate both long distance and local
calls on the same trunks. The LEC would want to charge long distance
access prices for the long distance calls and local access prices (which may
be lower) for local calls, but may not be able to distinguish between the
calls. Some LECs propose to remedy this problem by having the same
access prices for long distance and local calls. However, if reciprocal, this
arrangement creates the incentive for new LECs to encourage customers
to originate calls through the LEC and terminate calls through the new
LEC. If successful, this would force LECs to pay high termination prices
to new LECs for local calls that LECs would normally have terminated on
their own networks. The new LECs would pay little or no local access
prices to the LEC because customers would be originating calls through
the LEC, not the new LEC.
Pricing schemes based on the identity of the customer can continue
only as long as LECs have sufficient market power to control prices, can
limit resale of LEC services, and can identify calls as being local, long
distance, intrastate, or interstate. As the numbers and types of alternative
networks continue to increase, LECs are likely to lose much of this
ability.
D. Price Structures in Other Countries
It is generally recognized that other countries face pricing issues sim-
ilar to those in the U.S.5 9 Telstra's revenues for providing long distance
service were over seven times cost in 1987-1988, the last year for which
disaggregated data were available. Even on a fully allocated cost basis, 0
Telstra's long distance revenues were 2.5 times cost in 1989-1990, and its
local service charges covered only 70% of their costs. Also during 1989-
1990, France Telecom's long distance revenues were nearly 4 times their
fully allocated costs, and local service charges covered only 50% of their
costs.,,
A cross-country comparison by Datapro shows that similar pricing
problems exist in the U.K., Japan, and New Zealand. s" Datapro compares
58. A trunk is a circuit that carries telecommunications traffic (voice, data, or video)
between locations. In this case, the trunk connects an IXC's network to a LEC's network.
59. See, e.g., H. Hefekiuser, The Universal Service Principle in a Competitive Market,
in PROCEEDINGS: COOPERATION AND COMPETITION IN COMMUNICATIONS 123-6 (S. Farnoux-To-
porkoff & M. Botein eds. 1994); DATAPRO, WHO SHOULD PAY FOR THE LOCAL Loop? (1992).
60. Fully allocated cost is a process of allocating accounting costs to services. All over-
heads and common costs are allocated. In most cases, loop costs are also allocated between
local services and long distance services rather than directly assigned to local services.
61. DATAPRO, supra note 59, at 1-2.
62. Id. at 2.
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local service charges to long distance charges for 1988-1989. According to
Datapro, correct pricing would result in local service charges that are ap-
proximately 30 times the price of a 5-minute long distance call of 300-500
kilometers. In contrast to this optimal price relationship, the local-to-
long-distance price ratio was 15:1 to 19:1 in the U.K., 4.2:1 in Japan, and
6.9:1 in New Zealand. Indeed, Telecom cut long distance prices 35-50%
and raised local service prices 33% in anticipation of Clear entering the
New Zealand long distance market. Once Clear entered the market, long
distance prices decreased another 14% for small customers and 20-25%
for large customers."
International communications services have similar pricing problems.
Domestic telecommunications carriers receive payments from interna-
tional carriers for calls that terminate in domestic carriers' respective
countries. These payments are based on "accounting rates" that are nego-
tiated between countries. Costs for international calls have declined, but
the accounting rates have not kept pace. Accounting rates for calls be-
tween the U.S. and Western Europe countries are 2 to 7 times actual
costs, between the U.S. and Japan are 3-4 times cost, and between the
U.S. and Canada are 90% above cost. 4 The FCC and others have tried to
put downward pressure on these accounting rates by advocating resale of
international services and alternate calling procedures such as callback."
Prices in these countries will create problems similar to those found
for the U.S. High long distance prices would generally make it difficult for
incumbents to effectively compete with new entrants. On the other hand,
if the high usage prices are passed on to the new entrants in the form of
high access charges, their ability to compete would be diminished.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURE FOR ACCESS
Section II explained mismatches between the existing structure for
access and competition. This section describes an alternative structure for
access that is consistent with the development of competitive markets.
Other policies that may be important for competition are not discussed.
To remedy the mismatches between competition and the existing ac-
cess policies, a new access structure should be developed based on these
principles:
1. Non-discrimination
Prices and services should be available to customers without
discrimination as to who the customer is nor what the cus-
63. MUELLER, supra note 13, at 11-2.
64. J. Haring, J. Rohlfs, & H. Shooshan III, The U.S. Stake in Competitive Global
Telecommunications Services: The Economic Case for Tough Bargaining 4-5 (December 16,
1993) (copy available from Strategic Policy Research, 7500 Old Georgetown Rd., Suite 810,
Bethesda, MD 20814).
65. THE YANKEE GROUP, INTERNATIONAL SIMPLE RESALE: OPENING UP THE MARKET FOR
INTERNATIONAL LONG DISTANCE 1-3 (1995).
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tomer does with the traffic.
2. Modularity
As competition increases, regulators should be able to easily
change and remove pricing constraints without causing dis-
locations, such as in universal service policies.
3. Low mark-ups
Low mark-ups of price above incremental cost limit the po-
tential for price discrimination and cross-subsidy.
4. Flexibility
Carriers should have the ability to lower prices and intro-
duce more innovative price structures to respond to
competition.
This section describes an alternative access structure that conforms
to these principles. This access structure is described under the headings
of non-discrimination, modularity, low mark-ups, and flexibility. Even
though this structure is described under separate headings, it should be
viewed as a single proposition. Some of the pieces of this structure may
not make sense if they are separated from the whole.
The access policies in this section assume that the identities of tradi-
tional industry categories - LEC, IXC, cellular, cable television, etc. -
will blur if not go away over time. Customers will receive services from
service integrators. These companies will purchase network and service
functions from other providers, and may or may not own their own net-
works and service functions." This industry structure means that almost
all network companies will provide wholesale services to service integra-
tors, and may also provide retail services to end-use customers.
The access policies are described next.
A. Non-discrimination Policies
Non-discrimination is necessary to facilitate competition and to pro-
vide carriers with a pricing structure that is easy to administer. An access
policy with a single wholesale pricing system and common carrier obliga-
tions would satisfy the non-discrimination principle. The wholesale pric-
ing system would allow retail service providers to purchase network func-
tions and usage for collecting traffic from customers, distributing traffic to
end-use customers and other networks, and transporting traffic between
specific points. These wholesale services would be available to any cus-
tomer who was willing to accept the billing, engineering, etc., obligations
of a network provider. The common carrier obligation would prohibit a
66. See generally E. Noam, Beyond Liberalization: From the Network of Networks to
the System of Systems 18 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POL. 286 (1994). For an explanation of how
this industry structure would work, see generally WEINHAUS, MONROE, Er. AL., supra note 5.
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company from refusing to connect with customers except for normal busi-
ness reasons, such as bill payment problems.
B. Modularity Policies
Modularity means that access policies are not interwoven between
markets and with other regulatory policies such as universal service. This
provides regulators with an exit strategy - i.e., markets that become
competitive can be deregulated without changing regulations for other
markets and for other policies.
A modular system for regulating prices should have two features: (1)
price caps that the regulated company cannot manipulate; and (2) mar-
ket-by-market prices. The price caps should be set in the regulatory pro-
cess and have little reliance on data and studies that are under the con-
trol of the regulated company. Such a price cap can be determined at
least two ways. One way is to use standardized cost or financial models to
estimate what it should cost to provide access services in different types
of markets. These models would serve as guides or formulae for adjusting
access prices over time. Another method would be to link prices in non-
competitive markets to prices in competitive markets. Current rate-of-
return regulation should not be used because it provides companies with
incentives and opportunities to cross-subsidize and increase costs. Ex-
isting price cap systems would also be inappropriate because their formu-
lae and indices are based upon the regulation of entire companies, not
just a limited set of services such as access and basic telephone services.
Regulating price caps on a market-by-market basis means that the
maximum prices are set for each market. Once the market is deregulated,
the price cap can be removed without creating the need for adjustments
to any other pricing systems or other regulatory policies.
The modularity principle also means that universal service policies
should not be funded through access prices.8 7 A competitively neutral
mechanism should be developed that provides subsidies that are:
1. Based on customer need8
Payments should be based on customer's to afford basic
services.
2. Limited in size to what customers and service providers
needs9
67. For examples of regulatory tools that could be used to revise subsidy systems, see
generally C. WEINHAUS, T. MONROE, ET. AL., UNIVERSAL SERVICE TOOL KIT, PART 1: GETTING
FRoM HERE TO THERE: TRANSITIONS FOR RESTRUCTURING SUBSIDIES (1994).
68. This does not necessarily preclude subsidies for infrastructure. Infrastructure subsi-
dies may be needed if the public policy is that infrastructures should be deployed even if
customers do not value them sufficiently to pay for them through prices, or cannot pay for
them because of income or business limitations.
69. For an example of how this could be done, see C. WEINHAUS, T. MONROE, ET. AL.,
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Payments to support affordability of basic services should
be based on the difference between the price the targeted
customers can pay and the amount of revenue that a service
provider needs to remain financially viable. This amount of
revenue can be determined from market prices for services
if markets are competitive, or benchmark costs. Benchmark
costs are estimates of the economic costs of providing basic
services."0 The support payments can be provided either to
providers of basic services or to customers.
3. Nondiscriminatory
All providers of basic services should be treated equally with
respect to how their services are subsidized.
4. Funded in a way that does not hinder competition
Funding mechanisms should not disadvantage competitors
that would be viable absent the subsidy mechanism. Fund-
ing based on telecommunications revenues net of payments
to intermediary telecommunications providers is an example
of such a mechanism.
C. Low-mark-ups Policies
The low-mark-up principle means that the mark-up of access prices
above direct or incremental cost should be comparable to the mark-ups
for other services.7 1 Access prices should make a contribution to joint and
common costs to allow network providers to be financially viable.7 2 How-
ever, an unusually high mark-up permits the price discrimination de-
scribed in the previous section, and facilitates cross-subsidy. The low
mark-up could be achieved through direct regulatory oversight of prices.
Regulators could generate or obtain estimates of costs for access services
and adjust price caps so as to limit the emount of mark-up. Extensive
resale may also facilitate low markups/s
UNIVERSAL SERVICE TOOL KIT, PART 2: BEYOND COST ALLOCATIONS: BENCHMARK SUBSIDY
METHOD (1994).
70. These estimates would not be specific to any company, but would be representative
of companies that are in the market. These economic costs should include incremental costs
for basic services and a portion of joint and common costs to ensure that reasonably efficient
service providers have an opportunity to remain financially viable.
71. In some instances, mark-ups for access may be higher than mark-ups for end-user
prices for local service. This is because a local service provider's ability to sell access is
dependent upon having local service customers. So a local service provider would be willing
to have low prices for local service in order to be able to sell access.
72. See generally M. JAMISON, GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR SUBSIDY-FREE PRICES USING
COOPERATIVE GAMES (1995), for an explanation of why it is generally true that all services
should make a contribution to joint and common costs.
73. E. NOAM, PRESENTATION AT THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SOCIETY SYM-
POSIUM ON STRATEGIC ALLIANCES & INTERCONNECTION: CONTRIBUTIONS OF GAME THEORY TO
TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1995).
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This principle conflicts with the efficient component pricing rule
(ECPR) which was developed by Baumol and Willig7 4 and is generally
supported by incumbent monopolies. The ECPR recommends that inter-
connectors pay incumbent monopolies their opportunity costs of intercon-
nection. In other words, interconnection prices would ensure that the in-
cumbent monopolies make the same amount of profit regardless of
whether there is competition.
The ECPR is inappropriate to use because it can result in high mark-
ups, and because it is based on several assumptions that often do not
match reality. These assumptions include: (1) there are no sunk costs and
no monopoly profits;75 (2) there is no discrimination against the intercon-
nector in price or quality of interconnection; (3) the margin between the
monopoly's input price and retail price reflects the monopoly's economic
costs of producing the retail product; 6 (4) the retail market is homogene-
ous; 77 (5) interconnectors are price takers; (6) regulators are able to per-
fectly regulate the monopoly;78 and (7) new competitors are more special-
ized than the incumbent monopoly.7 9
D. Flexibility Policies
Carriers should be allowed flexibility to lower prices and introduce
more innovative price structures. One common form of price flexibility is
price bands - a policy where regulators allow companies to change prices
between a predetermined maximum price and a predetermined minimum
price. However, as long as maximum prices for access and non-competi-
tive basic telephone services do not contain high contributions to joint
and common costs, price floors should be unnecessary to facilitate effi-
cient competition." Therefore, carriers should be allowed to charge any
prices that are below the low-mark-up maximum price. It is also unlikely
that carriers could harm competition with alternative price structures as
long as the maximum price is not exceeded. As a result, carriers should be
allowed to also provide alternative price structures as long as the struc-
tures are non-discriminatory, especially in non-competitive access
74. Baumol, Some Subtle Issues in Railroad Regulation, 10 INT'L J. TRANSP. ECON. 341
(1983); Willig, The Theory of Network Access Pricing, in ISSUES IN PUBLIC UTILITY REGULA-
TION 109-52 (H. Trebing ed. 1979).
75. Tye, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors: A Response, 11 YALE J. ON REG.
203, 206, 210 (1994).
76. Kahn & Taylor, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors: A Comment, 11 YALE
J. ON REG. 225, 227, 230 (1994).
77. Willig, supra note 74, at 138; M. Armstrong & C. Doyle, Access Pricing, Entry and
the Baumol-Willig Rule, Discussion Paper No. 9422, University of Southampton.
78. B. MITCHELL, W. NEU, ET. AL., THE REGULATION OF PRICING OF INTERCONNECTION
SERVICES 6-7 (1994).
79. Willig, supra note 74, at 139.
80. M. Jamison, When does Cross-Subsidy Make Business Sense? presentation at Tele-
communications Infrastructure and the Information Economy: Interactions Between Public
Policy and Corporate Strategy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, March 10-11,
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markets.
CONCLUSION
This paper describes: (1) why current access policies are inconsistent
with competitive markets; and (2) an alternative access structure that
could remedy these mismatches. The alternative access policies described
are based on four principles: (1) non-discrimination as to who the cus-
tomer is not what the customer does with the traffic; (2) modularity so
that regulators can easily change and remove pricing constraints; (3)
mark-ups of price above incremental cost that are low enough to limit the
potential for price discrimination and cross-subsidy, yet high enough to
keep service providers financially viable; and (4) price flexibility for ac-
cess providers.
In some instances, these policies are significantly different than the
status quo. Transitions will be necessary to allow customers and compa-
nies time to adjust."' These transitions could include: (1) price adjust-
ments and deregulation in other markets to allow companies to develop
new sources of revenues; (2) increased competition to allow customers to
choose among service providers and to encourage lower overall costs for
the industry; (3) phase-outs of old subsidy systems and phase-ins of new
systems; and (4) time for companies and customers to adjust.
Special accommodations may also be needed for rural areas. Costs in
these areas are generally high, and cost-based prices may be unaffordable.
Special subsidies for rural areas may be needed to ensure universal ser-
vice and the development of rural telecommunications infrastructures.
81. WEINHAUS, MONROE, ET. AL., supra note 69, at 1.
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The Islamic and Jewish Laws of Usury: A
Bridge to Commercial Growth and Peace in
the Middle East
Daniel Klein*
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent moves toward peace in the Middle East make normalized
relations in the area a possibility for the first time in two generations.
Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Jordanian peace accords are in place. Syria
and Israel are negotiating an end to hostilities, while other Arab nations
are simultaneously easing their economic boycotts on Israel.1
Peace, however, is far from a reality. In the Islamic world, militant
fundamentalists have waged a bloody campaign to register their opposi-
tion to the normalizing of Arab-Israeli relations, 2 while in Israel, the
Likud party threatens these diplomatic agreements. Recent terrorist at-
tacks have also made the Israeli populace question the viability of peace.'
What role can the study of law play in supporting these fragile peace
agreements? Surprisingly, significant potential. This article will focus on
an unlikely, but highly plausible and important topic in Jewish and Is-
lamic law. The law of usury may serve as a bridge for extending peace
efforts in the Middle East.
Despite the centuries-long histories of both Jews and Muslims as
commercial peoples, the usury laws of the two religions forbid the charg-
ing of interest." Although many Muslims engage in interest-bearing trans-
* B.A., Princeton University, 1992; M.Phil., Cambridge University, 1993; J.D., Yale
Law School, 1996. I would like to thank Khaled Abou EI-Fadl, Saad El-Fishaway, and Mark
Wiedman for their time and advice concerning this article.
1. See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, Saudis and 5 Other Gulf Nations Will Ease Their Boycott
of Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1994, at Al.
2. See, e.g., Clyde Haberman, Among Israelis, Second Thoughts About Accord With
the P.L.O., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1994, at Al.
3. Id.
4. With the notable exception that Jews are allowed to charge and pay interest to non-
Jews.
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actions, the Islamic fundamentalists who most oppose the peace process
view the law restrictively5 and have called for the abolition of ribao in
their respective nations. Meanwhile in Israel, the Torah's prohibition on
interest is widely observed, even though it is functionally evaded. A com-
mon cultural and traditional ground exists between Muslims and Jews
through the law of usury.
This convergence of Islamic and Jewish legal traditions can play two
concomitant roles. First, Jews and Muslims share an appreciation of and
expertise in banking under stringent religious conditions. This sensitivity
and experience could lead to substantial profit and economic benefit for
the entire Middle East. Second, the very fact that the Jewish and Islamic
interest laws are so similar suggests that the mutual opposition to charg-
ing interest could be of tremendous symbolic importance. The interest
ban could serve as a reminder to Jews and Muslims that they worship the
same God, and by extension, help support a lasting peace.
This article begins by examining the jurisprudence of usury in the
Islamic and Jewish legal systems in Section II. Section III looks at the
economic potential of a Middle East at peace and the viability of interest-
free banking as a means of fueling this envisioned boom. Section IV dis-
cusses the semeiotics of shared legal meaning. Section V concludes this
article with a suggestion that Israeli banks create substantial opportuni-
ties for equity investment in Israel that will be satisfactory to Muslim
investors.
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF USURY IN THE ISLAMIC AND JEWISH LEGAL
SYSTEMS
The Jewish and Islamic laws of usury exhibit numerous similarities.
The majority of authorities in both faiths prohibit the charging or receiv-
ing of interest in any form between co-religionists. Jewish law and a few
Islamic schools, under certain conditions, permit lending at interest under
restricted circumstances. Yet in practice the Jewish prohibition has been
circumvented through heter iska, a mechanism that probably would not
meet with the approval of strict Islamic authorities. Additionally, many
Arab nations openly permit interest or allow transparent ruses that evade
the Islamic standard for riba-free transactions.
A. The Islamic Law of Usury
The starting point for a discussion of the Islamic law of usury is the
Qur'an. It states: "Those that live on Riba (interest) shall rise up before
God like men whom Satan has demented by his touch; for they claim that
Riba is like trading. But God has permitted trading and forbidden
5. Telephone interview with Saad El-Fishaway, Former Senior Advisor for Middle
Eastern Affairs at the World Bank and Professor of Islamic Law at Georgetown University
(Dec. 4, 1994).
6. A Qur'anic term interpreted as interest or usury.
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Riba."7 A total of seven other verses spread throughout the Qur'an ban
riba.8 Additionally, there are several hadith or narrations of the sayings
and behavior of Muhammad that deal with interest. In one, it is reported
that the Prophet "equated the taking and giving of interest to commit-
ting adultery thirty-six times, or being guilty of incest with one's own
mother." Other hadith report Muhammad saying that "People can ex-
change gold for silver, and wheat for barley, in different quantities, but
the transaction must be spot and not forward"1 and "[g]old for gold, sil-
ver for silver . . . whoever pays more or takes more has indulged in
interest."'"
Multiple interpretations of these verses have arisen. 2 One of the
least restrictive, loosely termed "modernist," treats the term riba as refer-
ring only to its standard English meaning of "usury," which is the charg-
ing of excessive interest, and not "interest" itself.' s This analysis ap-
proaches the Qur'anic verses and hadith as permitting interest-bearing
transactions in four cases: 1) when a government is attempting to induce
savings; 2) when financing international trade; 3) when financing invest-
ments that will enhance productivity; and, 4) when debtors are being
punished for not repaying their debts in a timely fashion.' "
Another interpretation of these verses is offered by the Zahiri school.
This approach rejects all forms of qiyas or analogical deduction. 15
Whereas the textual prohibition on interest, stated in relation to goods,
can be extended to govern monetary transactions, the Zahiri limit their
application of the ban on interest to the half-dozen commodities specifi-
cally mentioned in the Qur'an.'8 In this manner, it appears that the Zahiri
approach, which is textualist and normally conservative, allies itself more
7. AHMED ABDEL-FATrAH EL-ASHKER, THE ISLAMIC BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 15 (1987).
8. Alexandra R. Hardie & M. Rabooy, Risk, Piety, and the Islamic Investor, 18 BRIT.
J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 52, 57 (1991).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Book length debates have taken place on the exact meaning and degree of restric-
tion required. One of the most notable exchanges took place in Egypt in the middle of the
current century between Ibrahim Zaki Badawi and Abd ar-Razzaq as-Sanhuri. Chibli Mal-
lat, The Debate on Riba and Interest in Twentieth Century Jurisprudence, in ISLAMIc LAW
AND FINANCE 79-83 (Chibli Mallat ed., 1988).
Islamic legal scholars have subdivided the law of usury into riba al-fadl (riba stemming
from an excess of one of the charged countervalues) and riba al-nasi'a (riba due to delay in
completing an exchange). For a good summary of the various Islamic schools' views on the
restrictiveness of these categories, see NABiL A. SALEH, UNLAWFUL GAIN AND LEGITIMATE
PROFIT IN ISLAMIC LAW: Riba, Gharar and Islamic Banking 24-34 (1992).
13. David A. Suratgar, The Impact of Islamic Banking on World Financial and Com-
mercial Relations, 1984 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1089, 1102 n.31.
14. Id. This fourth exception is the justification generally cited for permitting the use
of credit cards. Only if the card-holder does not meet his deadline will interest be added to
the debt. Khaled Abou EI-Fadl, Lecture at Yale Law School (Nov. 23, 1994).
15. SALEH, supra note 12, at 18.
16. Id.
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with the modernist liberal interpretations of the ban on interest.
Several major Islamic schools share still another view, one that re-
stricts the interest laws to the Islamic world (Dar al-Islam). According to
many Hanafi jurists, who predominate in Egypt, a Muslim may engage in
a ribawi transaction outside of Dar al-Islam with a non-believer. " The
Ja'firi and some Sh'ia also accept this interpretation.18
Yet enough Islamic scholars interpret the Qur'anic verses as prohibit-
ing all forms of interest, regardless of the circumstances, for a plausible
claim to ijma or consensus on the issue to be made."9 The classical stan-
dard for lima, "a universal consensus of the scholars of the Muslim com-
munity as a whole"2 0 at a given period, 21 has clearly not been met. Histor-
ically, however, a claim of ijma has often been trumpeted when "only a
majority consensus had existed within or beyond a particular school. ' '2 It
is relatively safe to say that among fundamentalist scholars, who gener-
ally speak for the rapidly growing number of vociferous, politically active,
and hard-line Muslims most profoundly opposed to peace in the Middle
East,2 ' this lesser standard of ijma exists.24
This discussion thus concentrates on what will be referred to as the
"fundamentalist" interpretation of riba - i.e. that any interest-bearing
transaction is prohibited under all circumstances - not only because it is
possibly the most commonly held view in the Middle East,2 but because
it is a hardest case scenario. If fundamentalists can be convinced that a
profound legal commonality with Jews exists, it will be comparatively
simple to make the point to moderates. The fundamentalist interpreta-
tion is not the most textualist exegesis of the Qur'an and hadith, this title
belongs to the Zahiris. Rather, the fundamentalists have engaged in ex-
tensive qiyas. Building on centuries of scholarship, they have targeted a
number of illa, or effective causes, for the interest prohibition. The pre-
vention of unfairness and exploitation in financial transactions, 2 limiting
hoarding, the need for either risk or labor to be a part of any invest-
ment, and preventing the destabilization of business planning2s are the
17. Id. at 40-41.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 15. However, a caveat is in order. The definition of riba is so politically
charged at present that one suspects that scholars sympathetic to the fundamentalist move-
ment could be overstating their case. See generally El-Fishaway, supra note 5.
20. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 168 (1991).
21. Id. at 169.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Judith Miller, Faces of Fundamentalism, FOREIGN AFF. 123 (Nov./Dec.
1994).
24. See S.H. AMIN, ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE: THE EXPERIENCE OF IRAN 25 (1986).
25. MALLAT, supra note 12, at 83.
26. Id. at 83.
27. Id. In this sense, Islamic investment is intended to encourage savers to reinvest. A
comparison to the traditionally lower tax rates on capital gains in America is not
inappropriate.
28. M. UMER CHAPRA, TOWARDS A JUST MONETARY SYSTEM 120-121 (1985).
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most commonly invoked illa.2 s As a result, business people have only two
types of financing open to them. They may: 1) borrow funds, so long as
they are free of all interest, or, 2) enter into a partnership agreement."0
The strictest view of interest-free financing excludes any loans calling
for returns in excess of principal. Even adjusting for inflation through
indexing is prohibited. Scholars cite to the following rationale as support
for this prohibition: if indexing were allowed, people would keep their
money in savings accounts rather than investing it productively.8 1 Less
strict approaches justify indexing on the grounds that the investor is not
obtaining any increase in real terms.8 " Such truly interest-free loans are
very rarely available and are generally given only by close friends and
family members.
A far more common action for an Islamic businessman in need of
funds is to enter into either a mudaraba8s or murabaha.M The sine qua
non of mudaraba is the existence of risk. A mudaraba is a limited liabil-
ity partnership in which one or more people provide "a fixed amount of
disposable money capital."8' 5 The party receiving the money, the "agent,"
will have the funds at his disposal for investment. He is then able to in-
vest the capital in the manner he considers most salutary." Should the
agent invest the funds "reasonably," he will have no financial liability. 7
The agent receives a fixed percentage of the profits as compensation. 8
Because the receipt of such fixed percentage return on the principal is
contrary to Islamic principles, only profit-sharing agreements are permit-
ted. Although the Maliki and Shafii schools do not recognize mudaraba
agreements with fixed durations, their position is a minority one. 9 Never-
29. A number of scholars who accept these illa still allow the charging and paying of
interest in cases of necessity or, somewhat more controversially, on the grounds that engag-
ing in interest-bearing transactions may further the public welfare (maslahah mursaleh).
See MALLAT, supra note 12, at 77. Maslahah mursaleh, however, is restricted to actions that
are "proper and harmonious ... with the objectives of the Lawgiver." KAMALI, supra note
20, at 267. Conservative Muslim thinkers refuse to accept that necessity and maslahah mur-
salah can exist in anything but extreme individual circumstances and can never justify a
policy of permitting interest. MALLAT, supra note 12, at 77.
30. See Hardie & Rabooy, supra note 8, at 56.
31. CHAPRA, supra note 28, at 40. However, this reasoning misses the point. Money in
savings accounts is lent out by banks, so it will still be used productively.
32. EL-ASHKER, supra note 7, at 218.
33. Mudaraba is also known as Qirad and Muqaraba. Id. at 76.
34. There are numerous other interest-free devices, such as musharaka and wadia -
but the two mentioned in the text, or variations of them, predominate. Banking Behind the
Veil, THE EcONOMIST, Apr. 4, 1992, at 49.
35. EL-ASHKER, supra note 7, at 76.
36. Id. The degree of freedom is generally restricted in the mudaraba contract itself,
which often will limit the types of goods the agent may buy or the transactions in which he
may engage.
37. Id.
38. The arrangement has certain similarities to the American mutual fund, whose man-
agers are generally paid primarily through percentages of the profits.
39. SALEH, supra note 12, at 140.
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theless, the agreements tend to be relatively short-term since no division
of profits is allowed until the partnership terminates. 0 It is recommended
that the person who receives the mudaraba be a Muslim. However, jurists
also permit non-Muslims who are well versed in Islamic law to receive
funds from Islamic investors.41 The investor thus generally receives re-
turn on his money, but to do so he must take real risk and directly em-
ploy his capital in a business venture.
Banks and financial institutions in the Middle East and elsewhere
provide mudaraba banking by reformulating deposit money as partner-
ship capital. The bank monitors the investment" and generally acts as
the sole partner. The monitoring costs of mudaraba are, as one would
expect, significantly higher than in Western banking because active over-
sight of businesses is required. 3 The potential return on capital in these
relationships is also much greater." Large Islamic banks, which are usu-
ally involved in numerous equity partnerships, tend to pool their
mudaraba investments, returning a percentage proportional to the depos-
itor's capital.
A second'" type of Islamic investment instrument is murabaha, a sale
and buy-back agreement. In a murabaha, someone wishing to obtain a
piece of equipment, raw materials, or fixed asset of any type, will have a
bank or investor purchase the equipment for her and then repay the bank
over a period of time at a cost-plus-profit installment payback that re-
flects the market rate of lending."6 One drawback to murabaha finance is
that it requires banks to deal in commodities, 7 which many lending insti-
tutions are loath to do. Murabaha is primarily distinguished from
mudaraba in that "[w]ith murabaha, Islamic financial institutions are no
longer to share profits or losses, but instead assume the capacity of a clas-
sic financial intermediary.' 48 Although murabaha has occasionally been
criticized as dangerously close to riba, because it both defers sales and
yields a predetermined profit, "it is a universally recognized concept
under Islamic law."'4
40. Id. at 127.
41. EL-ASHKER, supra note 7, at 77. Jewish banks should be able to meet this standard,
especially if they hire an Islamic advisor.
42. CHAPRA, supra note 28, at 165.
43. Abbas Mirakhor, The Progress of Islamic Banking: The Case of Iran and Pakistan,
in ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE 95 (Chibli Mallat ed., 1988).
44. Hashi Syedain, Counting on the Quran, MGMT. TODAY, Mar. 1989, at 104. American
leveraged buyout firms, which operate as similar equity investment pools, often return spec-
tacular profits. Most recently, the firm of Forstmann, Little and Co. recorded profits in the
billions of dollars for its investors, a return of several hundred percent. Diana B. Henriques,
Refilling Forstmann's War Chest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1994, at D1.
45. There are several other types of relatively minor Islamic financial instruments. See
generally AMIN, supra note 24, at 34-35.
46. Id. at 33.
47. Id.
48. SALEH, supra note 12, at 117.
49. Id. at 117-118.
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B. The Jewish Law of Usury
"[T]he whole body of Jewish law is believed by the orthodox to be
divine law, and hence to have absolutely and permanently binding
force,""0 according to Israeli Supreme Court Justice Haim H. Cohn. "Jew-
ish monotheism implies . . . the absolute and indefeasible monopoly of
Jewish divine law." 511 The Halacha, the body of Jewish law, is as central
to the existence of a religious Jew as the Shar'iah is to his Islamic
counterpart.
The Halacha, like Islamic law, addresses business and financial issues
in depth. The Talmud5 states that the first question a Jew is asked when
he goes to heaven is: "Did you do business faithfully." 5 For religious
Jews, the manner in which monetary affairs are conducted defines their
relationship to God. Because the law of usury occupies a central position
in Halachic business law, it is integral to the identity of any religious
Jewish businessperson.
The Jewish law of usury derives from a trio of Scriptural verses.
First, Exodus 22:24 reads: "If you lend money to my people, to the poor
who are in your power, do not act toward them as a creditor. Take no
interest from them." Second, Leviticus 25:35-37 states that:
If your brother is poor, and his means fail with you, then you shall
uphold him .... Do not take interest from him nor increase, but fear
your God. Let your brother live with you. Do not lend him money on
interest, or give him food on interest.
Third, Deuteronomy 23:20-21 warns: "You shall not deduct interest from
loans to your countryman, whether in money or food or anything else that
can be deducted as interest. You may deduct interest from loans to for-
eigners, but not from loans. to your countryman."
The Scriptural passages, although stated in less colorful terms than
50. Haim H. Cohn, Secularization of Divine Law, in JEWISH LAW IN ANCIENT AND MOD-
ERN ISRAEL (Haim H. Cohn ed., 1971).
51. Id. at 6.
52. A brief explanation of the textual sources of Jewish law is in order. Jewish law in its
entirety is referred to as Halacha, a term roughly parallel to the Islamic Shar'iah. The Hala-
cha is primarily composed of:
1) the Torah or Pentateuch, the first five books of the Old Testament, which is the written
word of God as revealed through Moses on Mount Sinai. The entire body of Halacha is
derived from the Torah;
2) the Mishnah, the oral code of law, which was written down in the third Christian cen-
tury. Because the Torah "is stated only in general terms [it] required explanation and am-
plification to be applied to daily living." EDWARD ZIPPERSTEIN, BusINESs ETHICS IN JEWISH
LAW 18 (1983). This is the role of the Mishnah;
3) commentaries on the Mishnah known as the Gemara. There are two Gemara, the Babylo-
nian and the Palestinian. The word "Talmud" consists of both the Mishnah and the Ge-
mara; and
4) commentaries on the Talmud. The most important commentaries are those of Rashi,
Maimonides, and Jacob ben Asher. Id. at 17-19.
53. RABBI EZRA BASRI, ETHICS OF BUSINESS FINANCE & CHARITY 1 (1987).
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the relevant Islamic provisions, are clear in their intention. "Because of
the severity of the Torah prohibition against usury, the Rabbis took it
upon themselves, as a precaution, to ban any payment or transaction
which contains either a hint of interest or unearned profit."" The Mish-
nah extended the interest prohibition to sales, barring future delivery
transactions.'5
Other potential loopholes were also closed. Lenders could not live on
the property of borrowers while a loan was outstanding.56 In fact, Jewish
authorities went so far as to forbid a borrower from greeting his creditor
in an unusually effusive manner.' 7 In partnership arrangements, fixed
rates of return are forbidden.' 8 All forms of interest-bearing transactions
are prohibited between Jews."
When dealing with Gentiles, however, none of these restrictions ap-
plies. Jews have been known as moneylenders for centuries.6 0 Yet the
mere fact that this behavior is permitted does not mean that Jews should
lend to other peoples, and especially Muslims, at interest. A number of
Jewish authorities have called for the prohibition of interest-bearing ar-
rangements with Muslims because they worship the same God.61 Once
money is loaned to a Gentile, in contrast, authorities vary as to whether
interest must be charged."2
Lending in any form to Gentiles should be secondary, however, to
providing interest-free funds for Jews. Any loan without interest to a Jew
is a good deed (mitzvot) and an act of loving kindness (chesed).s3 Some
scholars go so far as to link the economic success of immigrant Jews to
the availability of interest-free loans provided by their communities."
There is, however, no restriction on capital partnerships between Jews
and Gentiles.
It is difficult to square the careful attention rabbinical authorities
have devoted to the interest prohibition with the development and gen-
54. ARNOLD COHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO JEWISH CIVIL LAW 211 (1991).
55. ZIPPERSTEIN, supra note 52, at 41.
56. Id.
57. COHEN, supra note 54, at 212.
58. BASRI, supra note 53, at 156.
59. Most authorities forbid indexing, although a few feel that it is something of an
exception as it can lead to illegitimate profit for the borrower. MEIR TAMARI, "WITH ALL
YOUR POSSESSIONS": JEWISH ETHICS AND ECONOMIC LIFE 203 (1987).
60. The Qur'an contains the first non-Jewish reference to Jewish moneylending prac-
tices. Id. at 163. The Qur'anic portrayal of Jews in this regard, while probably accurate
historically, demonstrates the depth of misunderstanding and prejudice between Jews and
Muslims.
61. BASRI, supra note 53, at 179.
62. TAMARI, supra note 59, at 180-81. Maimonides, whose position is a minority one,
felt that if a Jew provides interest-free monies to a gentile, the gentile will simply reloan the
money for profit; he would thus require Jews to lend to gentiles at interest.
63. Id. at 170.
64. Id.
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eral approval"5 of heter iska as Halacha. 6 This term refers to a form of
partnership agreement designed to circumvent the textual prohibition on
interest in commercial transactions.6" Evidenced in a document known as
a shtar iska, a partnership is ostensibly created in which one person sup-
plies capital and the other supplies labor and investment expertise.6 8 The
person receiving the funds stipulates in the contract that he has previ-
ously been paid for his services.69 If the money is lost through theft or
accident, this loss will be borne, at least in theory, by the lender."0 How-
ever, while this rule is the default, heter iskas can, and almost always do,
contain contractual provisions requiring the borrower to assume responsi-
bility for the funds regardless of what happens to them.7 1 Only if the bor-
rower is negligent will she be responsible for the full amount. If the
money is lost, two witnesses are necessary to prove that the loss was not
an act of negligence. Since heter iska contracts can specify which two
witnesses they will require, the lender usually requires that the two wit-
nesses be people whose testimony will be impossible to obtain. The bor-
rower thus ends up with responsibility for any loss. 73 A false risk has been
created. If a heter iska is carefully drafted, it will function identically to a
loan.7 1 Once the heter iska came into existence, "the prohibition on inter-
est lost all practical significance in business transactions."'
65. Not all authorities permit the heter iska. BASRI, supra note 53, at 167. It is particu-
larly difficult for some scholars to justify heter iska when its use is extended beyond busi-
ness loans whose repayment is contingent on the success of a particular venture. TAMARI,
supra note 59, at 184-185.
66. There are four primary methods through which Halacha is created. They are: 1)
support from the Scriptures; 2) acceptance by majority rule; 3) long acceptance though cus-
tom, usage and practice; and 4) recognition by a respected authority. ZIPPERSTEIN, supra
note 52, at 21. Heter iska, despite only questionably escaping from the textual prohibition
on interest, has become law through a combination of the other three methods.
It is worth noting that once one moves away from the plain meaning of text in inter-
preting scriptures, the same problem - that there are no natural limits on the interpreter
- arises as in constitutional law. For example, Tamari states that in today's world, any
interest-bearing transaction is acceptable since it involves an element of risk. TAMARI, supra
note 59, at 185. The concept of "risk", however, is not mentioned in the scriptural verses but
was read in through the exegeses of later generations as a rationale for the law. Tamari
turns to the notion of risk to eviscerate the plain-meaning of the text.
The reluctance of many Islamic jurists to accept such legal sources as equity (istihsan)
because they could "become a means of circumventing [the Shari'ah's] general principles"
seems well justified by the Jewish experience with heter iska. KAMALI, supra note 20, at 246.
67. Non-commercial loans require other mechanisms. For instance, the heter mechira, a
type of lease/buy back arrangement, is the favored method for structuring a loan for per-
sonal consumption. BASal, supra note 53, at 167.
68. ZIPPERSTEIN, supra note 52, at 44.
69. Id. This stipulation is required by a rabbinic ruling that partnerships in which one
party provides capital and the other labor involve payment to the laborer.
70. COHEN, supra note 54, at 217.
71. Telephone interview with Rabbi Michael Whitman (Dec. 12, 1994).
72. COHEN, supra note 54, at 217.
73. Whitman, supra note 71.
74. ZIPPERSTEIN, supra note 52, at 44.
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Despite the fact that heter iska is not mentioned anywhere in the
Mishnah or Torah, almost all rabbinical authorities now approve of it. It
has been said that heter iskas may make the Torah look "like a jest and
be treated with derision ... [but] the just will walk in them. 75 The justi-
fication for this device stems from a belief that the underlying rationale
for the prohibition is no longer valid. When the Torah was written, Jews
were almost exclusively farmers, and loans were needed by the poor to
buy the lasic necessities of life. Those needing loans were, thus, the least
able to pay interest, whereas the wealthiest, those most likely to loan the
necessary funds, had little need for the additional return. By the Middle
Ages, however, Jews were primarily a commercial people, and these
changed circumstances required the development of heter iska." The
heter iska has become law through long-standing customary acceptance
and consensus, a process akin to the Islamic ijma.7 8
Although heter iskas are generally executed in private banking, 79
which preserves at least the facade of observance and reflects the letter of
the Halacha, they circumvent its spirit. Partially as a result, many ortho-
dox Jews have alienated themselves from the State of Israel due to what
they perceive to be a widespread charging of interest.80 "The State wishes
to be a Jewish state . . . but at the same time it does not know how to
translate its "Judaism" into the language of reality without affecting its
secular nature." ' The establishment of equity investment, interest-free
banking services in Israel, modelled on the equity investment paradigm of
Islamic banks, would demonstrate that the Israeli government was, at
least in one small area, taking a step toward the letter of the religious law.
75. COHEN, supra note 54, at 217 (quoting Terumat Hadeshan, Responsuni 302). De-
spite the transparency of this sort of device, the great Islamic jurist Abu Hanifa approved
use of a similar device known as heyal, literally translated as "tricks." El-Fishaway, supra
note 5.
76. COHEN, supra note 54, at 216. This line of reasoning is highly unsatisfactory to
those who see interest as a form of malum in se. One commentary explains that interest is
prohibited because men should labor for their profits lest they forget that God created the
cosmos and will provide for mankind. BASRI, supra note 53, at 201-02. Other Talmudic
scholars have condemned interest because it is selfish to take from others when there is no
risk for the lender. Id. at 201. Both of these condemnations of interest hold regardless of
how the interest is characterized. The undeniable fact is that heter iska allows Jews to
profit from loaning each other money with virtually no risk and no labor. As Tamari makes
clear, Judaism examines interest as a moral-ethical problem. TAMARI, supra note 59, at 177.
The existence of a dodge or loophole, no matter how ingenious, should not excuse a person
taking advantage of it.
77. COHEN, supra note 54, at 216.
78. The actual justification for heter iska resembles the Islamic concept of maslahah
mursaleh or public interest.
79. "All financial institutions and banks in the State of Israel operate under a heter
iska." TAMARI, supra note 59, at 185.
80. Izhak Englard, The Problem of Jewish Law in a Jewish State, in JEWISH LAW IN
ANCIENT AND MODERN ISRAEL 143, 165 (Haim H. Cohn ed., 1971).
81. Izhak Englard, The Relationship Between Religion and State in Israel in JEWISH
LAW IN ANCIENT AND MODERN ISRAEL 168, 169 (Haim H. Cohn ed., 1971).
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It may therefore have a salutary effect on reintegrating previously alien-
ated individuals into the Israeli mainstream.82
More tangibly, many of the Jews in Israel most concerned with obey-
ing the Halacha have aligned themselves against the current Middle-
Eastern peace process. Recognizing that the fundamentalist Muslims,
whom they mistrust so profoundly, are pressing for similar interest-free
banking services in the Arab world will, at the very least, push ultra-reli-
gious Israelis toward a realization that they share some common ground
with their current enemies. The commercial benefits likely to accrue from
the injection of new Arab capital into Israel will create a pragmatic impe-
tus toward discovering this common legal ground.
The numerous shared characteristics of Islamic and Jewish usury
laws are apparent. The major difference between these laws is that Jews
are allowed to lend to non-Jews at interest.8 In a transaction between
religious Jews and religious Muslims, even those Jews who consider Mus-
lims potential co-religionists would feel that the Halachic obligation to
avoid interest is satisfied by simply executing a heter iska when lending
between Jewish and Islamic investors. The Islamic investor will probably
require a stronger guarantee against interest.
C. Will Heter Iska Satisfy the Islamic Usury Law?
Nabil A. Saleh warns against rationalization and flexibility because
"an Islamic banking system has no raison d'etre and no prospect for suc-
cess unless it safeguards the much-heralded legitimacy of its means and
objectives; otherwise the whole system will be perverted and its adherents
betrayed."'" In a similar vein, the immensely influential Ayatollah
Khomeini issued a fatwa forbidding any technical mechanism that would
circumvent the ban on riba.8 5 Fundamentalists are unlikely to approve of
heter iska.
Heter iska, however, may well satisfy the moderate Islamic ap-
proaches to usury, as it enjoys a more theoretical basis than most of the
devices actually in practice in Arab nations, such as simply referring to
interest as "service charges." Second, the very fact that Jews employ a
partnership agreement in modern banking, even if it is hollow, publicizes
the fact that Jews and Muslims have similar usury laws.86 It also serves as
a reminder that Jews and Muslims share the same concern over the fol-
82. Although clearly it would not address the Israeli government's financial practices,
which openly involve dealing in interest-bearing instruments.
83. Another difference is that Jewish charities are permitted to earn interest on their
endowments. COHEN, supra note 54, at 214.
84. SALEH, supra note 12, at 147.
85. AMIN, supra note 24, at 25.
86. The heter iska was developed, at least partially, as a mechanism through which the
Islamic world could trade with the West via Jews. ZIPPERSTEIN, supra note 52, at 11-12.
There is thus something of a history of resourceful Jews looking to the law as a means of
bridging cultural chasms.
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lowing principles: 1) the protection of disadvantaged elements of their re-
spective societies; 2) the moral component of business transactions; 3) the
labor theories of value; and 4) adherence to religious authorities inter-
preting the word of the same God.
D. Interest-Free Banking As It Currently Exists in the Islamic World
Middle Eastern governments employ a variety of methods to evade
the Qur'anic textual ban on interest. Kuwait technically bans ribawi
transactions in its Civil Code of 1980, but also permits the charging and
collecting of interest in Article 102 of the Commercial Code of 1980.87 The
United Arab Emirates' Code of Civil Procedure explicitly allows the
charging of interest.88 Other Middle Eastern nations opt for semantic
ruses. For instance, the "service charges" employed by a number of Arab
nations often identically reflect the interest rates charged by Western
banks. Some Islamic scholars adhere to the rigid view that labels, and not
substance, are controlling. Talib Siraaj Abdus-Shahid, for instance, ex-
plains that "[a] service fee cannot be made into interest and vice versa
simply by stating that the charge in some way corresponds to an interest
rate. If the bank's service is fairly-earned income, it is lawful under
SHARIAH." 8 9 However, the behavior of nations ostensibly observant of the
Shar'iah demonstrates the disingenuousness of this line of reasoning. 0
Saad El-Fishaway, the previous Senior Advisor for Middle Eastern Af-
fairs at the World Bank and Special Advisor to each President of the
Bank from 1974-87, recalls negotiating a $750 million loan for the Saudi
Arabian government in 1974. At first, the Saudi negotiators insisted that
the annual increase on the debt be termed "service fees." However, when
El-Fishaway explained that this terminology would not suffice for pur-
poses of marketing the bonds, the Saudis agreed to reference the annual
increase as interest.
91
Despite this general failure to observe the Islamic prohibition on in-
terest at the governmental level, individual investors in the Middle East
have flocked to Islamic lending institutions in substantial and growing
numbers. As a result, a great deal of capital is likely to flow to whomever
offers the most attractive riba-free banking services in the near future.
87. SALEH, supra note 12, at 7.
88. Id. at 8. However, when commercial issues do manage to reach the Islamic legal
courts of the United Arab Emirates, all interest payments are voided.
89. Talib Siraaj Abdus-Shahid, Interest, Usury and the Islamic Development Bank:
Alternative Non-Interest Financing, 1984 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1095, 1136.
90. Even Iran, probably the most radical of the Islamic nations, allows its state com-
mercial banks to pay "fees on loans" that vary in relation to governmental policies and the
rate of inflation. Iran: Banks Put Up Rates, MEED MIDDLE E. Bus. WKLY., June 5, 1992, at
12.
91. El-Fishaway, supra note 5.
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III. THE MIDDLE EAST AND A FUTURE PEACE: THE VIABILITY OF
INTEREST-FREE BANKING As A FUEL FOR ECONOMIC BOOM
Peace could bring spectacular profits to the Middle East if Israel and
the Arab nations reformulate their relationship into one of economic sym-
biosis. It is likely that much of this growth will be channeled through
investments acceptable to religious Islamic investors.
A. Can Interest-Free Banking Compete in the Modern World?
The viability of interest-free banking, primarily equity investment
and murabaha banking, is a central issue. If indeed lending and borrow-
ing at interest are integral to the survival of modern banks, lending insti-
tutions in Israel will be loath to offer interest-free financial services."
However, experience in the Muslim world has demonstrated that equity
investment deposits consistently return rates comparable to floating in-
terest rates.
"Advocates of Islamic banking say the 1990s will be the decade when
the industry will break into the commanding heights of Middle East
economies and start to beat upon the doors of global finance."as This
forecast is becoming a reality. Kleinwort Benson, a large international
bank, has realized enviable profits in the short-term Islamic trade finance
market and is now arranging more than $4 billion annually in finance for
Islamic ventures." An executive at the Saudi British Bank claims that,
from a banker's perspective, "[w]ith the exception of Hong Kong, [the
Middle East] is the best place in the world for a banker to be."95
The Economist reports that, "Islamic banking is not merely consis-
tent with capitalism ... but in certain respects may be better suited to it
than western banking."9 It explains that the Islamic belief that "risk be
rewarded only if it leads to productive investment" is likely to help create
greater growth and increased monitoring of borrowers, both areas in
which Western banking could use some lessons.9 7
There have also been failures of a relatively high magnitude, al-
though most of these occurred in the early years of Islamic banking. The
Dar al-Mal al-Islami (DMI) lost $48 million in a short period in 1983-84.98
92. This does not refer to banks merely offering to hold investors' money without any
increased return. Banks would without doubt thrive if their depositors refused to accept
interest. Yet with the exception of a small number of very religious investors of both faiths
willing to lend their money without any sort of increased return as a religious good deed,
depositors would simply avoid institutions refusing to pay interest.
93. MEED MIDDLE E. Bus. WKLY., Sept. 25, 1992.
94. Kleinwort Raises $4 Billion Islamic Trade Finance, MEED MIDDLE E. Bus. WKLY.,
Sept. 10, 1993, at 6.
95. Preparing for the Service Revolution, MEED MIDDLE E. Bus. WKLY., May 14, 1993,
at 9.
96. Banking Behind the Veil, supra note 34.
97. Id.
98. Id.
1995
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Further, a disproportionate number of scandals seems to have arisen
through scurrilous behavior in Islamic banks. 9 Other negatives result
from the significantly greater administrative costs of having to document
sales and resales in murabaha00 and oversee joint investors in mudaraba.
Despite these flaws, a sanguine appraisal of the prospects for Islamic
banking seems well merited. The early problems faced in Islamic banks
are best seen as growing pains and necessary failures arising out of
innovation.
For those Islamic investors who do not subscribe to the most radical
interpretation of the textual prohibition on interest, banking at interest
will always be available. In the case of the most religious Islamic inves-
tors, who also happen to be among those most opposed to peace in the
Middle East,1"1 the creation of interest-free banking services in Israel
would present an opportunity for investment, while concurrently laying
the foundation for peace through the overlap between the Islamic and
Jewish laws on usury.
Whether a modern economy can thrive without interest in any form
is a separate question and one that has yet to be answered. 10 The ques-
tion, however, is immaterial to this discussion, which advocates only use
of interest-free banking as a vehicle for Islamic investment in Israel.10s
B. The Extraordinary Economic Potential of the Middle East
Should peace in the Middle East ever become a reality, the potential
for economic growth throughout the region is significant. Israel boasts ex-
pertise in high technology, while its highly trained work force is compen-
sated at less than 50% of the American average. This makes Israeli prod-
ucts noticeably less expensive than their American counterparts.1 " An
even greater potential benefit for the Arab nations lies in their exposure
to Israel's agricultural expertise. Israel's agricultural advances could pro-
vide massive benefits for the entire Middle East with its arid climate. 05
The advantages for Israel in the event of a region-wide peace are
equally enormous. The Jewish State is currently unable to purchase oil
from its neighbor, Saudi Arabia, and the other Arab nations. As a result,
it is forced to satisfy its energy needs on the world market at great ex-
99. See, e.g., id.
100. Syedain, supra note 44.
101. See Miller, supra note 23, at 123, 124; see also El-Fishaway, supra note 5.
102. Although Pakistan may be taking fitful steps in this direction. See Lahore, Paki-
stan; Islam's Interest, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 1992, at 33.
103. There is, of course, potential for reciprocal investment by Israelis in Arab lands,
but this possibility will not be explored in this article because the vast majority of Israeli
investors are satisfied with heter iska.
104. Daniel Lubetzky, Incentives for Peace and Profits: Federal Legislation to En-
courage U.S. Enterprises to Invest in Arab-Israeli Joint Ventures, 1994 MICH. J. INT'L. L.
405, 413.
105. El-Fishaway, supra note 5.
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pense. Furthermore, the Arab world represents an immense consumer
market for Israel's manufactured goods and rapidly-growing economy.106
Indeed, the economic advantages likely to accrue to both parties have
been a primary motivation for the initial peace efforts. Articles XI and
XVI of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles "address and rec-
ognize the mutual benefit of regional economic cooperation. '"107
Attaining the requisite level of mutual trust needed to realize eco-
nomic benefit will be an immensely difficult task and is still years in the
future.108 Innovative use of law, however, can bolster this process and ac-
celerate its realization. Until now, the role of law in the establishment of
peace has generally been ignored or relegated to unrealistic projects.109
However, a natural and nearly costless option for aiding the nascent
peace while expanding financing in the region already exists as a result of
the usury laws of the Jewish and Muslim peoples.
IV. A SHARED LEGAL MEANING
Shared legal traditions represent profound cultural similarities. Both
practice and theory indicate that overlapping jurisprudences have the po-
tential to bring groups closer together. Israel and its Arab neighbors
should take advantage of this fact, both as a profit-making device and as
a bridge for peace, by making mudaraba and murabaha available to Is-
lamic investors in Israel.
A. Law as a Symbol of Shared Traditions and Values
The study of law can serve as a reminder that Jews and Muslims
worship the same God. Additionally, it provides a mechanism for linking
cultures. Law can, and has, served as a bridge between peoples with over-
lapping legal traditions.
The profound similarity between the Jewish and Islamic approaches
to usury is readily apparent. Some scholars have claimed the Islamic pro-
hibition on usury evolved from the Jewish law. 110 The root of this similar-
106. The Israeli economy grew from $36.7 billion in 1987 to $58.6 billion in 1991.
Lubetzky, supra note 104, at 414.
107. Id. at 410. Annexes III and IV of the Declaration also focus on economic
integration.
108. See, e.g., Haberman, supra note 2.
109. Lubetzky, supra note 104, at 406. Lubetzky, for instance, calls for using United
States trade organizations and tax incentives to encourage Americans to invest in Arab-
Israeli joint ventures. However appealing these proposals may seem, the possibility of seri-
ous American interest in such projects is remote. The overwhelming support of American
voters for smaller government in the last national election coupled with the xenophobia of
Jesse Helms, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is likely to curtail
any expansion of foreign aid programs.
110. Joseph Schacht for one claims that the Quranic law arose directly from the Hala-
cha. He finds evidence for his position in the fact that Jews were money changers in Arab
lands at the time of the Prophet. SALEH, supra note 12, at 14. EI-Fishaway also suggested
that the Islamic law was derivative of its Jewish counterpart. El-Fishaway, supra note 5.
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ity is a deeply divisive issue. The Shar'iah and Halacha are both posi-
tively the word of God. Thus, any discussion of one law progenerating the
other immediately evokes a fundamental hostility as it sheds doubt on
the divine origin of the later source, the Qur'an. A potentially unifying
solution to this problem exists in the religious beliefs of the two peoples.
Jews and Muslims both worship the same God."1 ' "(A)ll divinely revealed
laws emanate from one and the same source, namely, Almighty God, and
as such they convey a basic message which is common to them all. In-
deed, the Qur'an itself explains that 'We revealed the Torah in which
there is guidance and light.' "1 2 Similarly, Jewish thinkers have explained
that the Islamic faith is closer to Judaism than is any other religion."1 ' To
Muslims, the Qur'an is the last and definitive text that God delivered to
man:
Islamic tradition teaches that the Torah, New Testament, and the
Qur'an are all derived from the same heavenly source, but that the
Jews and Christians have, over the course of time, distorted the texts
of their respective scriptures, whereas the Muslims have in their pos-
session the pure, unadulterated text. 1"
In principle, therefore, the Torah's commands as written, and there-
fore undistorted, should be applicable to Muslims unless the Qur'an spe-
cifically abrogates them. 5 Perhaps somewhat inconsistently, Islamic ju-
rists have, in practice, generally ruled that the Torah's laws are only
binding on Muslims if the Shar'iah specifically includes them."' But be-
cause the Jewish usury law has received explicit divine approval in the
Qur'an, Allah's approval of the Jewish law is clearly demonstrated.
The fact that Jews and Muslims worship the same God is easily for-
gotten in the anger that separates the two faiths. The shared prohibition
on interest can help to diminish the fear and mistrust that has character-
ized Jewish-Muslim dealings for the last half-century. On every occasion
that an interest-free transaction between Jews and Muslims takes place,
it will remind both parties that in their fundamental spiritual beliefs they
are not as far apart as it may appear.
"The problem [in establishing Arab-Israeli commercial ties] lies in
breaking the negative cycle of mistrust, violence, and instability. ' 1 7 Law
111. Maimonides, for instance, felt that Muslims, unlike Christians, were true monothe-
ists and hence potential Jews. David Novak, The Treatment of Islam and Muslims in the
Legal Writings of Maimonides, in STUDIES IN ISLAMIC AND JUDAIC TRADITIONS 233, 238, 246
(William M. Brinner & Stephen D. Ricks, eds. 1986).
112. KAMALI, supra note 20, at 229.
113. Novak, supra note 111, at 238, 246.
114. David S. Powers, Reading/Misreading One Another's Scriptures, in STUDIES IN
ISLAMIC AND JUDAIC TRADITIONS 109, 109 (William M. Brinner & Stephen D. Ricks, eds.
1986).
115. KAMALI, supra note 20, at 230.
116. Id.
117. Lubetzky, supra note 104, at 410.
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has tremendous potential to bridge cultural chasms and break this cy-
cle. " s Material examples justifying this assessment abound. For instance,
when European Jews immigrated to the United States in large numbers
around the turn of the century:
[R]abbis and lawyers .. .devised the most persuasive synthesis be-
tween Judaism and Americanism. As they redefined Jewish legitimacy
in American legal terms, they fused Torah and Constitution as the
sacred texts of a Judeo-American legal tradition. 9
Jewish immigrants thus had their transition to the New World eased
through similarities between the Halacha and the Constitution. This pro-
cess continued as Jews became increasingly integrated into American so-
ciety. "The discovery, or invention, of a unitary Judeo-American tradition
of law and justice has enabled Jews to feel genuinely American. ' 20 The
Jewish experience demonstrates that the convergence of two legal tradi-
tions, even if one is secular and the other divine, can have a powerful
acclimating effect. Because the Jewish and Muslim legal systems are both
of divine origin, it should be noticeably easier, at least in areas in which
there is significant substantive overlap,12 1 to forge (or rediscover) a shared
Judeo-Islamic cultural identity.1 2 1
Abstract studies of the theoretical nature of law provide powerful
support for the claim that legal similarities, especially when divinely
based, reflect profound likenesses, and even cultural bridges, in societies.
Philosophers, recently joined by legal anthropologists, "have been dis-
cussing the nature of law for more than two millennia."'M3 The consensus
is that a law's efficacy is dependent on "a state of equilibrium" which
reflects the values of most people in a given society. 24 Clifford Geertz
118. Although there are clearly limits. As Professor Khaled Abou El-Fadl explains, "le-
gal culture is a subculture." Lecture at Yale Law School (Dec. 15, 1994). Thus, the technical
legal similarities between Jewish and Islamic law per se will only impact on limited seg-
ments of society. However, bankers and investors will also gain exposure to the other cul-
tures' usury law in the ordinary course of affairs.
119. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, RABBIS AND LAWYERS: THE JOURNEY FROM TORAH TO CONSTI-
TUTION xvi-xvii (1990).
120. Id. at 24.
121. The interaction of two divinely-based jurisprudential traditions is likely to provide
little room for maneuver in areas of substantive divergence.
122. Indeed, the limits of the fusion between the Jewish and American legal systems
have arisen from their asymmetrical origins. As Suzanne Last Stone has written:
one cannot fully understand Jewish law without considering the religious framework that
makes Jewish law possible and renders it intelligible to its practitioners .... concepts [such]
as the revelatory nature of Jewish law, the religious qualifications of authoritative interpret-
ers of the law, the veneration of early masters of the tradition, imitatio dei, and divine
accountability.
Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model
in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 821 (1993).
123. A.L. Epstein, The Case Method in the Field of Law, in THE CRAFT OF SOCIAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 205 (A.L. Epstein ed., 1979).
124. ELIOT DISMORE CHAPPLE & CARLETON STEVENS COON, PRINCIPLES OF ANTHROPOLOGY
674 (1978).
1995
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
expresses a parallel idea. "[M]an is an animal suspended in webs of sig-
nificance he himself has spun."125 The deep similarity between the Jewish
and Islamic laws of usury, a central concept in the economic structure of
two commercial peoples, proves that Jews and Muslims share at least one
significant aspect of their respective volkgeists.
1 2 6
This analysis garners additional strength from the divine origins of
Muslim and Jewish jurisprudence. "[S]acred symbols function to synthe-
size a people's ethos - the tone, character, and quality of their life, its
moral and aesthetic style and mood - and their world view.1 27 What is
true about the convergence of legal norms and meanings is even more
profound when the laws are divine in origin.
Even though Jews have functionally evaded the interest prohibition
through the use of heter iska, and many Muslims similarly ignore the ban
on riba, neither Jews nor Muslims can escape their shared heritage. Fur-
thermore, their respective usury laws demonstrate three commonalities:
1) both groups approach business in a principled way; 2) God plays a
significant role in their respective cultures; and 3) their basic values de-
rive from ancient traditions.
V. CONCLUSION: CREATE INTEREST-FREE BANKING OPPORTUNITIES FOR
ISLAMIC INVESTORS IN ISRAEL
Interest-free financing does not fit easily into standard western con-
cepts of banking. A Governor of the Bank of England has stated that
British banking laws simply were not designed to cover institutions deal-
ing with Islamic financial services. 128 As it currently stands in the Arab
world, riba-free banking "is a minnow in the sea of a global financial sys-
tem based on riba . . .it cannot survive without certain religious com-
promises.... There is no shortage of Islamic money; the problem is find-
ing suitable outlets for it.112 9
Israel is well suited to the task of providing financial services with
religious restrictions.1 30 Banks in Israel and even the United States3 1 that
count religious Jews as their clients employ a board of rabbinical advisors
125. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5 (1973).
126. The writings of the eminent legal anthropologist Leo Pospisil suggest that perhaps
the creation of national boundaries separating (for the most part) Jews and Muslims super-
imposed an artificial and hostile legal level, that of the nation state, on top of the religious
laws of Jews and Muslims, which were not wholly dissimilar. See generally LEOPOLD POSPI-
SIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIvE THEORY 119, 121 (1971) (suggesting theory of
multiple legal levels). Evidence for this theory is found in the relative harmony within which
Jews and Muslims lived under the Ottoman Empire.
127. GEERTZ, supra note 125, at 89.
128. Suratgar, supra note 13, at 1090.
129. Syedain, supra note 44.
130. The potential for interest-free investment in Israel is particularly impressive due
to the general laxity of Arab governments in enforcing the prohibition on riba.
131. The most prominent example is a bank in Baltimore known as the Bank Vaad
Hakashrus. Whitman, supra note 71.
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to approve of all actions and then restructure transactions that fail to
meet Halachic requirements."3 2
The central difficulty in realizing this vision is one of disseminating
knowledge. Despite the geographical proximity of Israel and the Islamic
nations, there is a deep ignorance of Jewish scriptures in the Islamic
world.13 Those who do have some familiarity with Jewish law are un-
likely to be familiar with the extent to which it is observed in Israel.
Heter iska is virtually unknown in the Arab world."" EI-Fishaway ex-
plains: "If they knew in Egypt what was happening in Israel it would
make a big difference. The lack of knowledge is unbelievable considering
the proximity."185 Even though heter iska itself would probably be insuf-
ficient as a means of meeting the strict riba-free standard of Islamic fun-
damentalists, the mere fact that an interest avoidance mechanism exists
could lend credibility to the Israeli government's peace efforts in the eyes
of Muslims.
If the Israeli, Jordanian, and other governments commit themselves
to forging lasting peace in the Middle East, the interest-free commonality
may serve as a small 8 6 step in this direction. Israel's major banks could
establish mudaraba and murabaha accounts. Arab leaders would then be
able to publicize the fact that Jewish law requires that financial transac-
tions between Jews be free of interest, and Israeli banks would advertise
their interest-free products. Especially for the secular Arab govern-
ments,1 37 the Jewish legal system's treatment of interest presents a seren-
dipitous means for squaring these two aims. In this situation, the Arab
governments can demonstrate that d6tente with Israel will not be anti-
thetical to the Shar'iah.8 s
For hundreds of years, Jews acted as financiers in the Islamic
world.8 9 Shared legal traditions could help to revive major financial and
132. Id.
133. Powers, supra note 114, at 109.
134. El-Fishaway, supra note 5.
135. Id. This cultural ignorance is proving highly resilient. As The New York Times
recently reported, "The Arab world's most famous poet has been expelled from the Arab
Writers' Union for meeting with Israeli intellectuals." Youssef M. Ibrahim, Arabs Bitterly
Split on Cultural Links With Israel, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 7, 1995, at A8.
136. The author fully realizes that the course this article suggests is far from a panacea
and only represents an incremental advance toward peace. Unless joint interest-free invest-
ment is accompanied by far-reaching and sensitive diplomacy, peace will almost surely re-
main elusive.
137. See Kristan L. Peters Hamlin, Note, The Impact of Islamic Revivalism on Con-
tract and Usury Law in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, 22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 351, 353, 380
(1987).
138. Even some of the most vocal fundamentalists have, on occasion, admitted that
"there is nothing inherently anti-Islamic in peace between a Jewish state and Muslims."
Miller, supra note 23, at 139. According to Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi, a major fundamen-
talist leader, "The first Islamic state itself had a constitutional document between the
prophet and the Jews of Medina." Id. at 139.
139. EL-ASHKER, supra note 7, at 24. Iraqi Jews and Egyptian Copts dominated Islamic
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commercial discourse between Jews and Muslims. Joint Arab-Israeli in-
terest-free investment is likely to be profitable for all involved, as the
combination of Arab capital with Israeli technology could bring tremen-
dous growth to the Middle East. In the process, Islamic fundamentalists
and Israeli hardliners will be exposed to each others' legal traditions.
Their enemies will no longer be faceless infidels, but people with
profound cultural similarities - and maybe, one day, enemies no longer.
commerce since 1453.
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A Paradox: Death Penalty Flourishes in
U.S. While Declining Worldwide
Laurence A. Grayer*
This article discusses how international law and individual countries
address the death penalty, with an emphasis on the United States and its
comparatively unorthodox approach. The historical development and ra-
tionale behind the death penalty will be analyzed to assist in constructing
a trend and to demonstrate the most probable role of the death penalty
in the future. This article is also intended to be a useful resource for any
practitioner with a need or desire to understand both international and
United States' law and theory surrounding the death penalty. Finally,
this article suggests that the United States must reevaluate its continued
acceptance of the death penalty if it seeks to remain a democratic civil
rights leader.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States' Federal Government, as well as a majority of its
separate state governments, oppose the international trend moving to-
wards the abolition of the death penalty.1 The United States regularly
criticizes other countries, such as Iran, Iraq, and China, for their civil
rights violations, but paradoxically joins with these same countries in
supporting the death penalty.2 Countries that look to the United States
for leadership and direction have trouble understanding the United
States' reluctance to abolish capital punishment.'
* Associate, Margolis & Edelstein, Philadelphia, PA; D.B.A., 1992, The George Wash-
ington University; J.D., 1995, St. John's University. This article is dedicated to Samuel
Nicinski, for his moral guidance.
1. Roger Hood, The Injustice of the Death Penalty, in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE
MACHINERY OF DEATH: A SHOCKING INDICTMENT OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 175, 183 (1995).
2. Id. at 175. In 1989, the United States voted against the adoption of the Second Op-
tional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the
Abolition of the Death Penalty, and only ratified the Covenant in 1992 when a reservation
was entered to the section calling for the abolition of the death penalty for those under the
age of eighteen. Id. "A mere glance at the list of countries where executions have been
carried out, shows that they are, almost without exception, countries which have been criti-
cized for their violation of human rights by the U.S." Id. at 176. "One wonders, therefore,
how the federal and state governments can reconcile their place among nations which exe-
cute their citizens with their claims to be upholders of human rights." Id. See also WILLIAM
A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 170 (1993).
3. See generally Hood, supra note 1. For "those who admire the U.S., it is disconcert-
ing and deeply troubling to find, both at the federal level and in the majority of the states,
so much resistance to the international trend which moves apace towards the abolition of
the death penalty worldwide." Id. at 176.
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The United States remains the only liberal democracy to regularly
execute criminals.4 As of 1994, 90 countries have abolished the death pen-
alty either de jure or de facto, while 103 countries have retained the
death penalty.' Approximately two countries per year abolish the death
penalty;' and it is estimated that by the year 2000, the majority of coun-
tries in the world will have eliminated the death penalty completely.
7
In contrast, the United States' Supreme Court once found the death
penalty to violate the U.S. Constitution's Eighth Amendment as being
cruel and unusual8 , but reestablished the death penalty in 1976.' As of
April 1994, there were 2,848 death row inmates in the United States,"0
and the number of annual executions has continued to rise steadily.1 A
compilation of statistics from seven states reveals that four out of every
five Americans favor the death penalty.1 Furthermore, of the 184 mem-
4. Id.
5. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY LIST OF ABOLITIONIST AND RETEN-
TIONIST COUNTRIES 2 (1994). A de facto country retains the death penalty for ordinary
crimes but has not executed anyone during the past ten years or more. AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL, UN MEMBER STATES AND THEIR POSITIONS ON THE DEATH PENALTY FOR CRIMES COM-
MITTED BY PERSONS BELOW 18 YEARS OF AGE 10 (1994) [hereinafter DEATH PENALTY FOR
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PERSONS BELOW 18 YEARS OF AGE]. Many of the states which have
retained the death penalty would only use it in an extremely rare situation. David Matas,
The Death Penalty as a Violation of International Human Rights Norms, in AMNESTY IN-
TERNATIONAL, THE MACHINERY OF DEATH: A SHOCKING INDICTMENT OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES 35, 38 (1995).
6. William A. Schabas, International Law and the Death Penalty, in AMNESTY INTER-
NATIONAL, THE MACHINERY OF DEATH: A SHOCKING INDICTMENT OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES 22 (1995).
7. Matas, supra note 5 (stating that "[b]y the year 2000, the majority of states in the
world will be abolitionist in law.").
8. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (ruling that the death penalty was discrimi-
natory, violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, arbitrary, and
irrational, thus violative of the Due Process Clause).
9. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (establishing the legal framework for capital
punishment in the U.S., attempting to avoid the arbitrary and discriminatory nature of ear-
lier laws).
10. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 16 (1994)
[hereinafter NAACP].
11. Henry Schwarzschild, The Death Penalty in the United States: A Commentary
and Review, in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE MACHINERY OF DEATH: A SHOCKING INDICT-
MENT OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 6 (1995). In recent years no more
than thirty people a year have been executed, but this number is increasing. Id.
12. CAMBRIDGE SURVEY RESEARCH, AN ANALYSIS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT IN FLORIDA 7 (1985); CAMBRIDGE SURVEY RESEARCH, AN ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL ATTI-
TUDES TOWARD THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (1986);
THOMAS AND HUTCHESON, GEORGIA RESIDENTS' ATTITUDES TOWARD THE DEATH PENALTY, THE
DISPOSITION OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS, AND RELATED ISSUES 22 (1986); BUREAU OF SOCIOLOGI-
CAL RESEARCH, NEBRASKA SURVEY: JOHNSON AND BOOTH 4 (1988); GRASMICH AND BURSIK, AT-
TITUDES OF OKLAHOMANS TOWARDS THE DEATH PENALTY 6 (1988); CAMBRIDGE SURVEY RE-
SEARCH, NEW YORK PUBLIC OPINION POLL, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
(1989); HANEY AND HURTADO, CALIFORNIANS' ATTITUDES ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY: RESULTS
OF A STATEWIDE SURVEY 34 (1989); VITO AND KELL, ATTITUDES IN THE STATE OF KENTUCKY ON
THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (1989).
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ber states of the United Nations, the United States is second only to Iraq
in the number of executions of minors over the past ten years."8 The
United States has even violated international law1" in the enforcement of
a discriminatory death penalty.15
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE DEATH PENALTY
A variety of sources in international law either restrict the death pen-
alty or provide for its elimination. These comprise two categories. First,
there are "optional treaties" in which countries commit themselves to the
abolition of the death penalty. Second, there are "fundamental minimum
human rights standards" associated with the death penalty, binding on
all states by virtue of their membership in the community of nations.
A. Historical View of the International Abolitionist Movement
There are several early examples of opposition to the death penalty.
The first recorded parliamentary debate on the death penalty was held in
427 B.C. when Diodotus, arguing that the death penalty was not a deter-
rent, persuaded the Athenian Assembly in Greece to reverse its decision
to execute all adult males of the rebellious city of Mitylene. 6 During the
first century A.D., Amandagamani, the Buddhist King of Lanka, abol-
ished the death penalty during his reign, as did several kings who seceded
him. 17 In 818 A.D., Emperor Saga of Japan removed the death penalty
from Japanese law, abolishing it for the next three centuries. 8
The modern abolitionist movement is usually said to have begun in
Europe with Cesare Beccaria's 1764 Italian publication, On Crimes and
Punishments.9 In 1786, based on Beccaria's ideas, Grand Duke Leopold
of Tuscany promulgated a penal code which completely eliminated the
death penalty."' Since this time, and especially in the last two decades,
many countries have abolished the death penalty, either for all offenses8'
13. DEATH PENALTY FOR CRIMES COMMITTED BY PERSONS BELOW 18 YEARS OF AGE, supra
note 5. The United States has executed nine juveniles, while Iraq has executed thirteen over
the past ten years. Id.
14. See generally Schabas, supra note 6, at 26.
15. See, e.g., NAACP, supra note 10.
16. 3 THUCYDIDES, THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 25-50 (3rd ed. 1971).
17. C.H.S. Jawawardene, The Death Penalty in Ceylon, 3 CEYLON J. HIST. SOC. STUD.
166, 184 (1960).
18. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WHEN THE STATE KILLS . . . THE DEATH PENALTY: A
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE 72 (1989) [hereinafter WHEN THE STATE KILLS].
19. Id. The book contained the first sustained, systematic critique of the death penalty.
Id. Beccaria stated in 1764 that "[tihe death penalty cannot be useful because of the exam-
ple of barbarity it gives men ... [In addition,] [i]t seems absurd that the laws, which are
expressions of the public will, which detest and punish homicide, should themselves commit
it." CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 50 (1963).
20. WHEN THE STATE KILLS, supra note 18.
21. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY LIST OF ABOLITIONIST AND
RETENTIONIST COUNTRIES, supra note 5. The countries that have abolished the death penalty
for all offenses, and the year in which abolition was made mandatory, include Venezuela
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or for ordinary crimes."'
B. Current International Law
There are a variety of international laws which affect the death pen-
alty. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948, pre-
dicted the abolition of the death penalty."3 Likewise, the nine safeguards
adopted by resolutions of the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations2' established rules that limited the imposition of the death pen-
alty on juveniles and the mentally disordered. It further declared that the
death penalty may only be used when the guilt of the person charged is
based upon "clear and convincing evidence."25
The Sixth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights26
has been recognized by the European Court of Human Rights2 7 as virtu-
ally a consensus, completely abolishing the death penalty for
peacetime offenses. 28 Any member state of the Council of Europe
may become a party to this treaty. e
The Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death
Penalty0 (hereinafter "ICCPR") enables countries to insist upon
the abolition of the death penalty as part of their international
human rights obligations.3' The death penalty was the only issue
(1863), Portugal (1976), Denmark (1978), Luxembourg (1979), Nicaragua (1979), Norway
(1979), France (1981), Netherlands (1982), Australia (1985), Haiti (1987), Liechtenstein
(1987), German Democratic Republic (1987), Cambodia (1989), New Zealand (1989),
Romania (1989), Slovenia (1989), Andorra (1990), Croatia(1990), the Czech and Slovak Fed-
eral Republic (1990), Hungary (1990), Ireland (1990), Mozambique (1990), Namibia (1990),
Sao Tome and Principe (1990), Angola (1992), Switzerland (1992), Gambia (1993), Greece
(1993), Guinnea-Bissau (1993), and Hong Kong (1993). Id.
22. Id. Those states which have abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes include
Canada (1976), Spain (1978), Brazil (1979), Fiji (1979), Peru (1979), Cyprus (1983), El Sal-
vador (1983), Argentina (1984), Australia (1984), Nepal (1990), Paraguay(1992). Id.
23. U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., Supp. No. 217A, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Council of Europe: Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 22 I.L.M. 538
(1985).
27. Soering v. United Kingdom, 1981 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 161.
28. WHEN THE STATE KILLS, supra note 18, at 82. This is the first peace time treaty
abolishing the death penalty for peace time offenses. Id. at 83.
29. Id. Article 1 of the Protocol states that the death penalty shall be abolished and
that no one shall be condemned to such penalty or execution. Id. at 83-84. Article 2 states
that the only exception to Article 1 can be in time of war or imminent threat of war. Id. at
84.
30. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1464
(1992) [hereinafter Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR].
31. Schabas, supra note 6, at 24. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally ex-
cept in the execution of a sentence of a court following a conviction of a crime for which this
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that the United Nations addressed within this international
human rights treaty.
3 2
Article Six of the ICCPR has been established as a minimum
standard of legal guarantees for the protection of a person's right
to life by the United Nations Human Rights Committee and by
the United Nations General Assembly.3" However, the United
States' Government interprets that Article 6 of the ICCPR to per-
mit capital punishment.3 4 The Convention on the Rights of the
Child (hereinafter "CRC") and the Second Optional Protocol to
the ICCPR both legislate that a contracting state is obligated to
prevent executions of persons for crimes committed when below
eighteen years of age. 5
III. THE UNITED STATES
Today, the majority of the people in the United States favor the use
of capital punishment and the retention of the death penalty.3 6 Surveys
show that in the mid-1960s, only thirty-eight percent of the public were
in favor of the death penalty, compared to seventy-six percent who sup-
ported the death penalty in 1991.37 This trend represents continually
growing support for capital punishment in the U.S.
A. The Proliferation of the Death Penalty
Brought to the United States by European settlers, the death penalty
has been available since colonial days. 8 During the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, only five states, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Rhode Island, and Wiscon-
sin, abolished the death penalty.3 9 Through the years, the United States
has developed a variety of laws permitting the execution of its citizens.'"
The United States presently is the only country in the world with more
than three means of administering a death penalty, permitting executions
by hanging, shooting, electrocution, gas, and lethal injection."1
penalty is provided by law. WHEN THE STATE KILLS, supra note 18, at 83.
32. Id. at 23.
33. David Weissbrodt, International Measures Against Arbitrary Killings by Govern-
ments, 77 AM. Soc. INT'L L. 378, 379-80 (1983).
34. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, The U.S., the U.N., and Arbitrary Executions, in AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, THE MACHINERY OF DEATH: A SHOCKING INDICTMENT OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 198, 201 (1995).
35. DEATH PENALTY FOR CRIMES COMMITrED BY PERSONS BELOW 18 YEARS OF AGE, supra
note 5.
36. Ndiaye, supra note 34, at 198.
37. Louis Harris, The Harris Survey, Feb. 7, 1977, CHI. TRm., at C3, cited in NICOLErTE
PARISI, SOURCEBOOK ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS: 1978 326 (1979).
38. Schwarzschild, supra note 11, at 8.
39. HUGO BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 21 (1982).
40. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Methods of Execution Provided in Law, Chart Prepared
by Amnesty International (1994).
41. Id.
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Between January 1, 1973, and April 20, 1994, there have been 232
executions within the United States. 42 There are nearly 3000 people on
death row within the United States today, and approximately 200 to 250
people added to this total every year.4 .
There are only fourteen United States jurisdictions without capital
punishment statutes." Unlike individual states, the federal government
has not completely reviewed the death penalty. Under current U.S. fed-
eral law the death penalty is available for peacetime espionage by individ-
uals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice,45 drug related
murders under the 1988 Drug Abuse Act,' 6 and murder under the United
States Military Code.47 Federal law has been struggling with whether the
death penalty should be reviewed broadly, made available for first degree
murder, or used only for specific crimes such as treason, espionage, and
mail bombings.8
B. The Continued Expansion and Implementation of the Death
Penalty
Even when faced with international opposition, the United States did
not fully adopt the ICCPR.49 The United States made reservations to Ar-
ticle 6, which addresses the death penalty, and to Article 7, which ad-
dresses protection against torture." It was the only country to submit a
42. NAACP, supra note 10.
43. Schwarzschild, supra note 11, at 4. In recent years no more than thirty people a
year have been executed, and the largest number ever executed in the U.S. is 199 in 1935.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF STATISTICS BULLETIN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 12
(1991). The number of people in the U.S. prisons and jails have also been increasing yearly
with over 1,390,000 people in custody in 1993. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONS
IN 1993 BULLETIN 231 (1994) (providing total number of federal and state prisoners on De-
cember 31, 1993 as 948,881). See also BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTIC, JAnL INMATES 1992 432
(1993) (providing total number of jail inmates on June 30, 1992 as 444,584).
As of April 1994, thirty-nine U.S. jurisdictions have capital punishment statutes with a
total of 2,848 inmates on death row. NAACP, supra note 10. These jurisdictions are Ala-
bama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Da-
kota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wyoming, the U.S. Government, and
the U.S. Military. Id.
44. Id. These jurisdictions are Alaska, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
45. 10 U.S.C. § 918.
46. 21 U.S.C. § 848(1).
47. 10 U.S.C. § 918.
48. Diann Yvonne Rust-Tierney, The United States Government and the Death Pen-
alty, in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE MACHINERY OF DEATH: A SHOCKING INDICTMENT OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 49, 50 (1995).
49. Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, supra note 30.
50. Multilateral Treaties, Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, deposited
with the Secretary General, Status of December 31, 1992, at page 132.
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reservation to Article 6,51 demonstrating the United States's strong desire
for continued use of the death penalty. The ratification of a treaty with
reservations can drastically reduce any received benefit of the treaty.
Eleven countries have already formulated direct objections to the United
States's reservations.2
When the United States refused to adopt the Second Optional Proto-
col to the ICCPR, it joined countries notorious for their human rights
violations, such as Iran, Iraq, and China. 8 Only after the United States
was able to make a reservation to the section calling for the abolition of
the death penalty for those under the age of eighteen was the Covenant
ratified. 5 4
With almost no exceptions, the United States Government has been
in strong support of the death penalty with heightened advocacy under
the Bush administration which promoted the death penalty for over fifty
crimes.55 Such a large expansion of the death penalty may even violate
the Supreme Court's mandate that the death penalty be applied nar-
rowly.56 The Clinton administration also outwardly supports the death
penalty and is continuing Bush's death penalty agenda.5 7 In addition,
many members of the newly-elected Republican Congress strongly sup-
port the death penalty, exemplifying the Republicans' determination to
be tough on crime.58
The U.S. Federal Government has even been aggressively attempting
to expand the application of the death penalty. Recently, there has been
a strong movement to extend the availability of the death penalty to non-
homicide crimes, especially for drug related offenses.59 Under the Bush
administration, several arguments were constructed to support the death
penalty for non-homicidal crimes. 0 As drug-related crimes have increased
in the United States, many lawmakers have considered it to be politically
expedient to propose the death penalty for drug related crimes in direct
51. DEATH PENALTY FOR CRIMES COMMITTED BY PERSONS BELOW 18 YEARS OF AGE, supra
note 5.
52. Schabas, supra note 6, at 27.
53. Hood, supra note 1, at 175. The Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR was ini-
tially opposed by the U.S. in 1989. Id.
54. Id. at 176.
55. Bush Administration's Comment on the Comprehensive Violent Crime Control Act
of 1991, at 2.
56. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 153.
57. Rust-Tierney, supra note 48.
58. Ronald Hampton, The Death Penalty: Racial Bias, Cost, and the Risk of Execut-
ing the Innocent, in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE MACHINERY OF DEATH: A SHOCKING IN-
DICTMENT OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 101, 110 (1995). "The driving force
behind the death penalty in this country are politicians whom use the issue in an attempt to
appear tough on crime." Id.
59. See Title II of H.R. 3355; Title VII of H.R. 4092 (103rd Congress).
60. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary
(House of Representatives) 100th Cong. (March 14, 1990) (testimony of Williams Barr, As-
sistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Council, U.S. Department of Justice).
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opposition to the Supreme Court's ruling that the death penalty only be
implemented for homicides. 1 This is another example of repeated pres-
sure to expand the death penalty beyond the scope set by the Supreme
Court 62 and well beyond the international standards followed by most of
the countries in the world.
IV. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
At the same time that the United States demands countries around
the world to comply with United Nations resolutions and international
laws, there are several circumstances in which the United States refuses
to fully adhere to the weight of the international community's convic-
tions. When the United States has made a reservation to every clause
associated with the death penalty in Article 6 and 7 of the ICCPR, it
effectively disregarded the intent and purpose of the treaty. Thus, when
the United States executed five juvenile offenders after the ICCPR be-
came effective, the United States was considered by many countries to
have violated customary international law. 4
The United States is not the only country to violate international law
and permit the execution of juveniles. Five other countries have violated
either the ICCPR, the CRC, or both, within the past ten years. 5 These
countries are Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Yemen.6
Out of the 184 member states of the United Nations, eleven countries
have implemented, but not used, independent state legislation which ex-
pressly permits the execution of individuals for crimes committed when
below the age of 18.67 These countries are Chile, China, Congo, Cyprus,
Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Thailand, Zaire, and Zimbabwe.6
Since all of these countries have adopted either the ICCPR, the CRC, or
both, each country would be in violation of their treaty commitments if
their national death penalty laws were ever used.
In addition, Amnesty International claims that the United States
breached several of the nine safeguards adopted by resolution of the Eco-
nomic and Social Council of the United Nations. 9 Since the quality of
61. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
62. Id.; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 153.
63. Inter-American Court of Human Rights; Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Art. 4
sec. 2 and art. 4 sec. 4 American Convention on Human Rights) Advisory Opinion O.C. 3/83
of September 8, 1983, Series A, No. 3, H.R.L.J. 352, 70 I.L.R. 449.
64. Id. at 27, 28.
65. DEATH PENALTY FOR CRIMES COMMITTED BY PERSONS BELOW 18 YEARS OF AGE, supra
note 5.
66. Amnesty International, Death Penalty News, March 1994, at 3. Iran has even im-
plemented stoning as a death penalty for crimes which do not include killing another indi-
vidual. Id.
67. DEATH PENALTY FOR CRIMES COMMITED BY PERSONS BELOW 18 YEARS OF AGE, supra
note 5.
68. Id.
69. Hood, supra note 1, at 176.
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defense attorneys available to indigent defendants has been classified as
substandard, Amnesty International has stated that the United States vi-
olated the international standards of human rights outlined in the nine
safeguards." °
V. RATIONALE FOR THE DEATH PENALTY?
The morality of implementing a death penalty has been repeatedly
questioned by organizations such as Amnesty International.7' These orga-
nizations contend that the use of the death penalty violates fundamental
human rights and that governments should not use homicide as an instru-
ment of social policy.72 Even the European Court of Human Rights de-
clared the wait for execution on death row as cruel, inhuman, and
degrading.7
8
In contrast, the United States Government has emphatically declared
that capital punishment does not violate a person's inalienable right to
life or constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment.7' The Gov-
ernment claims that in a democratic society, the will of the people of each
state must be followed when determining a society's penal laws and sanc-
tions.75 In determining the validity of capital punishment, it is important
to weigh the pronounced reasons for the implementation of a death pen-
alty against the resulting inequities.
A. Justification of the Death Penalty
Some countries contend that it is necessary to administer a death
penalty in times of war or to suppress political opposition. As Europe was
concluding war crime trials following World War II, the European Con-
vention on Human Rights76 was adopted, but the use of the death penalty
was still permitted.77 In a significant move, the United Nations opposed
the use of the death penalty even for war crimes.7 A decision within the
International War Crimes Tribunal,7 s established by the United Nations
for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, specifically states that the death
70. Id.
71. Schwarzschild, supra note 11, at 5.
72. Id. Amnesty International considers the death penalty to be akin to torture. Matas,
supra note 5. There are examples of botched executions. Id. In one case, an individual's
head caught on fire, and in another case, an electrocution took nineteen minutes. Id.
73. Soering v. United Kingdom, supra note 27.
74. Ndiaye, supra note 34.
75. Id.
76. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 (1955).
77. Schabas, supra note 6, at 25.
78. Matas, supra note 5, at 35 (stating that for the ex-Yugoslav war, the "United Na-
tions refused to impose the death penalty for the worst crimes imaginable, including geno-
cide." Id.).
79. Statute of the International Tribunal, S.C. Res. 827 (1993).
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penalty would not be an option for resolution of these crimes.80 This dem-
onstrates that even for the most brutal possible crimes, the highest inter-
national organization is no longer willing to implement the death penalty.
This action may set a precedent for future Tribunals on war crimes and
help to diminish justification of the death penalty. Presently, there are
fifteen countries which have abolished the death penalty except for ex-
ceptional crimes, such as crimes under military law or crimes committed
during wartime.8' These countries are Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Cyprus,
El Salvador, Fiji, Israel, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Seychelles,
Spain, and the United Kingdom.8 2
It is often after countries see the misuse of the death penalty that it
is abolished. Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru,
and the Philippines have eliminated the death penalty after emerging
from periods of political repression."
Deterrence has been one of the most prevailing arguments in favor of
the death penalty, but the small percentage of culpable homicides for
which the death penalty has been implemented is too small to deter fu-
ture crimes. 84 With the probability of being executed for a culpable homi-
cide being, at the most, one in one thousand, any possible deterrence ef-
fect has been negated.8 5 In addition, only one in ten defendants eligible
for the death penalty have been sentenced to death, and only a fraction of
those are ever even executed.8 6
There are some classifications which are almost universally excluded
from the death penalty. Virtually all countries in the world do not permit
the execution of the insane.87 In the United States, as an example, the
Supreme Court pronounced that the execution of the insane is
unconstitutional. 88
B. Disparities with the Death Penalty in the United States
The administration of the death penalty has proven to be riddled
with inherent inequities, but the United States remains determined to
80. Schabas, supra note 6, at 26.
81. DEATH PENALTY FOR CRIMES COMMITTED BY PERSONS BELOW 18 YEARS OF AGE, supra
note 5.
82. Id. None of these countries has used the death penalty within the past ten years.
Id.
83. WHEN THE STATE KILLS, supra note 18, at 73.
84. Hood, supra note 1, at 177. Mr. Hood, the Director of the Center for Criminological
Research, stated that "the review of the literature on deterrence which I carried out for the
United Nations convinced me that the probability of execution for a homicide is so low in
the U.S. that it could not have other than a symbolic purpose." Id.
85. Id.
86. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS: 1992,
539 (1992).
87. Schabas, supra note 6, at 25.
88. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
VOL. 23:3
DEATH PENALTY WORLDWIDE
continue its implementation. 9 Even after the Supreme Court took steps
to eliminate any arbitrary or discriminatory administering of a death pen-
alty," the death penalty law continues to be irrational and discrimina-
tory." Within the United States there has been the execution of the inno-
cent,9" of children,93 of the mentally retarded,9" and the mentally ill.91
The most prominent disparity stems from the percentage of African-
Americans being executed. Supreme Court Justice Blackmun has stated,
"[e]ven under the most sophisticated death penalty statutes, race contin-
ues to play a major role in determining who shall live and who shall
die."96 Of the 2,848 inmates on death row in the United States, almost
fifty percent are White and almost forty percent are African-American.
97
Seventeen, or fifty-two percent, of the thirty-three juvenile offenders on
death row, are African-American. 98 Of the 4,016 people executed in the
United States between 1930 and 1990, 2,129, or fifty-three percent, were
African-American. 99
The statistics of African-American executions for crimes committed
in conjunction with rape are even more alarming. Ninety percent, or 405
of the 455 men executed for rape within the United States between 1930
and 1976, have been African-American.100 Under the new 1988 Drug
Abuse Act, there has been thirty-seven prosecutions for drug related
murders, and all but four of these people have been African-American or
people of color.10 1 With the national African-American population in the
United States hovering around twelve percent, it becomes apparent that
89. Matas, supra note 5, at 33 (stating that the "death penalty by its very nature is
arbitrary, discriminatory, and racist." Id.). "To talk of a death penalty that is not cruel and
unusual is an oxymoron, a self contradiction." Id.
90. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 153.
91. Schwarzschild, supra note 11, at 5.
92. Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 73 (1973) (mentioning several examples such as James Ad-
ams who was executed in Florida in 1984).
93. Rumbaugh v. Texas, 629 S.W.2d 747.
94. Dunkins v. Alabama, 489 So.2d 603 (1978).
95. Louisiana v. Prejean, 379 So.2d 240 (1975), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 891, 66 L.Ed.
119, 101 S.Ct. 253 (1980).
96. Callins v. Callins, No. 93-7054 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97. NAACP, supra note 10. Of the 2,848 death row inmates, 1,423 (49,96%) are White,
1,138 (39.96%) are Black, 208 (7.30%) are Latino/Latina, 50 (1.75%) are Native American,
20 (0.70%) are Asian, and 9 (0.32%) are unknown. Id.
98. VICTOR L. STREW, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: PRESENT DEATH Row IN-
MATES UNDER JUVENILE DEATH SENTENCES AND DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVE-
NILE CRIMES 6 (1993); Rev. Fred Taylor, Race, Youth, Poverty and the Death Penalty, in
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE MACHINERY OF DEATH: A SHOCKING INDICTMENT OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 88 (1995). "It is no coincidence that the death penalty in
the U.S. is strongest in the former slave states, the states of the old Confederacy." Matas,
supra note 5, at 33.
99. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE U.S. 134 (1991).
100. Id.
101. Rust-Tierney, supra note 48.
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there is a disproportionate large number of African-American being
executed.,0o
Furthermore, there have been far more African-Americans executed
for the murder of Whites, than Whites executed for the murder of Afri-
can-Americans. Since capital punishment was reinstated in 1976, only one
White defendant has been executed for killing a non-White victim. 108
Homicides committed against African-Americans fail to receive the
same ratio of executions, as do homicides committed against Whites.'"
Even with nearly one half of all homicide victims being African-Ameri-
can, eighty-five percent of the individuals executed within the United
States since 1972 were convicted of killing White victims.105 The United
States General Accounting Office has specifically stated that someone
who murders a White individual is more likely to receive the death pen-
alty than someone who murders an African-American."' s
An additional death penalty imbalance within the United States
stems from the seeming low-quality of court appointed counsel. A large
percent of the defendants subjected to the death penalty are indigent.107
Their lawyers are assigned by the court and are paid extremely low
wages, in some states no more than $1600 per case.108 With the estimated
counsel time needed to adequately represent a defendant subject to the
death penalty ranging from 800 to 1000 hours, some state appointed at-
torneys earn approximately $2.00 an hour. 09 Any hourly wage remotely
near this level does not afford an indigent defendant adequate
representation.
Finally, there are documented cases of evidence being produced to
vindicate an individual who has already been executed or who was on
death row awaiting execution.1 0 In 1987, researchers documented 350
102. Hampton, supra note 58.
103. NAACP, supra note 10.
104. Id.
105. Hampton, supra note 58, at 102. "This sends a clear message that when people of
color - particularly black people - are killed, whether as victims of private or state-sanc-
tioned homicide, the cost to society is hardly as great as when whites are killed." Id.
106. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING 5 (1990). "The
race of the victim was found to influence the likelihood of being charged with capital mur-
der or receiving the death penalty, i.e., those who murdered whites were found more likely
to be sentenced to death than those who murdered blacks." Id. (emphasis added).
107. Matas, supra note 5, at 37. Nearly all of the over 2,800 people on death row are
poor. Hampton, supra note 58, at 101.
108. Matas, supra note 5.
109. Id. The number of lawyers willing to work these hours are few. Id. Defense counsel
needs to be paid a reasonable remuneration to ensure an effective defense. Id.
110. Hampton, supra note 58, at 103. "No matter how careful courts are, the possibility
of perjured testimony, mistaken honest testimony, and human error remains all too real. We
have no way of judging how many innocent persons have been executed, but we can be
certain that there were some." Furman, 404 U.S. at 367-68.
In 1993, the number one concern raising doubts among voters regarding the death pen-
alty is the danger of a mistaken execution. Id.
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cases in which 325 defendants, whose guilt was in serious doubt, were
convicted of murder; 119 of them were sentenced to death. 1 Cases such
as these have lead to erroneous convictions, as was the conviction of Kirk
Bloodsworth who served nine years on death row in New York until a
DNA test established his innocence."" Walter McMilliam spent five years
on death row in Alabama until it was proven he did not commit the
crime.'
Throughout this century, in every jurisdiction except for six or seven
states, innocent people have been sentenced to death.1 Since 1973, at
least forty-eight people have been released from prison after serving time
on death row. " Forty-three of these defendants were acquitted,
pardoned or had the charges against them dropped.1 6 A Staff Report for
the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights stated that "[t]hese
forty-eight cases illustrate the flaws inherent in the death sentencing sys-
tems used in the states."" 7 Low attorneys' salaries and racial prejudice
are factors in wrongful convictions and perpetuate the inequities with the
death penalty.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the Clinton administration, the Federal Government of the
United States is poised to expand the death penalty to more than sixty
crimes." 8 With the new Republican Congress, there is no reason to sus-
pect any change in this progression. Considering the world's steady move
towards the abolition of the death penalty, the United States must
reevaluate its role as a global leader and as an advocate of human rights if
it allows the death penalty to continually thrive.
Since the administration of the death penalty is saturated with er-
rors, it is illogical for the United States to continue to execute offenders.
111. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 92, at 38.
112. Hampton, supra note 58, at 103.
113. Id.
114. Hugo Adam Bedau, Innocence and the Death Penalty, in AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL, THE MACHINERY OF DEATH: A SHOCKING INDICTMENT OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 98 (1995). "In particular, many of these cases, approximately two dozen,
involve rescue from the execution chamber with less than three days to spare. In several
cases, as recently as the past decade, there have been people within hours of execution
under law who were not executed, and it was later established that they were innocent." Id.
115. Innocence and the Death Penalty: Assessing the Danger of Mistaken Executions,
STAFF REPORT ISSUED BY THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS COMMIT-
TEE ON THE JUDICIARY, ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION 2 (October 21, 1993).
116. Id. In three of these cases, a compromise was reached and the defendants were
immediately released upon pleading to a lesser offense. In the remaining two cases, one
defendant was released when the parole board became convinced of his innocence, and the
other was acquitted at a retrial of the capital charge but convicted of lesser related charges.
Id.
117. Id. at 8. Racial prejudice was considered a determining factor. Id.
118. H.R. 3355; H.R. 4092. The Federal Omnibus Crime bills from the 103rd Congress
were passed by Congress on August 25, 1994. Id.
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The United States must explore other alternatives to capital punishment.
Although three out of four Americans say they favor the death penalty,
the support drops to one in four if a state could impose a life sentence
without parole and require offenders to work in prison for money that
would go to families of victims. 1 9
The political will to abolish the death penalty ultimately comes from
within a country. International human rights treaties establish restric-
tions and safeguards on the use of the death penalty in countries which
have not abolished it; however, these treaties have been violated and are
insufficient. A better international perspective could stem the tide of sup-
port for capital punishment in the United States and assist the United
States in joining the global flow of countries who have abolished the
death penalty.
119. Williams J. Bowers, Popular Support for the Death Penalty: Mistaken Beliefs, in
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE MACHINERY OF DEATH: A SHOCKING INDICTMENT OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 70 (1995).
In New York we found that 71 percent of out respondents said they "favored"
capital punishment, but only 19 percent said they would stick with the death
penalty if the alternative was life without parole plus restitution. In Nebraska,
where 80 percent initially "favored" the death penalty, only 26 percent would
stick with it if given this alternative. These 52 and 54 percentage points drop
in death penalty support are strong indications that people are merely giving
lip service to the death penalty in the public opinion polls-cited by the Su-
preme Court in its Gregg decision as indication that Americans want capital
punishment. Id. at 70-71.
"[P]ublic support for capital punishment is an illusion that has become a self-perpetuating
myth." Id. at 73.
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Exporting U.S. Products, Services and
Technologies: An Overview of the
Regulations and Considerations Regarding
Compliance Programs
Matthew H. Wenig*
I. INTRODUCTION
Every product, service, and form of technology exported from the
United States, as well as every exporter, is subject to export control.
These controls dominate every aspect of the export from the product, to
the customer, to how the exporter conducts and records his business op-
erations. Numerous rules exist, that on a domestic level are simple, but
become more complex when expanded to an international scale. Yet, it is
common knowledge in this business that if you are big enough to export,
you are big enough to play by the rules. This phrase emphasizes that
every exporter, regardless of the size of the operation, is held accountable
to comply with the regulations, no matter how complex they appear to be.
If these regulations are violated, significant civil and criminal penalties
may be imposed and/or the export may be prohibited from taking place
at all. The level of control applied depends on: 1) what the export is, 2) to
whom and where that export is going and 3) how it is exported.
To complicate things, many departments and agencies of the govern-
ment play a role in controlling exports. These departments do not neces-
sarily communicate with each other to discover any overlapping or redun-
dancies in the various regulations. However, with the computer age,
information sharing may be more prevalent.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a guide through this maze. It
outlines the major items of which every exporter needs to be aware and
provides general considerations for a model compliance program for an
exporting company. Section II identifies the major statutes and the gov-
ernmental departments and agencies controlling the export process. Sec-
tion III then describes the start of the export process, product classifica-
tion or what is exported. Section IV follows this with the licensing
requirements and Section V with a focus on the issues regarding to whom
the product is shipped, known as "customer restrictions" or "customer
screening." Section VI discusses the Anti-Boycott Amendments, focusing
* J.D. 1995 University of Denver, College of Law; B.S. 1992 University of Delaware,
majored in Finance and minored in International Business. The author would like to thank
Professor J. Triplett Mackintosh for his inspiration and insight into the field of Interna-
tional Business Transactions and also the Denver Journal of International Law & Policy for
their assistance and diligence in the preparation of this article.
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on how the exports are completed, while Section VII discusses the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act, focusing on the actions of the exporters. In
Section VIII, the article describes the criminal and civil penalties for non-
compliance with these laws and Section IX suggests important items to
include when drafting and negotiating international transaction contracts.
Section X pulls these concerns together into a discussion of general con-
siderations for an exporter's "compliance program", including the educa-
tion and training required for an exporter's personnel to comply with the
regulations and a review of what exporters should do when they discover
a violation of the export laws in their operations. Section XI concludes
the article.
II. U.S. EXPORT LAWS AND CONTROLLING AGENCIES
A. The Export Administration Act (EAA) and the Export Administra-
tion Regulations (EAR)
The primary statute governing U.S. exports is the Export Adminis-
tration Act (EAA)1 resulting in the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR).2 The EAA has three main objectives: 1) "to restrict the export of
goods and technology which would make a significant contribution to the
military potential of any other country which would prove detrimental to
the interests of the United States,"' 2) to restrict the exports "where nec-
essary to further significantly the foreign policy of the United States or to
fulfill its declared international obligations," and 3) to restrict the export
of goods where "necessary to protect the domestic economy from the ex-
cessive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the serious inflationary
impact of foreign demand."5 The majority of the EAA focuses on the first
two goals while the third goal, known as "short supply areas," is less im-
portant and makes up only a small portion of the export controls.
Adherence to the EAA regulations, as well as the other regulations to
be discussed in this article, is essential if a company is involved in any
international business. If exportation is to be a regular part of a com-
pany's business, programs must be enacted within the company to ensure
compliance with all of the governmental controls regarding its exports.
The EAA designates the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA),
under the Department of Commerce, as the agency to insure adherence to
the EAA and EAR. The BXA, therefore, is the agency that plays the larg-
est role in export and reexport activity. The BXA controls dual-use items,
items that have civil uses but which can easily be utilized in military ap-
plications or which are deemed to have strategic significance. The term
"items" is not to be misleading. It applies to all products, services, and
1. 50 U.S.C. § 2401 et seq. (1988).
2. 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-799 (1991).
3. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2)(A) (1988)
4. Id. at 2(B).
5. Id. at 3(C).
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technology.
The BXA is divided into three smaller offices: 1) the Office of Export
Licensing (OEL), which receives applications for export authorizations,
licenses and makes determinations consistent with the statute, 2) the Of-
fice of Foreign Availability (OFA), which determines what items should
be decontrolled because of the product's ready availability within the
world-wide community, and 3) the Office of Export Enforcement (OEE),
which handles the actual enforcement of the EAA and the EAR.
The BXA works closely with three other government departments: 1)
The Department of Commerce, 2) the State Department and 3) the De-
fense Department to develop policies regarding the treatment of various
items, recommend changes to the EAR, and represent the U.S. at interna-
tional export meetings held by the Coordinating Committee for Multilat-
eral Export Control (COCOM).
COCOM, located in Paris, France, is a multinational committee com-
posed of all NATO countries, except Iceland and including Japan and
Australia.' Established in 1949, during the early stages of the Cold War,
COCOM's purpose is to control items that are scarce, strategic or affect
restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union, People's Republic of China,
and their allies.7 The delegation from the U.S. is chaired by an official
from the State Department's Office of COCOM Affairs (OCA) and at-
tended by the Department of Commerce's Office of Technology and Pol-
icy Analysis (OTPA) and the Department of Defense's Defense Technol-
ogy Security Administration. (DTSA)8
B. The Arms Export Control Act (ACEA) and the International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
A second statute governing U.S. exports is the Arms Export Control
Act (ACEA) which deals with goods that are inherently military.' This
statute was enacted to control the export of "defense articles and ...
services"'0 such as weapons, weapon components, and technical data re-
garding weapons. The purpose of the ACEA is to further world peace,
security and the foreign policy of the U.S.
In the State Department, the Office of Defense Trade Control (DTC)
administers the ACEA using the International Traffic in Arms Regula-
tions (ITAR)." The ACEA and the ITAR are completely separate from,
6. The current members of COCOM are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Turkey, and the United States of America.
7. For a history of COCOM, see ROOT & LEIBMAN, U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 10/1-10/10
(3d ed. 1991).
8. See generally EVAN R. BERLACK & CECIL HUNT, OVERVIEW OF U.S. EXPORT CON-
TROLS, 9 PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4366 (1992).
9. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2777-79; 22 C.F.R. § 120.1 -.3 (1995).
10. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1).
11. 22 C.F.R. § 120.
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and in addition to the EAA or the EAR. The State Department's DTC
works with the Defense Department's DTSA to review the applications
that are filed.
III. PRODUCT CLASSIFICATION - A Focus ON WHAT Is EXPORTED
U.S. export control begins with product classification, a focus on
what is being exported, not to whom or how. Classification of a product,
service or technology involves every component of the product, as well as
the technology that went into making the product and components. Sev-
eral lists guide the classification process and all the lists must be checked
before product classification is complete. These lists include: 1) COCOM's
International Industrial and Munitions Lists, 2) U.S. unilateral regula-
tions, 3) the U.S.'s Commodity Control List (CCL), and 4) the Munitions
List of the AECA and the ITAR.
A. COCOM's International Industrial and Munitions Lists
COCOM's role is to periodically review and update: a) COCOM's In-
ternational Industrial List, commonly known as the "Core List", and b)
COCOM's Munitions List. These lists attempt to control scarce or strate-
gic resources necessary to maintain world peace. COCOM debates and
discusses multilateral compliance controls, but has no enforcement power
of its own. However, COCOM's lists regarding restrictions of exports af-
fect the U.S.'s export control laws by giving the U.S. guidelines on how to
tailor their own lists.
B. U.S. Unilateral Regulations
There are many products and services that the U.S. deems to be stra-
tegically important and in need of regulation, but other countries, such as
those in COCOM, do not agree. These positions are usually self-serving
for almost all countries. When the U.S. is not able to control such prod-
ucts through international groups, it creates its own list of restricted
goods or services. These are listed in the U.S.'s Unilateral Regulations.
C. U.S.'s Commodity Control List (CCL)
Every product, component and technology that is subject to U.S. ex-
port controls by the Department of Commerce"2 must be classified in the
U.S.'s Commodity Control List (CCL) according to the EAR. The CCL,
administered by the Departments of Commerce and Defense, is said to be
"the complete listing of human knowledge."'" The CCL is made up of
both U.S. unilateral controls, as well as bilateral or multilateral controls
12. As will soon be seen, many different departments control different areas of export
law, sometimes overlapping exists and approval from one department does not relieve the
exporter from the other department's statutory requirements.
13. Professor J. Triplett Mackintosh during lecture at University of Denver, College of
Law, Fall 1993.
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made in agreement with other countries under COCOM.
Exceptions to the CCL exist. For instance, if a product is classified as
medicine or medical supplies, it is usually not restricted. Also, if the prod-
uct is generally available in the world marketplace, it is usually not re-
stricted. These types of exceptions, however, do not mean that classifica-
tion is not necessary.
In 1991, the CCL was rewritten in accordance with the modifications
of COCOM's controls that relaxed many restrictions. COCOM issued a
new "Core List" which caused the Department of Commerce to revise the
CCL to incorporate the Core List changes as well as the unilateral con-
trols that the U.S. wished to maintain. 14
The new CCL reorganized products and technology into new com-
modity groups to reflect industrial changes since World War II. The num-
bering system for Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCN) was
also changed. The new system, now five digits instead of the previous four
used, allows the reader to glean more information regarding the product
from just the number alone. This helps the exporter classify the product
more efficiently than previously.
An exporter's product must be classified correctly under the CCL.
Generally this is accomplished by a two-step process. First, the engineers
of the exporting company look at the CCL and determine which classifi-
cation they believe the export, including all of its components, best fits.
This is usually a difficult and ambiguous process because considerable
overlap exists in the categories. The exporter's goal in determining the
classification, however, is to get the product classified under the ECCN
with the fewest restrictions, so that the exporter can, theoretically, send
the export to the greatest number of customers.
The second step is to submit a commodity classification request to
the Department of Commerce's Office of Technology and Policy Analysis
(OTPA). Commerce's engineers then review the exporter's suggested
product classification and make a final determination on the classifica-
tion. This final ruling defines the product's assigned ECCN and deter-
mines which licenses are required to export the product and to which
countries the product may be shipped.
D. AECA/ITAR Munitions List
The Defense Department's Munitions List defined in the ACEA is
comparable to the Commerce Department's CCL and is based on
COCOM's Munitions List.15 This list is organized around 31 categories
covering various types of weapons, delivery systems, and military training
equipment. The ITAR lays out definitions and interpretations that are
14. 56 Fed. Reg. 42,824 (1991). Later codified as Commodity Control List and Related
Matters, 15 C.F.R. § 799 (1995).
15. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1.
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essential to working with and classifying a product under the Munitions
List.1 6
It is necessary for the exporters to evaluate the products to see if
they fall into any of these categories. If so, permission must be obtained
from the State Department, regardless of any approvals that are granted
by the Department of Commerce.
IV. LICENSING REQUIREMENTS
Once assigned, the ECCN determines what type of license the ex-
porter will need to export the product. One of two types of licenses is
required: 1) a "general license", or 2) a "validated license".
A. General Licenses
A "general license" is a blanket authorization established by the
BXA to permit exports under certain conditions. This is the license used
for most exports from the U.S., with over twenty different types of gen-
eral licenses for goods"7 and two different types for technology. 18 The va-
rious types of general licenses cover different types of goods and their
export destinations. To obtain a general license, no application or special
documentation is required by the government. Instead, general licenses
are self-authorizing.
B. Validated Licenses
If an export does not qualify for a general license under the regula-
tions, then a "validated license" is required. There are five main types of
validated licenses: 1) individual validated licenses, which allow "the ex-
port of technical data or a specified quantity of commodities during a
specified period to a designated consignee;' 9 2) project licenses, which al-
low the exportation of all goods relating to a specific activity for approxi-
mately one year; 0 3) distribution licenses, which allow "the export of cer-
tain commodities to approved consignees..." for the period of one year;2 '
4) special chemical licenses, which allow "the shipment by approved ex-
porters of certain chemicals and chemical and biological equipment to ap-
proved consignees . . . .";2 and 5) service supply licenses, which allow the
export of needed spare or replacement parts for equipment that were pre-
viously made or exported.2 3
To obtain a "validated license" for a good or service, an application
16. 22 C.F.R., supra note 11.
17. 15 C.F.R. § 771.
18. 15 C.F.R. § 779.
19. 15 C.F.R. § 772.2 (b)(1).
20. 15 C.F.R. § 772.2 (b)(2).
21. 15 C.F.R. § 772.2 (b)(3).
22. 15 C.F.R. § 772.2 (b)(4).
23. 15 C.F.R. § 772.2 (b)(6).
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with supporting documentation must be filed with the Office of Export
Licensing (OEL).2 4 Validated licenses are not self-authenticating but in-
stead require written approval from the OEL. Validated licenses are not
automatically granted to the exporter and can be denied in whole, or in
part, to remain consistent with the purpose of the export regulations.
C. Streamlining the Licensing Process - The Exporter's Bill of Rights
To make it easier for exporters to obtain information regarding li-
censing, the Department of Commerce developed an Exporter's Bill of
Rights.2 5 This Bill states that those who export have the right to expect
the following: 1) accurate and consistent licensing analyses, 2) prompt de-
cisions regarding licensing determinations, 3) full access to licensing and
regulatory information, and 4) responsive and courteous service.
To help raise the level of its office's performance, the BXA has signif-
icantly streamlined the licensing process, reducing the time in which ex-
porters can expect to receive licensing decisions to an average of one to
two weeks. Forms are read from an Optical Character Recognition System
(OCRS) to enhance the speed of processing the form.
The BXA has also installed three electronic systems to help export-
ers: 1) the Export Licensing Automated Information Network (ELAIN),
on which it is possible to submit an application electronically, 2) the Sys-
tem for Tracking Export License Applications (STELA), on which a digi-
tized voice answering machine gives exporters current information on the
status of their applications, and 3) the Export Licensing Voice Informa-
tion System (ELVIS), which answers many commonly asked questions in
a recorded message format. ELVIS addresses all aspects of licensing in-
formation, and if needed, allows the exporter to speak with an export
counselor.
Information regarding ELAIN can be found by calling the Depart-
ment of Commerce at (202) 377-2753. After authorization, the response is
sent automatically, so the shipper need not be delayed awaiting further
authorization. STELA can be reached by touch-tone telephone by calling
the BXA at (202) 377-2752.
The BXA has also implemented seminars, publications, and the OEL
Insider, a quarterly publication, to help the public understand what it
means to be "in compliance" with the regulations.
In the event that an application is denied, and the exporter disagrees
with the OEL's final determination, the BXA provides for an administra-
tive appeal procedure and limited judicial review. 6
24. 15 C.F.R. § 772.1.
25. See generally Ian S. Baird, The U.S. Department of Commerce Export Licensing
System: Making Life Easier, 606 PLI/Comm 81 (1992).
26. 15 C.F.R. § 789 (pertaining to administrative review). 50 U.S.C. app. § 24090)(3)
(pertaining to limited judicial review).
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D. Technology Classification
The export controls, classifications and licensing requirements dis-
cussed above, apply not only to products and services, but also to technol-
ogy and "know-how". Congress realized that the sale of technology
needed to make a product can be as damaging to U.S. interests as the
product itself. Because of this, Congress restricted the export of technol-
ogy through classification and licensing requirements.2 7 This gives mean-
ing tb the ancient Chinese proverb "Give a man a fish he eats for a day.
Teach a man to fish, and he eats for life."
The EAR define "technical data" as "information of any kind that
can be used, or adapted for use, in the design, production, manufacture,
utilization, or reconstruction of articles or materials. This includes techni-
cal data, technical assistance and software."28
Exports of technical data can occur whenever the data is transferred
to a foreign person.2 This can occur when: 1) any information regarding
an export is sent to a foreign buyer, 2) product specifications are taken
with a salesman to a foreign country, 3) a foreign buyer tours an Ameri-
can facility to either hear or see such data, or 4) an U.S. employee dis-
cusses the data with a foreign person, either in the U.S. or abroad. All of
this underscores the fact that an exporter can violate the Regulations
without ever conducting a sale. It is critical, therefore, that all depart-
ments involved with technical data in an exporting company be aware of
these rules.
V. CUSTOMER SCREENING PROCESS - Focus ON To WHOM THE
PRODUCT IS EXPORTED
U.S. export regulations also exist which govern to whom the exports
can be sent, and thus exporters must "screen" their customers to ensure
that they do not violate these regulations. Tables and lists are produced
by various departments of government, including the Department of
Commerce, Department of State, and the Department of Treasury
against which an exporter's customers must be screened. If a customer
appears on a table or list, the U.S. exporter must refuse to sell the prod-
uct to the denied party. Additionally, U.S. exporters may not service U.S.
origin items owned or held by a denied party. 0 Therefore, they must
screen customers for reexports of U.S.-origin goods and technology to a
denied party. The laws and regulations in this area are very complex. To
ensure compliance, U.S. exporters must establish careful procedures
within their companies. This compliance program must involve all de-
partments of the company. The sales department must obtain a certain
amount of information from the customer and have it entered into the
27. 15 C.F.R. § 770.3(a).
28. 15 C.F.R. § 779.1(a).
29. 15 C.F.R. § 779.1(b).
30. 15 C.F.R. § 781.12.
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customer base listings. Next, the customer's information must be com-
pared against lists in the company's computer database. These lists must
therefore be updated on a regular basis. Finally, when the item is ready to
be shipped, a final check must be made by the shipping or delivering de-
partments to ensure that the addressee was not recently placed on any
list.
The relevant lists that must be consulted are: 1) the Department of
Commerce's Table of Denial Orders, 2) the Department of Treasury's Of-
fice of Foreign Assets Control List of "Specially Designated Nationals", 3)
any country embargoes that currently are in effect, and 4) Country Lists.
These lists are generated by the various departments that enact the regu-
lations. The laws and regulations that must be considered are: 1) the
Trading with the Enemy Act and 2) the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act. Updating all the lists for personnel that interact with
customers is an essential function in this area as well. Having a plan, but
not having it updated can get an exporter in as much trouble as if there
was never a plan to begin with.
A. "Table of Denial Orders" List
The Department of Commerce prints a semi-annual "Table of Denial
Orders" which lists companies and people that are barred from trade with
the U.S. because of past infractions under the law or regulations. 1 Denial
Orders vary in their scope and duration, but, in general, they prohibit the
named person from participating in U.S. export transactions for a period
of several years. The Commerce Department also prints daily updates of
the Denial Orders in the Federal Register,2 and exporters are deemed to
be on notice of all denial orders printed in the Federal Register upon its
publication. Accordingly, someone in the company will need to receive
and read the Federal Register, extract any names that have to be added
to the Table, and make sure that everyone's list is properly updated.
B. "Specially Designated Nationals" List
A similar list is published by the Department of Treasury's Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) which lists the people or companies that
OFAC considers to be "Specially Designated Nationals" (SDN) of coun-
tries under foreign policy embargoes. Transfer of items to these entities
and individuals, located worldwide, is prohibited without authorization
from OFAC. The SDN list is updated through the Federal Register in a
fashion similar to the one described above for the Table of Denial Orders.
Information regarding SDNs may be obtained from:
Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of Treasury, 1500
Pennsylvania Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20220, Tel: (202) 566-5021.
31. 15 C.F.R. § 787.12(c).
32. 15 C.F.R. § 788. The Table of Denial Orders are usually updated in March and
October, and are available from the Department of Commerce.
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C. Country Lists
Country restrictions under the CCL are ranked according to the anal-
ysis of the political and military risks posed by each country. The list is
temporary and changes periodically. This generalized system is meant to
be a kind of preliminary screening of the country, no matter to whom
within the country the exporter is exporting. This is also a point from
which to start the customer screening section of a compliance program.
D. The "Grey List"
There is also a grey list compiled by the Department of Commerce,
similar to the Table of Denial Orders, but not made public. Generally, the
grey list contains the names of people and/or companies that may have
their export privileges curtailed in the future and thus it alerts exporters
to potential problem areas or customers.
E. Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) and the International Emer-
gency Powers Act (IEPA)
The Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) was enacted at the start
of World War I and has been amended several times since then."3 It pro-
hibits "trading" with the "enemy" or any "ally of the enemy". To violate
the act, it is necessary
to trade or attempt to trade, either directly or indirectly, ... with
knowledge or reasonable cause to believe . . . [that the trading part-
ner] is an enemy, or ally of enemy, or is conducting or taking part in
such trade ... for, or on account of, or on behalf of, or for the benefit
of ... the enemy .... "'
In 1976, the International Emergency Powers Act (IEPA) 5 was en-
acted, providing the President with authority to maintain export regula-
tions without having to declare a national emergency. Most OFAC regula-
tions are broad sweeping prohibitions on financial and trade transactions
with targeted countries, sometimes accompanied by a freezing of foreign
assets.
Treasury's OFAC administers both the TWEA and the IEPA. Under
both statutes, the OFAC has promulgated regulations that restrict ex-
ports to Cuba, North Korea, Libya, Vietnam, South Africa, Iraq, Kuwait,
Iran, and Cambodia. Embargoes are also usually included within the en-
actment of TWEA or IEPA. These can include prohibitions on exports
and imports to and from the embargoed country. The assets of that coun-
try or its nationals can also be frozen, and not allowed to be removed
33. See, e.g., Historical Notes following 50 U.S.C. app. § 9. See generally Swan, A Road
Map to Understanding Export Controls: National Security in a Changing Global Environ-
ment, 30 AM. Bus. L. J. 607 (1993).
34. 50 U.S.C. app. § 3(a).
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b).
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from the U.S.
Even when the President lifts all sanctions from a country, such as
with South Africa, the regulations may still be on the books, technically
making an exporting company liable if products are exported to the re-
stricted country. The exporter must follow the regulations and lists avail-
able rather than take newspaper headlines as an indication that the lists
have been altered.
The best way to accomplish the customer screening portion of the
company's export compliance program is to incorporate the screening of
each customer into a routine clerical task that is checked at each step of
the export process. It is critical that every employee involved in the ex-
port process understands the importance of the reporting requirements
and is aware of the required compliance procedures. This is a less techni-
cal area than product classification, but it is also an area that it is easier
for the federal government to catch any illegal actions that a company
might inadvertently make.
F. Classification of Reexports
Reexports are transactions in which the person receiving the item in-
tends to transfer the item, or some portion of it, to a third person. The
EAR defines reexports as "the reexport, transshipment, or diversion of
commodities or technical data from one foreign destination to another." 6
Reexports can be: 1) to a third party within the same country or 2) to
another country.
Any export controls that exist on an original product, service or tech-
nology also apply to all reexported portions of that item. For example: if
the reexport is to a country where the item could have been shipped orig-
inally under a general license, then it is known as a "permissive reex-
port," requiring no prior approval from the OEA. However, OEA ap-
proval is needed for reexport if the material has been incorporated into a
foreign-made product even if the original item has lost its identity, and
regardless of whether it is only a minor part or amount of the total new
product.
If the Office of Export Licensing (OEL) requires prior approval
before exporting a commodity from the U.S., the exporter must: 1) notify
the OEA of the reexport, 2) obtain authorization to reexport on the origi-
nal license application form, and 3) inform the consignee on the Destina-
tion Control Statement that the consignee must also secure authorization
from the U.S. prior to reexport. If an exporter discovers a violation from a
consignee, and, in good faith did not know of the reexport beforehand,
the exporter incurs no liability. Instead the liability falls to the foreign
party, which is usually placed on the Table of Denial Orders, discussed
above.
36. 15 C.F.R. § 770.2.
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VI. ANTI-BOYCOTT LAWS - Focus ON HOW EXPORTS ARE HANDLED
A. The Anti-Boycott Amendments
Along with the regulations regarding "what products" and "to
whom" exports can be sold, the Anti-Boycott Amendments to the EAA s7
regulate certain activities of exporters such as how and on what terms
they can engage in international sales with another country. The Anti-
Boycott legislation makes it illegal to deal with or participate in any boy-
cott against a country with whom the United States has friendly rela-
tions. Compliance with this legislation affects the sales, purchasing, and
marketing departments.
In the 1930's and 1940's, the Arab League initiated a boycott against
the territory that was to become Israel. This boycott extended to three
phases: primary, secondary and tertiary boycotts. s The primary boycott
prohibited direct trade with Israel and Israeli companies. The secondary
boycott prohibited business transactions with companies that had ex-
isting business relationships with Israel. The tertiary boycott encouraged
companies that traded with Arab League members to boycott Israel and
companies that traded with Israel. The secondary and tertiary boycotts
actually shifted enforcement from the Arab League to foreign sellers 9
and these sellers, if American, were subject to United States jurisdiction.
The Arab Boycott Office maintained a blacklist of companies that have
traded with Israel and required that members of the boycott not trade
with those companies.
The U.S. response to this boycott has intensified over time. Initially,
the overall effect of the boycott was minimal because the Arab nations
traded so little with the U.S. However, in the 1965 Amendments to the
Export Control Act of 1949, Congress added a declaration that it was the
official policy of the United States to oppose boycotts imposed against
countries friendly to the U.S., and encouraged U.S. exporters to refuse to
37. Codified at 50 U.S.C. app § 2402(5).
38. See The Arab Boycott and American Business, Report of the Subcomm. on Over-
sight and Investigations, H.R. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10-11 (1976) at 10. In 1977, the three levels of boycott were explained as follows:
The boycott takes three forms. The primary boycott involves Arab countries and companies
refusing to do business with Israel and Israeli companies. This form falls outside U.S. juris-
diction and is generally recognized as a legitimate type of economic warfare ...
The secondary boycott involves the Arab Central Boycott Committee and Arab nations
refusing to do business with third-country companies that deal with Israel.
The tertiary boycott involves U.S. companies refusing to do business with other U.S.
companies. . . because they fail to comply with the Arab boycott regulations or because of
race, religion, or national origin. This type of boycott is clearly against the spirit and intent
of U.S. law, including the civil rights and equal opportunity laws and the antitrust laws.
H.R. Rep. No. 190, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1977) reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.A.A.N. 362.
39. Pamela P. Bread & Pleasant S. Bronax, III, The Anti-Boycott Provisions of the
Export Administration Act, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS 1990: THE LEGAL As-
PECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series
1990), at 781.
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take any action pursuant to the boycott.40 In addition, the President is-
sued further encouragement, but did not actually prohibit U.S. firms
from participating in the Arab boycott of Israel.
41
In 1973, the price of oil increased upwards of 500%, resulting in the
need for increased trade with the Arab countries. This resulted in the
U.S. v. Bechtel42 case which finally raised the question of whether it was
illegal, under U.S. anti-trust laws, to participate in the Arab Boycott. The
case was settled out of court, but it served notice that companies may be
liable if they cooperated with the Arab boycott.4 3 The EAA prohibited
compliance only when it would have had a discriminatory effect on
friendly countries. It also required reporting of others who joined the boy-
cott. This was usually done when a company was asked to join a boycott
or told that the sale was conditioned on the seller joining the boycott.
In 1977, as the boycott affected increasing numbers of U.S. busi-
nesses with greater impact, Congress concluded that mere encouragement
not to participate was not good enough. Congress therefore added the
Anti-Boycott provisions to the Export Administration Act of 1969.4 , This
prohibited a U.S. person or business from willfully taking or agreeing to
take actions to comply with any boycott imposed by a foreign country
against a country that is friendly to the U.S.4 5 This gave more teeth to
the past provisions.
On January 18, 1978, the Commerce Department further issued regu-
lations implementing the 1977 Amendments,46 and the courts have up-
held these regulations in various challenges.4 7 If found guilty, the com-
pany can have their export license revoked and other civil and criminal
penalties may apply.
B. The Ribicoff Amendments to the Tax Reform Act of 1976
As a further sanction, Congress enacted the Ribicoff Amendments to
the Tax Reform Act of 1976."' Normally, U.S. taxpayers who pay taxes in
another country are permitted to take that amount as a credit on their
U.S. taxes. The Amendment, however, denies these tax benefits to those
companies who "participate in or cooperate with an international boy-
40. Pub. L. No. 89-63, 79 Stat. 209 (1965).
41. 30 Fed Reg. 12,121 (1965).
42. U.S. v. Bechtel, 648 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. (Cal.) 1981).
43. See U.S., Bechtel Reached Accord on Boycott Case, WALL ST. J. Jan. 11, 1977 at
14.
44. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420. The EAA sets forth the Anti-Boycott provisions at 50
U.S.C. app. § 2407.
45. Supra note 1. See also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a) for prohibitions on actions in sup-
port of the boycott.
46. Restrictive Trade Practices on Boycotts, 15 C.F.R. Pt. 769 (1995).
47. See, e.g., Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Baldrige, 728 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1984); Trane
Co. v. Baldrige, 552 F. Supp. 1378 (W.D. Wis. 1983).
48. IRC § 999, the Revenue Act of 1971, § 501, 85 Stat. 497, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 861
(1988).
1995
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 23:3
cott"'  The Internal Revenue Service has issued regulations that help ex-
plain the applicability of these provisions.
50
Many other differences exist between the tax and export control
laws. Under the tax laws, a person loses tax benefits if he "cooperates or
participates in an international boycott" in any way.51 Under export con-
trol laws, U.S. persons are prohibited from refusing to do business with
anyone pursuant to a request from or agreement with a boycotting coun-
try.52 They are also prohibited from: 1) refusing to employ or otherwise
discriminate against any U.S. person on the basis of sex, race, religion, or
national origin;53 2) furnishing information regarding the race, religion,
sex, or national origin of customers;" 3) providing information about
someone's business relationships or membership in other organizations;"
or 4) drafting letters of credit which request any of the above
information."
There are many exceptions to these rules that appear to allow the
exporter some leeway in determining with whom he wants to deal. For
example, U.S. persons are allowed to comply with requirements of a boy-
cotting country which:
1) prohibits the import into that country of goods and services of
another country,5 7
2) wants unilateral selection over carriers, insurers,58 shipping docu-
49. Id.
50. IRC § 999. IRS Temp. Reg. § 7-999-1 and Proposed Reg. § 1-999-1.
51. Supra note 37.
A person participates in or cooperates with an international boycott if he agrees -
(A) As a condition of doing business directly or indirectly within a country or with the
government, a company, or a national of the country -
(i) to refrain from doing business with or in a country which is the object of the boycott
or with the government, companies, or nationals of that country;
(ii) to refrain from doing business with any U.S. person engaged in trade in a country
which is the object of the international boycott or with the governments, companies, or
nationals of that country;
(iii) to refrain from doing business with any company whose ownership or management
is made up, all or in part, of individuals of a particular nationality, race, or religion, or
remove (or refrain from selecting) corporate directors who are individuals of a particular
nationality, race, or religion; or
(iv) to refrain from employing individuals of a particular nationality, race, or religion; or
(B) As a condition of the sale of a product to the government, a company, or national of
a country, to refrain from shipping or insuring that product on a carrier owned, leased, or
operated by a person who does not participate in or cooperate with an international boycott
52. 15 C.F.R. § 769.2(a).
53. 15 C.F.R. § 769.2(b).
54. 15 C.F.R. § 769.2(c).
55. 15 C.F.R. § 769.2(d-e).
56. 15 C.F.R. § 769.2(f).
57. 15 C.F.R. § 769.3(a-1).
58. 15 C.F.R. § 769.3(c).
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ments without negative certificates,5 9 reshipments of exports, 0 and immi-
gration or passport requirements," or
3) governs only activities within that foreign country, especially if the
U.S. exporter resides in the boycotting country."2
The jurisdiction of the tax and export control laws also differ. The
tax laws apply to all U.S. companies and their foreign subsidiaries if the
U.S. company owns more than 10% of the stock. In contrast, the export
laws apply to U.S. taxpayers and foreign subsidiaries only in situations
where they are engaged in U.S. commerce.6"
In addition to the laws prohibiting boycott assistance, there are a se-
ries of laws requiring companies to report anyone attempting to recruit
them to participate in a boycott.64 The request, whether oral or written,
must be reported to the Department of Commerce. It is irrelevant
whether the request was for information or to join a boycott.65 The re-
quest must be reported by the end of the month following the calendar
quarter in which the request was received.66 The report must include doc-
umentation of the request, disclosure of what action was taken, and a
description of the commodities or technical data involved.
Compliance with these regulations involves training the marketing,
sales, and purchasing departments to be aware of such boycott requests
and how to handle them. Procedures need to be installed, and all ques-
tions should be referred to legal counsel.
C. Record Retention Requirements
Under the EAR, there are generally three main categories of transac-
tions that are subject to record-keeping requirements.6 7 These are: (1)
transactions that involve restrictive trade practices or boycott require-
ments or requests, for example relating to the Arab boycott of Israel6", (2)
exports of known commodities or technical data from the U.S. and known
reexports, transshipments or diversions of commodities from the U.S., or
(3) any other transactions subject the EAR, regardless of whether the ex-
port or reexport is made, or proposed to be made, by any person with or
without authorization by a validated license, general license, or any other
export authorization.
The EAR require the following items to be retained 69 :
59. 15 C.F.R. § 769.3(b).
60. 15 C.F.R. § 769.3(d).
61. 15 C.F.R. § 769.3(e).
62. 15 C.F.R. § 769.3(f).
63. Supra note 37.
64. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(b); 15 C.F.R. § 769.6.
65. 15 C.F.R. § 769.6(a)
66. 15 C.F.R. § 769.6(b).
67. 15 C.F.R. § 787.13(a).
68. See infra notes 36-65 and accompanying text.
69. 15 C.F.R. § 787.13(c).
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1) export control documents
2) memoranda
3) notes
4) correspondence
5) contacts
6) invitations to bid
7) books of account
8) financial records
9) restrictive trade practices or boycott documents and reports
10) other written matter pertaining to the transactions described
above
The EAA and EAR exempts many items from the record-keeping re-
quirements, including:
1) export information pages
2) special export file lists
3) vessel logs from freight forwarders
4) certificates regarding inspection, warranties, guarantees, packing
material, or the quality of goods
5) letters of indemnity
6) financial hold and release forms and reports
7) invoices for commission and engineering fees
Generally, required-records must be retained for at least two years
after the "termination of the export".7 0 Anti-boycott materials, however,
must be retained for three years after the "termination of the export".
The "termination of the export" has been interpreted as the latest time:
(1) the good was exported from the U.S., (2) any known reexport or diver-
sion of the goods took place, or (3) any other termination of the transac-
tion occurred, whether formally or by other means.
While this limits the amount of time that a company must retain
records, a company may want to retain clean and complete records
longer, since the statute of limitations for criminal actions brought under
the EAA is five years.
The time limits may also be extended if the Department of Com-
merce or any other governmental agency so requests. In such case, the
records may be destroyed only with written authorization from the
agency that originally requested the materials.
70. 15 C.F.R. § 787.13(e).
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VII. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT - Focus ON THE ACTIONS OF
EXPORTERS
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act7 l1 is not concerned with what the
product is, what it is made out of, or where it is sold. Instead, the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) regulates the actions of the exporters, as
individuals, and the operations of their companies, whether in the United
States or not.
The origins of the FCPA started in 1976. The Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) submitted a report to the Senate Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs Committee revealing questionable and illegal corporate
payments and practices.7 The report stated that the SEC would, within
its power, continue to demand disclosure of questionable and illegal pay-
ments to foreign government officials. However, the SEC stated that some
"limited purpose legislation in this area would be desirable to demon-
strate a clear Congressional policy with respect to a thorny and controver-
sial problem. 7 - This resulted in the SEC drafting proposed amendments
to the Securities Act of 1934 to deal with this problem.74 The amend-
ments, called the FCPA, were meant to eliminate three basic problems: 1)
off-the-book slush funds resulting from unrecorded transactions, 2) falsi-
fied records intended to disguise some aspect of a transaction, such as a
payment to a different person, and 3) qualitative misrepresentations, such
as part of $100,000 given to A, that was actually given to B. This third
problem was the most difficult to correct.
Congress passed the FCPA and it was signed into law by President
Carter on December 20, 1977.75 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) amended U.S. securities law by: 1) imposing accounting stan-
dards for corporate assets;76 2) prohibiting bribes in foreign dealings; 3)
imposing the same anti-bribery requirements on "domestic concerns", en-
forced by the Justice Department, which include all companies not regis-
tered with the SEC; and 4) extending these regulations to U.S. citizens
and residents, as opposed to only businesses and corporations. 7
The FCPA78 regulates primarily the accounting, sales and marketing
operations of companies. In the accounting departments, the FCPA regu-
lates the manner in which: 1) companies register with the Securities and
71. Pub. L. No. 95-213 95th Cong., 91 Stat. 1494, codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. § 78 [hereinafter referred to as FCPA].
72. Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Questionable and Illegal
Corporate Payments and Practiceg, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
Committee print, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 1976), at 2.
73. Id. at 57.
74. Id. at 58.
75. See supra note 1.
76. This was in an attempt to eliminate "slush funds". Codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.A. § 78q(b).
77. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-1 (1990).
78. The FCPA is codified under short title at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78A, note.
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Exchange Commission (SEC), 2) keep their records and 3) audit their ac-
counting systems. 9 The marketing and sales departments' activities are
regulated through the Anti-Bribery provisions of the FCPA.s0 These pro-
visions prohibit U.S. companies from paying bribes to a foreign official.
The FCPA governs all U.S. companies and individuals subject to the
jurisdiction of U.S. law. The anti-bribery portion of the FCPA also ap-
plies to all companies that are engaged in international trade whether or
not they are registered with the SEC. It uses the term "domestic concern"
to define who is within its grasp. "Domestic concern" means: 1) any indi-
vidual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the U.S.; or 2) any corpo-
ration, partnership, association,... which has its principle place of busi-
ness in the U.S. or is organized under the laws of the U.S. Superimposed
on this is the requirement that "interstate commerce" be involved in the
violation. The term "interstate commerce" has been interpreted to in-
clude the use of telephone, mails, or other systems of communication.
The FCPA follows a two-track approach: 1) accounting mandates;
and 2) anti-bribery prohibitions. 1 These are discussed below in greater
detail.
A. FCPA Accounting Mandates
First, in the FCPA, Congress mandated that all companies: 1) make
and keep books, records and accounts in reasonable detail so as to accu-
rately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the com-
pany's assets; and 2) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting
controls sufficient to provide assurances that: a) all transactions are exe-
cuted in accordance with management's authorization; b) the transactions
are recorded to permit preparation of financial statements in accordance
with the General Accepted Accounting Principles; c) access to assets is
permitted only with management's authorization; d) recorded accounta-
bility for assets is routinely compared with the existing assets; and e) ap-
propriate action is taken with respect to any inconsistencies.8 2
The FCPA also contains an "internal accounting controls require-
ment" meant to regulate and guide the design and maintenance of a sys-
tem of controls. These control systems are auditing systems, not account-
ing systems, meant to prevent off the book slush funds, not just find them
after they happen. These provisions also are not limited to material
amounts, but to any amount.
Compliance under this first part of the FCPA goes to ensuring that
an exporter's system of record keeping and accounting is inspected, pref-
erably by outside auditors, on a regular basis and that the personnel in
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (for issuers of registered securities) and 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (for
domestic concerns that are not issuers of registered securities).
81. See supra note 78.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78m, note.
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these departments are well-trained to comply with the FCPA.
B. FCPA's Anti-Bribery Provisions
The second track of the FCPA contains the sections of the Act which
have declared it illegal for any company, whether publicly traded or not,
to bribe any foreign official or political party for the purpose of obtaining
business.83 Numerous interpretations evolved concerning what consti-
tuted a violation, but the Act requires that the payment must have been
made to a foreign official who has "discretionary authority". "Grease pay-
ments", or payments made to a person who does not have any discretion-
ary authority in order to simply expedite routine matters, are not covered
by the statute.
At face value it would appear that these requirements were already
being met, especially by publicly-traded corporations. However, consider-
able confusion and debate occurred regarding what was needed to comply
with this new law. In addition to the confusion it created, the FCPA was
criticized by some experts as a major disincentive to exports.8 " In 1980,
the complaints were made in two General Accounting Office Reports 5
and to the President's Export Council of 1980.
C. The FCPA's 1988 Amendments
As a result of this confusion and criticism, Congress made several
amendments to the FCPA in 1988. The amendments, enacted as part of
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OTCA)8s , were
designed to: 1) remove ambiguities from the Act, 2) lessen the burden of
the controls on the exporters and administrators,8 7 and 3) clarify and nar-
row the scope of the FCPA by lowering the knowledge requirements".
The 1988 Amendments accomplished many important changes to
help the Act function properly. First, the 1988 amendments cleared up
confusion concerning whether the FCPA's accounting requirements ap-
plied to foreign subsidiaries, the issue of a parent corporation's responsi-
bility for a subsidiary. The Amendments stated that if the U.S. company
owns 50% or less of a foreign firm, and the parent reasonably and in good
faith attempts to require that the subsidiary make and keep accurate
books within a system of internal accounting controls, then the U.S. firm
has no liability for the foreign firm's practices.
Second, the 1988 Amendments lowered the standard of "knowledge
83. Supra note 80.
84. See Julia Christine Bliss & Gregory J. Spak, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1988: Clarification or Evisceration, 20 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 441, 442 at n.3 (1989).
85. See Conf. Report, Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 916-917 (1988) [hereinafter OTCA Conference Report].
86. The FCPA amendments appear at Title V, subtitle A, pt. i §5001-5003 of the
QTCA.
87. OTCA Conference Report, supra note 85, at 916.
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that a payment was illegal or was a bribe" to only "knowing". 88 The prior
1977 standard was "knowing or having reason to know" that a payment
would be used by a third party for a purpose unlawful under the Act."
Since 1988, a person is deemed to "know" that the thing of value will be
given to a foreign official if the person "is aware of a high probability...
that the funds will be so used."8 9
Third, the 1988 amendments expanded the "grease payments excep-
tion". Originally, "grease payments" were allowed only if the official's du-
ties were ministerial or clerical. After 1988, the FCPA allows payments to
any foreign official for facilitating or expediting any routine nondiscre-
tionary action. The Amendments also require that: 1) the payment be
used to retain some business or 2) something be received in return.
Fourth, the 1988 Amendments clarified that, when enforcing the
FCPA, the SEC would not impose criminal penalties for insignificant,
technical, or inadvertent violations.
Fifth, while certain aspects of the FCPA were relaxed by the 1988
Amendments, the penalties for violation of the anti-bribery provisions of
the FCPA were made significantly more severe by the 1988 Amendments.
Congress raised the maximum corporate fine from $1 million to $2 mil-
lion, and the maximum individual fine from $10,000 to $100,000. The
maximum prison term remains at five years fot any officers or directors
who willfully violate these provisions.
Sixth, Congress strengthened the FCPA's regulations regarding the
liability of individuals in international trade when it repealed the Eck-
hardt Amendment, which had required that a company actually be con-
victed of a FCPA violation before any of its directors or officers could be
prosecuted under the Act. Now a company's employees or agents may be
prosecuted regardless of whether the company has been convicted or
prosecuted. Thus, the FCPA is an important statute for exporters to be
aware of and to comply with.
VIII. PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF EXPORT LAWS AND REGULATIONS9"
Violations or non-compliance of the above noted export laws and reg-
ulations are detailed and carry significant criminal and civil penalties.
The Export Administration Act of 19799' (EAA) provides for criminal
penalties and administrative sanctions for violations of the anti-boycott
88. Pub. L. No. 100-481, § 5003, 102 Stat. 1416, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3).
89. Id. at 102 Stat 1418 codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(A).
90. See Cecil Hunt & Pamela P. Breed, Export Administration Act: Penalties and En-
forcement Process, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS 1990: THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, supra note 40, at 803. Murphy, Export Controls Compliance and
Enforcement: A Private Practitioner's Perspective, 398 PLI/Comm 393 (1986).
91. 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 2401-2420, as amended by Pub. L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107. The
EAA of 1979 was extensively amended by the Export Administration Amendments Act of
1985, Pub. L. 99-64, 98 Stat. 120 and by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub.
L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107.
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and export control provisions of the EAA. The Export Administration
Regulations9" (EAR) impose export control related requirements, specify
offenses which are subject to sanctions and establish procedures for ad-
ministrative enforcement proceedings. This is a section that hopefully a
company will not have to refer to, but merely peruse to get a feeling of
the harsh view that is taken toward export violations by the courts.
A. Criminal Penalties
Criminal penalties can be imposed for violations, attempts, or con-
spiracies to violate the EAA, or any regulation, order, or license under the
Act. Criminal violations of export laws are broken into two groups: 1)
"knowing" violations and 2) "willful" violations. "Knowing" violations in-
clude: a) the mere possession of goods or technology with the intent to
export in violation of U.S. export control laws, or b) knowing or having
reason to believe that the goods or technology would be so exported. For
each "knowing" violation,9" the exporter may be assessed a fine of up to
$50,000 or five times the value of the export involved, whichever is more,
imprisonment for up to 5 years, or both.
"Willful" violations 4 include each occurrence, with knowledge, that:
a) the export will be used for the benefit of any country to which exports
are restricted for national security reason or foreign policy purposes, or b)
that the intended destination of the goods or technology involved is such
a restricted country. The penalties for "willful" violations are even har-
sher than for "knowing" violations. For individuals, fines up to $250,000
or imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both can be assessed.9 5 For compa-
nies, fines of $1,000,000 or up to five times the value of the exports in-
volved, whichever is greater, may be assessed.96
The same penalties apply to a person or company, holding a vali-
dated license "for the export of any goods or technology to a controlled
country, and who, with the knowledge" of its unauthorized use for "mili-
tary or intelligence gathering purposes," fails to report the facts to the
Secretary of Defense. However, the maximum prison term in this case is
five years.9
Willful violations of the Arms Export Control Act (ACEA) provides
criminal penalties of up to $1,000,000 and/or up to imprisonment for 10
years," while violations of the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA) 99
provide for criminal penalties of up to $50,000 and/or imprisonment up to
92. 15 C.F.R. Pts. 768-799 (1995).
93. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(a); 15 C.F.R. Part 787.1(a)(1)(i).
94. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b)(1)(A), 15 C.F.R. § 787.1(a)(1)(ii).
95. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b)(1)(B), 15 C.F.R. § 787,1(a)(1)(ii).
96. 15 C.F.R. § 787.1(a)(1)(ii).
97. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(b)(2), 15 C.F.R. § 787.1(a)(1)(ii)(B).
98. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(e). The Arms Export Control Act (ACEA) also provides for admin-
istrative and civil sanctions.
99. 31 C.F.R. Parts 500-520.
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10 years.'.10
In addition to the fines and prison terms, knowing and willful viola-
tors of national security controls face forfeiture of: a) their interest in the
"goods or tangible items that were the subject of the violation,"''1 1 and b)
the proceeds of the violation itself.1 0' 2 However, these severe penalties are
not applicable to violations of short supply controls or to violations of the
anti-boycott regulations.
B. Civil Penalties
In addition to criminal penalties, the EAR provide that a respondent
found to have violated the Act or the Regulations is subject to any or all
of many civil sanctions. The civil penalty for violations occurring before
December 29, 1981 were up to $10,000. For violations after December 29,
1981, especially involving national security controls, the fines can be up to
$100,000 per violation.'0 3 In addition to a fine, however, four additional
sanctions may be levied against the respondent. First, illegal exports are
subject to seizure and forfeiture, together with any vessel or aircraft used
in the export or the attempt to export.'0 4 Second, "[a]ny outstanding vali-
dated export license affecting any transaction in which the respondent
may have any interest . . .may be suspended or revoked."' 0 5 Third, the
respondent may be denied the privilege of participation, either "directly
or indirectly, in any manner or capacity, in any transaction involving
commodities or technical data exported . . . from the U.S."'0 6 This is
known as a "general denial of export privileges." Fourth, the penalty that
does the most damage is the "Denial Order", 0 7 which is in effect a black-
list. A denial order means the affected party and its affiliates are prohib-
ited from participating, in any way, in any transaction involving the ex-
port of goods or technical data from the U.S. Other exporters and
importers must also avoid all dealings with a person or company subject
to a Denial Order. For this reason, the Department of Commerce pub-
lishes individual Denial Orders in the Federal Register and semiannually
publishes a Table of Denial Orders. The effect of these are to notify any-
one involved in international trade that they cannot deal with those per-
sons or companies appearing on the lists.
To avoid problems leading to these penalties, companies should use:
1) a strong contract, and 2) an adequate compliance program. Each are
discussed below.
100. No civil penalties apply to TWEA violations.
101. 50 U.S.C. app.§ 2410(g)(1)(A).
102. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(g)(1)(C).
103. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c)(1), 15 C.F.R. §§ 787.1(b)(3) and 788.3(a)(4).
104. 22 U.S.C. § 2401(g) (1994).
105. 15 C.F.R. Part 788.3(a)(1).
106. 15 C.F.R. Parts 788.3(a)(2).
107. 15 U.S.C.A. § 788.19.
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IX. DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
International contracts, important to all exporters, vary greatly from
domestic ones.' 8 Considering that the negotiation of the contract is the
building block that eventually leads to the actual export, it is in this area
that the laws and regulations must first be adhered to in order to avoid
further problems down the road. A solid, informed negotiation and well-
written contract will start in the marketing and sales departments, since
they are the ones who usually make the first contact with prospective
buyers.
It must be kept in mind when negotiating a contract for the interna-
tional sales of goods that there are a number of critical items which must
be definitively addressed in the contract. These include:
1. Government Regulations - Approval of the Contract:
Government approval necessary to export a product, service or data
is always a factor in international sales contracts. Any agreement that is
contingent upon the grant of all government approvals and licenses
should therefore always be stated upfront in a contract.
2. Licensing Requirements:
Any import licensing or restricting regulations should also be stated
upfront in a contract. This is important to see if a validated license is
required and if it can be attained in the time frame that the contract is
outlining.
3. Shipment Using Incoterms:10 9
The International Chamber of Commerce publishes a manual of
terms and provisions concerning issues of delivery, storage, shipment, in-
surance, and risk allocation when negotiating an international contract.
This manual is called "Incoterms" and is often used by foreign parties.
Incoterms defines common shipping terms and discusses protocols such
as: 1) when the title passes, 2) apportionment of the risk of loss, and 3)
the allocation of transportation and insurance costs. Use of Incoterms
reduces the likelihood of mistakes and misunderstandings in international
contracts.
4. Payment:
From the exporter's viewpoint, payment for the exported goods is the
most important trade issue. The exporter wants to be assured of payment
for the goods he ships. The best way is to have the money in hand before
the goods leave port, but this is rarely acceptable to the purchaser of the
contract. Instead, the most common method of payment in international
108. See generally Eleanor Roberts Lewis, Drafting International Sales and Agenti
Distributor Agreements, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS 1990: THE LEGAL ASPECTS
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 9 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
668, 1990).
109. International Chamber of Commerce, INCOTERMS (3rd ed. 1990).
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sales contracts between a buyer and seller, without an established rela-
tionship, is the letter of credit.110 The advantages of a letter of credit is
that it offers security of payment to the seller and facilitates the transfer
of funds between the buyer and seller. This is done by using the seller's
documents, such as the bill of lading, invoices, and carrier's papers, as
evidence of the delivery of the goods themselves. Payment is demanded
upon seller's presentation of the documents to the buyer's bank where the
letter of credit was issued. The seller receives payment earlier and shifts
the buyer's credit risk onto the bank, who is in a better position to evalu-
ate the buyer's credibility. The standards for this aspect of the transac-
tion include the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary
Credits."""
The two types of letters of credit are: 1) "revocable" and 2) "irrevo-
cable". The latter is much better for the exporter because the bank un-
conditionally guarantees the letter. The United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (CISG), enacted in the
U.S. on January 1, 1988, is also relevant here since it only allows for can-
cellation of the contract when a "fundamental" breach occurs, 1 2 which
does not necessarily include "non-payment". To protect the exporter, if
the CISG is being used, the contract should explicitly state that non-pay-
ment will be considered a fundamental breach.113
If the buyer will not agree to a letter of credit, the buyer may secure
the transaction with a "sight draft" or "time draft", enforceable against
the buyer independent of any original sales contract.1 " This "documen-
tary credit" requires the buyer's bank to accept the draft and the risk of
the buyer defaulting.
5. Currency To Be Used:
An export contract must always define in which currency payment
will be made. In doing this, the exporter must be aware of any risks relat-
ing to the foreign exchange rates between the countries as well as any
restrictions on converting the currency. If the currency of the buyer's
country is not stable, the best thing for the seller to do is to demand
payment in U.S. dollars. However, the buyer may not always agree. Some
alternatives include: 1) accept payment in the foreign currency with the
price put forth in U.S. dollars, requiring the buyer to match that amount
regardless of the exchange rate, 2) require payment in a stable third
country's currency, or 3) state an agreed upon exchange rate in the con-
tract, although this provides less security against fluctuations for the
seller.
110. SHAUL I. EZER, INTERNATIONAL EXPORTING AGREEMENTS § 10.01 (1988).
111. International Chamber of Commerce, Uniform Customs and Practice for Docu-
mentary Credits, I.C.C. publication #400.
112. CISG, infra note 115, at Articles 59, 61-65.
113. ALBERT KRITZER, INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT MANUAL: CONTRACT CHECKLISTS (1990)
note 46, 9-3.
114. HENRY HARFIELD, LETTERS OF CREDIT (1979).
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6. Choice of Law and Jurisdiction - The United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods (CISG) 115
The choice of law governing the contract is critically important. If
U.S. exporters desire to have U.S. law apply in an international contract,
they must explicitly state, in the contract, that U.S. domestic law, and no
other international or national law, applies. However, other parties may
also request the use of their countries' laws.
If a contract does not expressly designate which country's law ap-
plies, the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sales of Goods (CISG) will govern the contract. Enacted in the U.S. on
January 1, 1988, the primary purpose of the CISG is to: 1) handle
problems that arise in the formation of the standard international sales
contracts, 2) expressly delineate the obligations and rights for parties on
each side of the contract,"16 and 3) allow two foreign parties to negotiate a
transaction under the CISG rather than under the laws of one particular
country. The CISG is helpful for foreign parties because it codifies pri-
vate international law that has evolved from both common and civil law
jurisdictions.
Currently, many countries have acceded to the Convention,"17 and
the trend is for most countries to follow. A current list of ratifying coun-
tries is available from the State Department (202/653-9851) or the United
Nations (212/963-3918).
If nothing is said in the contract about which national law governs
and all signatories to the contract are from CISG ratifying countries, the
CISG will apply. However, if one party to the contract is from a non-
ratifying country, then Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) applies, not the CISG, unless the parties agree otherwise. The
CISG never applies, however, if the parties are a U.S. company and its
foreign subsidiary because both parties are American companies and thus
automatically subject to U.S. law. The CISG also does not apply to con-
sumer transactions," 8 securities, goods sold by auction, or contracts con-
cerning electricity or ships." 9 The CISG is a default provision that can be
opted out through specific language in the contract, therefore disregard-
ing the Convention. Such derogation need not be referenced in any way
to the CISG. Therefore, the parties are able to retain flexibility in devel-
115. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods,
April 11, 1980, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262 (1987), 15 U.S.C. app. at 29 (1994) reprinted in I.L.M. 668
(1980), also called the Vienna Convention [hereinafter referred to as CISG].
116. Id. at article 4.
117. As of May 1992, Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Canada,
Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland,
France, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Lesotho, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, People's Re-
public of China, Romania, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Uganda,
Ukrainian S.S.R., United States, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.
118. CISG, supra note 115, at article 2(a).
119. Id. at article 2(b-f).
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oping international contracts which best serve their needs.
The CISG is similar to the U.C.C. in its purpose, scope and most of
the content, but there are also many differences about which the Ameri-
can exporter should be knowledgeable. For example, the Statute of
Frauds at § 2-201 of the U.C.C. requires a contract be in writing and
signed if the value is over $500.'20 Article 11 of the CISG rejects such
formal requirements and allows a contract to be proved by any means,
including witnesses.121
Similarly, the U.C.C. recognizes the mailbox rule when dealing with
the timing of offers and acceptances, the revocability of an offer, the bat-
tle of the forms, the requirement of consideration in contract formation,
and the right to recover for defective goods. Under the CISG, there are no
such requirements.
A word of caution: In most U.S. contracts, if the CISG is not used
every attempt should be made to have U.S. law govern. This will help
because of the familiarity of the U.C.C. and will also greatly reduce ex-
penses of having to hire local counsel in a foreign country where the ex-
porter may be unfamiliar with the laws. The choice of jurisdiction also
presents similar problems.
7. Unforeseeable "force majure" events:
Risks always exist in a contract which cannot be foreseen at the ne-
gotiating table. Therefore, the contract should allocate responsibility for
force majure events including: war, riots, embargoes, acts of nature,
changes of government, etc. If such responsibility is not allocated in the
contract, the law governing the contract might fill in the gap. The U.C.C.
§ 2-615 makes reference to who will be excused. The CISG does not use
the term force majure, but discusses impediments that are beyond the
control of any one party to the contract.
122
8. Warranties:
Warranties also need to be clearly laid out and explained. If no war-
ranties exist, a disclaimer should be made to that effect in the contract. A
well-drafted warranty clause in an international contract should contain:
a) the scope of exactly what is warranted, b) how long the warranty will
be in effect, c) what type of notice is needed to file a valid claim, and d)
an identification of agreed upon remedies to satisfy the warranty.
9. Dispute Resolution:
A dispute resolution procedure should be clearly defined in the con-
tract. Such methods can include: a) conciliation, b) renegotiation, c) me-
diation, or d) arbitration. Of these, arbitration is the most widely used
method because it usually tends to be quicker and less expensive than a
court proceeding or adjudication, and is conducted by a knowledgeable
120. U.C.C. § 2-201(1).
121. CISG, supra note 115, at article 11.
122. Id. at article 79.
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person in that sector of the industry. Some of the international arbitra-
tion systems include: 1) the International Chamber of Commerce (I.C.C.),
2) the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCI-
TRAL), and 3) the International Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association. A contract's arbitration clause should
discuss the forum for hearing the arbitration and the type of panels arbi-
trating. These dispute resolution alternatives are beneficial. Even though
neither party has any negative intentions at the time the contract is
formed, such a clause can keep the parties out of a potentially unfavora-
ble court system if a dispute arises. Knowledge of the different forums
available will better serve international negotiators.
X. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING EXPORT COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS
A. Forming an Export Compliance Program
While export regulations are detailed and specific, exporters gener-
ally are left to implement their own types of in-house compliance pro-
grams as long as all statutory requirements are met. An effective in-house
program must be tailored to each individual company and involves partic-
ipation, communication, decision-making, and a proper corporate atti-
tude. The purpose of a program is to ensure that the company complies
with all applicable laws and regulations pertaining to the export and reex-
port of goods, services and technology. However, it must also be practical.
The goals of an exporter's compliance program include insuring that: 1)
proper licenses cover all exports, 2) employees handle and report orders
where special compliance problems arise, 3) exports are screened for spe-
cial handling requirements, 4) an export manager holds ultimate respon-
sibility over shipments, 5) reviews are made on a regular basis, and 6) the
Office of Export Licensing receives the proper reports. To lay a founda-
tion for a strong compliance program, there are some basic issues that
must be addressed regarding the exporting company's practices and
operations.
First, a company's top management must mandate compliance with
the export laws and regulations. A cover letter from the CEO, discussing
the necessity and importance of a compliance program, is a good starting
point. The statement should be followed with a clear, in-depth descrip-
tion of the company's export compliance policy, stating the company's
intent to export in compliance with all laws and regulations and commu-
nicating that intent to all levels of the firm. It should clearly: 1) state that
each employee is responsible for compliance, 2) delineate the penalties
employees face for violating the company policy, 3) describe the chain of
command responsible for tracking compliance, and 4) provide an outside
source, such as outside counsel, to whom employees can anonymously re-
port violations.
Second, the compliance program should contain checklists for deter-
mining whether and how to export, including: 1) the Table of Denial Or-
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ders, 2) a list of proscribed countries, 3) a list of strategic products sold
by the company, and 4) a list of red flags which alert the employee to
suspicious circumstances. A list of red flags would include: a) receipt of
unusual orders from companies not generally known in the trade, espe-
cially if the company has no obvious use for the items, b) order amounts,
packaging or delivery routes which are unusual in the industry, c) reluc-
tance to provide end-user information, d) willingness to pay cash, and e)
a purchasing agent's refusal to accept installation or service contracts
that are usually standard for the industry.
Third, export compliance must be integrated and visible in all de-
partments as a routine task. The export manager, or a person in a similar
position, must work with all departments to make sure that compliance
regulations are adequately met. Experience has shown that involvement
of the following departments is critical:
a) the marketing department, where initial contacts with customers
are made and where most violations occur, must have export regulations
incorporated in its earliest planning stages for new markets and product
development,
b) the finance departments, which obtain information about custom-
ers and pass it along to determine if any customer screening problems
exist,
c) the legal department, which must incorporate the laws and regula-
tions into the various forms and contracts used by the company for ex-
portation and licensing. A clause is needed to making all contractual
agreements contingent upon receipt of the required license, so that the
company remains in compliance with U.S. law,
d) the distribution department, which is the last opportunity for the
company to control the export. Preparation of the final shipment instruc-
tions must be the last check before the product leaves the company's pos-
session, and
e) it is also important that one department take responsibility for
updating the compliance program.
B. Education and Training
Exporters must be aware of all the regulations relating to exports
discussed above and put these into effect in their companies at the earli-
est possible time. The training of employees is crucial throughout the
company. It is very easy to be confused by the regulations or simply to
forget what is needed in order to comply. Therefore it is crucial for all
officers and employees of a company, including new ones, to attend an
educational program discussing the relevant laws and regulations. All em-
ployees, as a condition of employment, should sign an agreement stating
that they received an export compliance manual and will conform, to the
best of their ability, to the exporting requirements. This training program
should develop an understanding of the EAR and EAA as they relate to
the company's exporting activities. This training should contain informa-
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tion on the firm's procedures, destinations of the products, and an organi-
zational chart for determining who is responsible for carrying out the dif-
ferent parts of the compliance program.
One goal of the training program is to make the employees realize
this is an ongoing process. The procedures and any problems continually
need to be discussed between counsel and the people involved with the
exporting functions. A major part of compliance requires continual up-
dating and education. This is done by updating the compliance program
with changes from the Federal Register, Table of Denial Orders, and
EAR using explanations, manuals, refresher courses, presentations, and
seminars.
Compliance under the regulations work only if the company is prop-
erly organized and actions are taken quickly. Spot checks and audits need
to be performed to insure that the actions of the company follow the pro-
gram as originally conceived. If there is any discrepancy, immediate reme-
dial action should be taken, and the damage should be controlled.
The export manager shall ultimately be responsible for compliance.
He must transmit the important parts of the EAR to others in his com-
pany. He must also establish guidelines, with the help of outside counsel,
and communicate the guidelines to the employees. The export manager
will make the final determinations regarding licenses and shipping papers
and documentation, as well as control periodic audits, and other things
that relate to the exporting of goods, services and technology.
Outside counsel should be readily available and accessible to any em-
ployee or officer of the company.
C. If There is a "Problem"
Usually compliance programs get enacted long after the company has
started exporting its goods or technology. This presents a problem of
what to do when past or present violations are discovered. There are two
plans of action. One is to voluntarily disclose the information regarding
the violation. The other is to sit on the issue and hope that you do not get
caught. There is no legal duty to come forward with violations other than
anti-boycott requests or changes in a company's knowledge regarding a
material fact.
It is often to the exporter's advantage to voluntarily disclose viola-
tions to the proper authorities. The EAR, the Office of Export Enforce-
ment (OEE) and the Commerce Department encourage such action. It
has numerous risks, but can also be beneficial if done correctly. There are
no set rules in this area, but voluntary disclosure has been considered a
mitigating factor when penalties need to be assessed. Whenever possible
an internal investigation should be performed before making any disclo-
sures, so the scope of any infractions is known and can be controlled.
If nothing is done about an infraction, or if one is simply not found,
the company as a whole should know what to do if a representative ar-
rives at the company headquarters to initiate an investigation. This does
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not necessarily mean that a violation has occurred, but there are several
triggers that might send the OEE looking your way. Triggers include
dealing with someone on the Table of Denial Orders, on the gray list, in a
Middle Eastern country, or intelligence reports from another agency.
If a representative from the OEE arrives at the exporter's offices to
conduct an investigation, the receptionist should know which person to
immediately contact within the company, usually the general counsel or
the export manager. The receptionist should be courteous and coopera-
tive to the agent, and if the agent has a warrant, legal counsel should be
notified immediately. If not, the agent should be taken to a conference
room for the remainder of the meeting so that contact between the agent
and the company's affairs can be minimized.
Once an investigation is underway, the exporter should try to mini-
mize and contain the damage as much as possible. General guidelines in-
clude: cooperating, showing the government what the company has done
correctly at every opportunity; making sure that the current stream of
business is without violations; and taking remedial action immediately.
An exporter can increase his likelihood of success by planning. Coopera-
tion is necessary to avoid suspicion; give the agent what he wants without
demanding a warrant. However, if the agent wants to remove any docu-
ments from the place of business, the exporter is entitled to copies of the
documents.
XI. CONCLUSION
As is clear, the exporter needs to be aware of much information relat-
ing to any international exporting that is performed. The above article
attempts to help define what the exporter's company and the different
departments need to be made aware of to ensure compliance in the ex-
port control arena. It is important to remember that this area of law is in
a state of constant flux. Therefore, exporters must remain aware of any
substantial changes in the law that could affect their obligations.
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And gladly wolde he lerne, and gladly teche.
Chaucer, General Prologue, The Canterbury Tales
International Environmental Law and World Order: A Problem-Ori-
ented Coursebook is a unique approach to teaching this exciting subject.
To review it, we utilized the unique approach of having a student and a
professor write the review together, after using the text in class this
spring at the University of Denver College of Law. To our amazement,
given our very different perspectives, we agree. Like Chaucer's clerk, we
found ourselves glad to learn and glad to teach with this stimulating
book.
The field of International Environmental Law, as the book's authors
indicate, "has come of age,"1 and this is neither the first nor last such
* Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; J.D., University of Michigan;
B.A., Harvard College.
* * Dual degree candidate, 1996, J.D. University of Denver College of Law; M.A. Gradu-
ate School of International Studies; B.A. University of Wisconsin.
1. LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY, GEOFFREY W. R. PALMER & BURNS H. WESTON, INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK ix.
(1994) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER]. They are
scarcely the first to make this observation, see e.g., George W. Pring & David Joeris, Book
Review: Various International Environmental Law Collections, 4 COLO. J. OF INT'L ENVTL
L. & POL'Y 422 (1993).
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textbook we will see.2 This book stands out, however, and will continue to
do so, because it is one of the few law texts to use the "problem-method"
of requiring students to learn the law by applying it to solve realistic fact
situations, rather than the more traditional "casebook" approach. It is
also noteworthy because it is accompanied by the Basic Documents Sup-
plement, containing nearly 150 key international environmental treaties,
declarations, resolutions, cases, etc., to be used in solving the problems, as
well as an outstanding behind-the-scenes Teacher's Manual.
Each of the three authors brings his unique expertise, teaching ap-
proach, and personal views. Professor Guruswamy, a leading authority in
environmental law, contributes his idea of an "integrated approach" to
solving environmental problems, and his influence can be seen through-
out, in his excerpted articles, the imaginative problems, and the extensive
notes.' Complementing and contrasting with this is Professor Palmer, a
leading proponent of "soft law" (as opposed to "hard" command/control)
solutions to current international problems, who ensures this important
approach receives emphasis.5 Finally, Professor Weston brings his vast
expertise on international law to the book; as the lead author of an earlier
"problem-oriented coursebook" on international law,6 Professor Weston
contributes not only the pedagogic approach but also his own ideas on
interdisciplinary approaches to global problems."
The book's Preface spells out the authors' fundamental philosophies.
They view most of today's major environmental problems as outstripping
2. WILLIAM WEINER, DAVID FAVRE & SUHDIR CHOPRA, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW (1994) is a more traditional textbook combining articles, notes, and international docu-
ments in one looseleaf volume. The 1994 edition replaces an earlier one, both published by
Lupus Publications Ltd./Detroit College of Law Press.
Professor Edith Brown Weiss at Georgetown and colleagues Daniel B. Magraw and Paul
C. Szasz are preparing another textbook for publication by Little Brown in 1996; Professor
Pring acknowledges with gratitude the use of a draft of this text in prior International Envi-
ronmental Law classes, with good results.
3. As the authors explain in the Teacher's Manual (at 1), they purposefully use the
term "Coursebook" because they feel the "content and procedure of International Law in
general, and International Environmental Law in particular, are not adequately mirrored in
a 'Casebook.'"
4. See, e.g., Lakshman D. Guruswamy, Integrated Environmental Control: The Ex-
panding Matrix, 22 ENVTL. L. 77 (1992); Lakshman D. Guruswamy, Integrating Thought-
ways: Re-Opening of the Environmental Mind?, 1989 WIs. L. REV. 463.
5. See, e.g., Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259 (1992).
6. BURNS H. WESTON, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORI-
ENTED COURSEBOOK (2d ed. 1991). The authors acknowledge their debt to this "predecessor
pioneering effort" in this book. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 1, at x.
7. See, e.g., ALTERNATIVE SECURITY: LIVING WITHOUT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE (Burns H.
Weston, ed. 1990); Burns H. Weston, The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Rela-
tions Law, Continued: Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making:
Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1991); Burns H. Weston, The Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of Foreign-Owned Wealth, 75
AM. J. INT'L L. 437 (1981).
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national boundaries, a "spurious anachronism,"' and the capacity of the
traditional international legal order, premised as it is on "sovereignty."9
They and their book are unashamedly environmentalist and internation-
alist. In addition, the authors view much of traditional law teaching as
wrong-headed:
We unapologetically identify ourselves in general with those who rank
issue-spotting, problem-solving, and synthesis as more important in
the legal learning experience than the assimilation and comprehension
of raw, disembodied knowledge. 0
While this pedagogic approach may seem improper to some,11 we found it
refreshing and effective. For students, this may be the first time in law
school that they have been asked actually to use the various laws, trea-
ties, customs, general principles, authors, and processes they have stud-
ied. For teachers, this may be the closest they have come to simulating
actual law practice in the classroom.
The authors envision International Environmental Law and World
Order as useable in four different settings: first, in a class of students with
no prior knowledge of international law; second, with students who have
had a prior course in public international law; third, as a basic introduc-
tory course in international law; and fourth, as a specialized seminar for
advanced international law students. We would not go so far, but three
out of four is not bad. Clearly, in the second and fourth settings, where
students have some prior knowledge of international law (true of the
other half of our Spring 1995 law class), the book succeeds very well. Sur-
prisingly, we can vouch that it also works in the first setting, for students
who have not had basic international law (true of the other half of our
law class and a graduate class of environmental engineers). 12 However, we
feel the third setting, using it for an introductory course in "generic" in-
ternational law, is overly optimistic; this specialized book would come up
short in a number of key areas, specifically the use of force, citizenship,
national jurisdiction, human rights, and the laws of war, to name a few,
and there are better-focused competitors, not least co-author Weston's
own pioneering international law text.' s
8. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 1, at ix.
9. Id.
10. Id. at x.
11. William A. Mogel, Book Review: International Environmental Law and World Or-
der, 16 ENERGY L. J. 197, 198 (1995). The reviewer is a Washington D.C. attorney specializ-
ing in Energy and International Law and admits to "the standards of one who attended law
school thirty years ago." Id.
12. Amazingly, the book also proved highly successful in a non-law school setting: as an
elective in the Environmental Science and Engineering Department at Colorado School of
Mines taught by Professor Pring in Summer 1995. Both the law and engineering students
had a prior course in U.S. environmental law; while the engineers clearly benefitted from
some prior law course exposure, the law students who had not had an intro environmental
law course did as well overall with this book as those who had.
13. See WESTON ET AL., supra note 6.
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The coursebook is divided into three parts. Part I (320 pp.) combines
a basic introduction to international law (three chapters) with an intro-
duction to environmental issues (one chapter). Part 11 (670 pp.), which
constitutes half of the book, sets out the 18 problems that are the heart of
the course. And Part III (160 pp.) looks to future issues.
Rather than rely solely on theoretical analyses, this book begins with
a gripping true story: the ill-fated saga of the Rainbow Warrior. In 1985,
while Greenpeace and other environmental organizations were protesting
France's nuclear testing in the South Pacific, French government agents
bombed Greenpeace's boat, Rainbow Warrior, while it was moored in a
New Zealand harbor, sinking it and killing one of its crew. The authors
use this story of state-sponsored terrorism as a recurrent theme to give
substance to the lessons of the early chapters, and events in 1995 give it
all the more relevance.
Chapter 1, "The Concept of International Law," surveys the basics of
the international law system, encouraging both new and experienced stu-
dents to explore the jurisprudential justifications for treating it as "law."
Here, L'affaire Rainbow Warrior proves its worth. For inexperienced stu-
dents, it serves as an exciting skeleton on which to build an anatomy of
international law and test its strengths and weaknesses. More exper-
ienced students, while finding the chapter materials quite familiar, will
discover Rainbow Warrior gives them a fresh challenge and perspective.
Chapter 2, "The Sources of International Law," presents this essen-
tial topic in the typical fashion, which is surprising given the authors'
liberal views on "hard" vs. "soft" law. It uses Article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice as its framework, with the usual result
that the article's internal sequence gives hard law (treaties, custom) top
billing and most of the emphasis. A student could easily draw the impres-
sion that only hard law is "real," and that soft law (conference declara-
tions, U.N. resolutions, codifications of international law bodies, etc.) has
no legal effect, a conclusion completely at odds with the authors' empha-
sis throughout the later problems. A little more Rainbow Warrior might
help here.
Chapter 3, "The Application of International Law," reviews the
many ways in which international law is applied or enforced. Rainbow
Warrior resurfaces, with actual documents from U.N. Secretary-General
Perez de Cuellar's conciliation efforts between New Zealand and France.
This stage of the case is not entirely successful here, focused as it is on
the unusual and non-environmental issue of imprisonment of spies. So-
phisticated students will crave "more environmental" examples of inter-
national law application, and those with little or no international law
background may draw the misleading conclusion that international law is
not all that different from domestic law, with fixed codes, procedures, and
penalties, a misconception that will create problems when it comes time
to analyze "soft law" like the Stockholm and Rio Declarations.
Chapter 4, "The Global Environmental Probl6matique [Predica-
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ment]," tries to bring students up to speed on both the scientific reality
and the economic, political, and philosophic aspects of environmentalism,
a difficult amalgam that is not entirely successful here; the materials do
not present themselves with cohesion and are difficult to use in class dis-
cussions; in all fairness, this is a problem in any environmental law cour-
sebook. The science sections are shallow, the economics materials, better,
and the philosophy selections, including "Ethics," "Deep Ecology," and
"Ecofeminism," make for great class bull-sessions. Oddly, "sustainable
development" and the advances made at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit are
jammed in almost as an afterthought. One way to overcome this and give
cohesion to the class discussions is to assign the Rio Declaration14 first
and discuss each reading in conjunction with the appropriate one (or
more) of Rio's 27 "Principles."
Part II, the "problems" portion of the book, begins with Chapter 5,
"International Environmental Wrongs," a fine introduction to state re-
sponsibility and liability, material vital to the students' success in debat-
ing the problems to come. For an advanced class of students with a back-
ground in both international and environmental law, Chapter 5 would be
an excellent place to begin the course and plunge straightaway into the
problems.
Chapters 6-11 present the rich collection of 18 different international
environmental problems, not all, of course, meant to be covered in a sin-
gle semester. Conveniently, the authors arrange them in taxonomic
groups, allowing the professor or the students to select problems from
each category, including Antarctica (problems on petroleum exploration,
nuclear proliferation, or seal hunting), the atmosphere (acid rain, strato-
spheric ozone, nuclear accident), the hydrosphere (land-based ocean pol-
lution, tanker spill, groundwater contamination), the lithosphere
(hazwaste dumping, toxic disposal leakage, desertification), the biosphere
(driftnet fishing, elephant poaching, rainforest destruction), and special
issues (trade vs. environment, population control, environmental war-
fare). Not to be missed is Problem 11-1, the free-trade vs. environment
problem, easily the international environmental law issue of the 1990s.18
For each problem, the coursebook supplies facts, copious articles and
notes, detailed references to the applicable international law documents
in the Basic Documents Supplement, and recommended written and oral
assignments. Each problem is expected to take one week (approximately
3 hours of class time), which allows for both conventional lecture-discus-
sion and student debate. It is easy to do at least five in a typical 14-week
14. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of the United Nations Con-
ference on Environment and Development (UNCED) at Rio de Janeiro, June 14, 1992, re-
printed in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 1, at 317;
BASIC DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, at 177.
15. See George W. Pring & Geoffrey Sweitzer, Book Review: Freer Trade, Protected
Environment: Balancing Trade Liberalization and Environmental Interests, 23 DEN. J. OF
INT'L L. & POL'Y 227 (1994).
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semester. The authors' recommended approach is to have all students
prepare "issue outlines" before class, then assign two students to argue
each country's position, and two or more students to preside over the oral
argument as the International Court of Justice or as the Director of
UNEP, President of the U.S., etc. Students "carry" these classes and, af-
ter the initial trepidation, prepare in depth, engage with gusto, and rate it
one of the best experiences in law school.
Part III we both found the most challenging, rewarding, and fun part
of the course. In Chapter 12, students are asked to represent states and
negotiate a protocol/amendment to the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention
on Climate Change.16 The students' actual public conferences, secret side-
meetings, and spirited negotiations tie all the preceding chapters together
and demonstrate how difficult it is to negotiate an effective multilateral
treaty on the environment. Students are faced with the problems and dif-
fering aspirations of developed vs. developing states, centrally planned vs.
market economies, industrialized vs. agrarian infrastructures, states with
abundant natural resources vs. those with none, countries able to afford
environmental priorities vs. those whose priorities are poverty, famine,
and overpopulation. Plan on two weeks to get the most out of this incred-
ibly rich experience. We cannibalized a second week by skipping the last
chapter, "The Future of International Environmental Law," which may
come off a bit esoteric and melodramatic to students.
Is this "problem-oriented" approach an overwhelming amount of
work for the professor? It could be, save for the first-rate Teacher's Man-
ual the authors have prepared. This hefty, 242-page guide not only has a
chapter-by-chapter explanation of the authors' recommended teaching
goals and methodology but also provides detailed, annotated outlines for
each of the 18 problems and "confidential negotiating instructions" for
the climate change negotiations. The marvelous resources in this manual,
in which the authors have done 90 percent of the work in advance, are
alone a reason to select this coursebook. 17
The Basic Documents Supplement is also worthy of note. This vol-
16. The authors give credit to Professor David A. Wirth of Washington and Lee Uni-
versity School of Law for creation of the climate change exercise. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 1, at 993, note a.
17. The manual is not without its flaws, forgivable in such an ambitious first effort.
Professors will want to go over the problems/outlines carefully to check citations for inaccu-
racies (some wrong article numbers, misquotes, better cites, etc.), to restructure some of the
outlines (considerable redundancy, some misordering of arguments, occasionally having the
wrong party arguing first, etc.), and to assure that the problem in the coursebook is com-
plete, accurate, and clear. (To pick one example, Problem 11-1 states that key animals are
on the CITES annexes, when they are not, which causes considerable student confusion.)
To get students used to the issue-outline format, we provided in advance "skeletons" of
the manual outlines, giving the issues (I, II, etc.), pro-con headings (A., B.), and some of the
subarguments (1. "Violation of Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties (explain),"
etc.). By the second or third outline, the "skeletons" can shrink to just the issues and pro-
con headings.
VOL. 23:3
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
ume, organized to track the coursebook, reproduces all or parts of nearly
150 international law documents (treaties, cases, declarations, resolutions,
conference reports, international law codifications, etc.) essential to the
18 problems. While this is only a fraction of the near 1,000 international
environmental law documents worth noting today, it is superior to all
other compendiums because it is the only one published since 1992 and
containing the crucial documents of the Rio Earth Summit. 8 The cour-
sebook directs the readers to the precise documents needed in each
problem.
A problem with this supplement is that a number of the items are
not in full text form. Obviously, the authors were grappling with length,
but some of the omissions are unfortunate, such as leaving out the draft-
ers' "explanatory notes" to the International Law Commission and other
codifications as well as important "annexes" to some of the treaties, like
Annexes I and II to the U.N. Convention on Climate Change. On the
plus-side, it contains a copious appendix giving the status (as of Decem-
ber 31, 1992) of each document, i.e. countries signing, ratifying, making
reservations, votes, dates, and entry into force. 19 Although the supple-
ment is a "must-buy" for students, it boosts the price of the textbooks to
over $80.
One cannot make a better choice than this trio, although they are not
without some shortcomings. By design, these are "public law" materials
and do not attempt to be a "private" international business law text.2 0
The coursebook overemphasizes basic international law and policy in the
beginning chapters, to the detriment of environmental law and policy;
eliminating or condensing materials that merely repeat the general public
international law course would help, as would a fuller environmental
treatment than provided by Chapter 4.
Another problem, given the book's information cut-off date of early
1994, is that change happens. For example, in the real world of the 1992
Convention on Climate Change negotiations, the first Conference of the
Parties (COP-i) was held in Berlin in April 1995, the new rounds of talks
began in Geneva in August, leading up to COP-2 in 1996,21 and each of
these meetings introduces changes which outdate the coursebook's brief-
ing,2 and require additional documents and changes to the draft proto-
18. See Pring & Joeris, supra note 1, for a review of the pre-Rio international environ-
mental law collections.
19. It would be helpful if the authors would send out regular updates, since some key
treaties (like the Climate Change Convention) have added substantial numbers of new coun-
tries since 1992.
20. Which disappointed one business-law-oriented reviewer, see William A. Mogel,
supra note 11.
21. See, e.g., Paul Lewis, U.S. Industries Oppose Emission Proposals, N. Y. TIMEs,
Aug. 22, 1995, at C2.
22. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER, supra note 1, at 993, 997-
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col 8". A happy solution would be for the authors to send out as-needed
updates to the Teacher's Manual and/or create a World Wide Web page
for on-line viewing and downloading of updates.
We disagreed on one issue. The problems do not utilize actual coun-
tries, but pseudonymous states modeled on one or more real states. While
professors will appreciate the added flexibility and focus such "perfect"
states offer, some of the best students will find this frustrating. For exam-
ple, the pseudo-state of "Hanguo" is obviously modeled after the People's
Republic of China; yet, in researching a problem in the coursebook and
document supplement, the student discovers that China is a party to a
relevant treaty or has adopted a particular position, but the status of
"Hanguo" is unclear. This can lead to considerable frustration. One solu-
tion is to convert to "real" countries (which might work with the climate
change negotiations, but would not work with some other good problems);
another solution is to retain the pseudo countries, but for the authors to
provide more rigorous detail of the pseudo state's party and position sta-
tus on all relevant documents and issues.
Minor caveats aside, International Environmental Law and World
Order and its Basic Documents Supplement more than live up to the
goal of providing a challenging, comprehensive course on international
environmental law with a unique "problem-oriented" approach. We
highly recommend them as books which will definitely make students and
professors glad to learn and glad to teach.
23. Id. at 994-95.
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Equity and International Law: A Legal
Realist Approach to International
Decisionmaking
REVIEWED BY PAULA RHODES*
ROSSI, CHRISTOPHER R., EQUITY AS A SOURCE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW?: A LEGAL REALIST APPROACH TO INTERNA-
TIONAL DECISIONMAKING, Transnational Publishers, Inc., Irving-
ton-on-Hudson (1993); ($85.00) ISBN 0-941320-81-2; 309 pp. (hardcover).
In Equity and International Law, Christopher H. Rossi traces the
development of equity in international law. Rossi admits the book is 'un-
abashedly eclectic.' The early chapters provide a good introduction to the
subject of equity and international law. Once this introduction has been
given, the author commences to take the reader on a journey through eq-
uity and international law by utilizing international conventions, arbitra-
tion award decisions, and decisions of the International Court of Justice.
Chapter One provides an effective overview of the book. It sets out
an excellent roadmap of the trek upon which the author is embarking.
Chapter Two traces equity in a non-international context by examin-
ing its development in early societies. Rossi provides descriptions of vary-
ing lengths of equity development in ancient Greek law, Roman law, early
common law and civil law. By mentioning without providing any descrip-
tions of the development of equity as Ch'ing of early Chinese law, the
Dharma of Indian law, the Elohim of Judaic law, or the Istihsan of Is-
lamic law, the stated goal of this chapter, to show the roots of equity
coming from many sources, both legal and religious, is done a disservice.
Chapter Three shows the development and incorporation of equity in in-
ternational law during the 19th century. This was a period of the domi-
nance of positivist legal thinking. Rossi posits the theory that the struc-
ture of international law itself contributed to the rise of international law
as an effective way to resolve disputes between states. This in turn gave
rise to natural law thinking which was in the spotlight between the two
world wars.
Chapter Four looks at the use of equity in arbitration and the meta-
morphosis which Rossi argues it has undergone. It is further argued, this
metamorphosis has affected the nature and role of equity in areas outside
of arbitration.
Chapter Five explores the connection between the practice of inter-
national arbitration to the realm of international adjudication. This chap-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; J.D., Harvard Uni-
versity; B.A., American University.
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
ter takes the reader across what the author calls 'the treacherous stream
of sources enumerated in Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice.' This chapter investigates legislative history, statutory
construction and interpretation.
Chapter Six takes the reader to the world of implied judicial power,
and with it the reason why judges feel compelled to utilize equity in their
decisions. The theory is developed that judges use equity to avoid arriv-
ing at the inability to make a decision.
Chapter Seven explores the rise of equity to its current position, as a
source of international law. Rossi uses Diversion of Water from the River
Meuse decided in 1937 to accomplish this. This is an examination of the
role of judicial discretion, or as Rossi calls it, judicial prevarication. Rossi
contrasts the majority opinion with the separate concurring opinion.
The remainder of Equity and International Law is used to explore
the pivotal role of equity in emerging questions of international law such
as the law of the sea in establishing maritime boundaries and the distrib-
utive justice demands of the developing world.
Equity and International Law is obviously well-researched, and pro-
vides an extensive bibliography for those desiring to engage in a greater
examination of this subject matter. The book, however, would have been
more readable if the author had consigned more of his extensive quotes
from authorities to footnotes rather than the text.
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Chinese Foreign Investment Laws and
Policies: Evolution & Transformation
REVIEWED BY THOMAS MAXWELL'
JIA, WEI, CHINESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAWS AND POLI-
CIES: EVOLUTION & TRANSFORMATION; Quorum Books; Westport,
CT (1994); ISBN 0-89930-900-3; 216 pp. (hardcover). Index.
The most important thing about China is that it can afford to emerge
slowly and gradually, rather than eat humble crow pie and other sub-
stances as it kowtows in tumultuous subservience to Western superiority.
It's a developing country, of course, and thus "needs" the help of devel-
oped countries to accomplish its program of growth, but no more than
developed countries need to be needed by China. And thus, virtually by
definition, China must be considered among the global crowd of develop-
ing countries competing for capital, managerial know-how, technology,
and market access from abroad, which, also by definition, are finite and
somewhat discretionary, the coveted rewards accorded to only the favored
few. In fact, however, the competion as it is actually being played out is
just as stiff among foreign suppliers to be China's main angel as China's is
to be granted this favor. In this looking-glass competition, if truth be
told, the United States suffers every bit as visibly under its largely self-
imposed array of handicaps as China does worrying about its exchange
balance problems or the internal demographic catharsis its growth is
bringing about.
Inseparable from China's economic status - towards the low end of
Asian countries as measured in per capita GDP, say - is its other measure
of status, military capacity. For decades, China has possessed the ability
to crush any of its Asian neighbors, India excluded, almost overnight, by
virtue of its army's sheer mass. Entering the twenty-first century, how-
ever, China's military has acquired some of the high-tech glitter generally
associated with only two other organizations: The US and Israel. The de-
liberate deprovocatization of modern military language at the top of the
range - "insertion" rather than "invasion", "response" rather than
"counter-strike", "neutralization" rather than "destruction", etc. - are
now within China's provinence as well. Everybody in the world, for in-
stance, including especially twenty million Taiwanese, knows that Taiwan
will be annexed into the PRC aegis sooner or later, because a declaration
of independence by Taiwan would result in a surgically exact confiscation
of it through a military action. Taiwan would not have to be destroyed by
China's ultramodern military in order to save it.
* Professor of English Literature and Journalism, Red Rocks Community College;
M.H.A. and B.A. University of Colorado.
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As with America and Israel, this overwhelming military superiority
by China may exist in quiet sublimation, more a laser pointer than a big
stick. It seems to suggest an obligation, a destiny, to dominate its sphere
of influence, rather than a threatening menace. Even further, China can
present its military posture of restraint as key evidence that it possesses
the sophistication and maturity a super-power needs to lead tomorrow's
world. Thus, in negotiations with Britain over the expiration of the lease-
hold of Hong Kong, it is obstreperous only to the extent that understand-
able prudence would call for, and Taiwan can expect the same. Neither
little island acquisition will get all it wants - no more unresticted pouring
forth of golden eggs from either - but China will be perceived as bending
a good deal as well. Taiwan, to be more pointed, being the keeper of the
official Dr. Sun Yat-Sen flame, the true vision of modern China, might
very well assume the effective leadership of the country when the situa-
tion eventually stabilizes.
One other, less tangible, factor must be added to this mix: the histor-
ical preeminence of "Chinese" culture in the east-Asian quadrant. Japan,
Korea, Indo-China, even the urban aspects of Indonesia, freely acknowl-
edge in their autobiographies the admirable hegemony of China in their
makings over the millenia. The organic self-sustenance of Confucianism,
the godless spirituality of Buddhism and Taoism, the efficacy of
mandarinist legalism, the quiet, world-class beauty of the oriental aes-
thetic, even the ability to assimilate into international capitalism - China,
not ironically perhaps, the slowest to perform - are all attributed to this
giant motherland. Of course, warlord tribalism, often unrestrained. in its
cruelty and destruction, a tendency to disrespect iconoclastic permuta-
tions of "Asian" culture - China's crude, banal, but effective deracination
of Tibet being the current example - and a casual willingness to let bu-
reaucratic infrastructures take on happy-go-lucky, unchallengeable lives
of their own, these are also indemically "Chinese" in nature, if not in
absolute origin. From on top of it all, however, emerges a voice from the
cacophony that says, China is the fountainhead of Asian nobility, the
place from which the assertion will come forth that Asian culture and
Asian people are the equal of any that ever have been or ever will be.
Condescending western characterisations of Asian behavior, such as the
supposed simplistic endeavor always to "save face", or the need of Asian
people to become virtually identical bees in gigantic hives - kernels of
truth in those perceptions notwithstanding - will be replaced with global
universals, "face" becoming "dignity", "conformity" becoming
"cooperation".
The western nation or western bloc that fails to acknowledge this
cummulative lack of desparation on China's part is setting itself up for a
rude disenfranchisement from the mainstream of the twenty-first century.
If, for instance, the shameless headiness of NAFTA parlance, choreo-
graphed and rationalized undisguisedly by the United States, condemning
every bit of protectionism no matter how small, like fussy gardeners nuk-
ing every weed that even dreams of raising its head, casually attributing
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all human rights abuses and ecological destruction to restraints on "free
trade" - yes, those were the conclusions of the Hemispheric Trade Con-
ference held in Denver in early July 1995, no exaggeration - were to be-
come the order of the day in western approaches to commerce with
China, the predictable results of oblivious overkill will ensue. Instead, we
must understand, appreciate, and be responsive to China's commitment
to gradualism, recognizing that there are monumental cultural issues at
stake for all of Asia that in the long run will be at least as telling as the
economics of it all.
Technically scholarly and professionally oriented though it be, Chi-
nese Foreign Investment Laws and Policies contains the understated but
clear message for readers (among whom will be potential foreign investors
and their legal counsel) that the canny would-be player must understand
present-day China in its complex evolutionary context, and perceive with
sensitivity the directions China's tendencies of change - Jia is not reluc-
tant to reference policies promulgated as far back as 1911 and even before
- seem to suggest. Not just seem, really; Jia's implied contention is that
China invites the world to extrapolate tendencies which, if all parties
have the wisdom and patience to let the Tao play itself out according to
its needs and nature, shall come about. In one of the few normative intru-
sions Jia places in his book, he concludes a simple introductory passage,
"Therefore, a gradualist approach should be adopted." Letting ordinary
syntax rather than rhetoric make his point, Jia clearly suggests there is
no option to a gradualist approach. Those who ride illusory waves of
Commerce Department hyperventilation about the wonders of "free
trade" risk missing key observations and consequently being at the wrong
place at the wrong time.
The nice thing is, if you follow Mr. Jia's presentation as it is, rather
than how idealogically one might wish it to be, the good news about
China's foreign investment climate beats the bad news all to heck. China
is not abusing its favored position of being able to afford gradualism by
engaging in prodigal nonsense. Socialist idealogy still obtains there, nomi-
nally (Oh, how very flexibly ambiguous Marx and Lenin and Mao can be
when it comes to turning a buck on the world market!), but psycho idea-
logues currently have little voice in code, policy, or practice. (A fact that
Jia does not mention is that two of Deng Xiaoping's children are wealthy,
influential westerners who no doubt regard the Cultural Revolution the
way Floridians regard Hurrican Andrew. Deng himself is anything but
naive.) Jia's essential point is that China's development is circumscribed
by an impressive, growing, and recognizeable body of law which is usually
lived up to reasonably well, is potentially enforceable in its entirety, and
is predictable in its consequences. What is more, there are "experimenta-
tion" processes underway in China, some nearly twenty years old, some-
what casual yet rarely exactly extra-legal, which allow for creative, test-
driveable business arrangements to emerge and possibly pass into more
general currency if they get the job done, but with few bend-over punish-
ments if they don't pan out as authorities wish they might.
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It could be fairly argued that this reviewer chews a good deal more of
the cultural and geopolitical dimensions of the subject than Jia actually
bites off in his book. To be accurate, most background references Jia
makes in the text of his work are limited to introductory clauses to
sentences, such as, "In 1975, when Deng Xiaoping reemerged from his
political obscurity . . ." His quick references to the "Cultural Revolution"
must evoke our already knowing - and how many readers will know? -
that this includes Mao's Holocaustean "Great Leap Forward", one of the
most disasterous incidents of genocide by stupidity in the history of our
species, since the phrase "Great Leap Forward" is never mentioned. Like-
wise, similarly, his references to the passing along of coastline success to
the "loser" hinterland - the coastline being given favored economic status
- as proposed by Beijing's master plan leave unexpressed the fact that the
process is provoking a city vs. plain conflict which, in sheer numbers, is
utterly unprecedented in history. The number of people, for example,
who are expected to migrate to China's cities in the near future is greater
than the entire population of the United States, this despite central gov-
ernmental control practices to prevent same which no American would
tolerate for a minute. Government measures to support agricultural
prices, the primary carrot (vs the stick) method of discouraging urban
migration, consuming taxes as they do, are about as popular in the cities
as an outbreak of cholera. Not so similarly, but in the same vein, Jia gives
very little treatment to the role increasingly played in the Chinese econ-
omy by Chinese entrepreneurs, many of whom operate as freelance wild-
catters, a role which could very well become as decisive as the bourgeois
revolution in Europe and America in the 19th century; nor is there treat-
ment of the considerable levy of official and unofficial racketeering, which
slaps every China-partner smack in the face first when they realize paying
a considerable transaction fee to the official bank with every currency ex-
change is unavoidable, and continues at regular intervals all along the
way thereafter.
Readers who will not, or cannot, read between the lines, or who fail,
more importantly, to peruse Jia's extensive endnotes, will be left never-
theless with a document which can serve as a very useful introduction to
foreign investment in China, facilitating detailed research immensely. As
such, the book's lack of outline-type structure might be considered irri-
tating. In the midst of any given passage, for instance, a casual glance will
not very well inform you whether the law under discussion at that mo-
ment is how it used to be, how it used to be after they sort of fixed it, or
how it is today. Equally questionable to some, especially to counsel
charged with construction analysis and contract generation, is Jia's prac-
tice of providing cogent charts of primarily economic and financial sorts,
but few of a conceptual sort.
The book's best chart is conceptual, however, and represents a con-
densation of the book's overall content. Jia identifies seven areas of con-
sideration he calls "tidal changes in the legal treatment of foreign direct
investment." By tidal changes he means gradual, evolutionary changes to-
VOL. 23:3
CHINESE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAWS
ward "liberalization" in policy, liberalization meaning normalized, ratio-
nalized free markets. These are expressed as "from and to" concepts, two
points defining a line for each, suggesting directions which one might logi-
cally expect to hold course into the future. These seven areas are, or cor-
respond to, standard regimes in international business law, beginning
with, 1) joint ventures, modern China's first forays into international
commerce, proceding through, 2) wholly foreign-owned ventures, a devel-
opment which rational analysis informed China's leaders was not only un-
avoidable but desireable under certain conditions, 3) China's internal re-
gional policies, a tidal change within tidal changes and a happening Jia, if
anything, underestimates, 4) taxation, moving toward more predictable,
investment-friendly, rational normalization, 5) foreign exchange manage-
ment, a subject Jia feels is quite weakly developed in China (even while
citing China's relatively under-control inflation), 6) technology transfer
and intellectual property protection, a subject Jia, speaking in an opti-
mistic tone at any rate, acknowledges the Chinese have yet to tackle all
the way to the turf, and 7) banking, a subject the Chinese have just
barely addressed. A chapter is devoted to each area, chronologically or-
ganized to emphasize evolutionary progress. Several times Mr. Jia refers
to a truth dating to times immemorial: "Make foreign things serve
China." This concept expresses the foundational colloration of all the ten-
dencies he speaks of and must be regarded as a perpetual caveat.
All of these areas in Mr. Jia's estimation indicate "Go" signals, each
a trend in that direction in other words, some more strongly established
than others. Viewed in this light, it makes sense that Mr. Jia essentially
avoids the word "risk" altogether. Some lawyers assess risk, others at-
tempt to manage it, others, like Mr. Jia in his guise as author, prefer to
let the facts speak for themselves. Americans especially must go with the
flow as their country adjusts to the establishment once again of a two-
superpower planet earth, though with a rival not quite so antagonistic
this time. This adjustment is liable to evoke a panoply of self-righteous-
nesses on America's part that even a fleet of corporate lawyers couldn't
begin to shake a stick at. America, for instance, might choose to regard
participation by American firms in Chinese "experimentation" as tanta-
mount to accepting or paying corrupt considerations (spelt with a capital
"B"). Also, China might very well choose to demure from "normal" cur-
rency exchange marketplaces until the practice of devaluation-as-eco-
nomic-warfare is outlawed by binding convention, which might take de-
cades and which might impact American investors more than most
others. To go on, the process by which valuable proprietary intellectual
properties quickly mutate into commodity status in the public's mind, a
condition of minimal protectability, and then into utility status, a condi-
tion of no protectability, if unstoppable in China, as it often appears to
be, could spell disaster for many of America's most powerful corporate
houses (generating tons of billable legal hours, admittedly). Or how about
a prolonged political crisis when Deng passes on, or nasty, nasty scenes
when Hong Kong, Macao, and eventually Taiwan go over, or Chinese bal-
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listic missles being shipped to all ends of the earth (remember their for-
eign-exchange problems?), or even a pan-Asian vendetta taking shape im-
pelled by centuries of humiliation by western powers; all these spell risk
for foreign investors, if risk is what's being looked for.
For better or for worse, Jia leaves those problems for other authors to
consider. Like a proper legal representative, he is offering us options
under the law. Take heart that their is a body of law, this book asserts,
take note of its growth and development, be cautious and realistic, but be
also agile and creative. Chinese courts? What courts, a not unknowing
cynic might answer, But one suspects Jia would reply: any court is better
than no court, how much better, a matter only continued practice will
decide. Finally, be aware that seed when sown may be small, but its har-
vest may be bountiful.
And way between the lines he says this: China is as glad to be rid of
the Soviet Union as we are. The Chinese know what bears do in the
woods and what corporations do in their board rooms. What they are not
so sure about - a question which the Soviet millstone has kept them from
asking - is whether we in the west have any memory of what it used to be
like before people became consumers and citizens became voters. Any
lawyer who does not have some retrospective sensitivity to this trend, still
an anathema to the Chinese, has got a rough, grating row to hoe.
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BASSIOUNI, M. CHERIF, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE; Transna-
tional Publishers, Inc., New York (1994); ISBN 0-941320-87-1; 500 pp.
(hardcover) Table of Authorities, List of Acronyms, Introduction,
Contents.
Keeping with tradition, M. Cherif Bassiouni furthers the universal
understanding and development of international human rights in The
Protection of Human Right in the Administration of Criminal Justice.
This compendium of United Nations norms and standards in the realm of
human rights is an essential reference for any scholar or advocate of in-
ternational criminal law.
Bassiouni sets the stage with a powerful dedication to the memory of
his law school comrade who devoted his life to international human rights
law and had this same life stolen through the practices of arbitrary arrest,
detention, and summary extra-judicial execution. He then pays tribute to
the contributions of the United Nations in the development of interna-
tional human rights law norms and standards.
This compilation of human rights laws combines all of the interna-
tional, national, and regional procedural norms and standards applicable
to criminal processes. It is organized by topic, and is divided into the
following sections: (1) Prevention of Discrimination; (2) Statelessness and
Refugees; (3) Principles of Legality; (4) Right to Life and Freedom From
Cruel and Unusual Punishment; (5) Right to Liberty and Prisoners'
Rights; (6) Right to a Fair Trial; (7) Administration of Juvenile Justice;
(8) Criminal Justice Policy; (9) Codes of Conduct; (10) Victims' Rights
and Remedies; (11) Complaints and Reporting Procedures; (12) Deroga-
tion; and (13) International Cooperation in Penal Matters, Including
Model Treaties.
Within each subject heading, Bassiouni provides both excerpts and
complete text for all of the international agreements, declarations, trea-
ties (model and enacted), and reports applicable to the topic. Where nec-
essary, he provides commentary and explanatory remarks about the docu-
ments at hand. His method of using excerpts is particularly useful
because the reader is not required to sort through irrelevant material in
order to find the applicable article or comment.
Bassiouni also assists the scholar with two additional user-friendly
sections. He provides an alphabetized Table of Authorities with legal cita-
tions for all of the documents in the compendium. He further offers a List
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of Acronyms to aid the readier in interpreting the various recognized and
short-hand abbreviations used in these materials.
Overall, this compendium is well-organized, easy to use, and ex-
tremely informative for any scholar or advocate of international criminal
law. As a desk-side reference, this book will save hours of valuable re-
search time.
Sandra L. Jamison
NELSON, JOAN M., INTRICATE LINKS: DEMOCRATIZATION
AND MARKET REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA AND EASTERN
EUROPE; Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and Oxford (1994);
($32.95); ISBN 156-000-1771; 225 pp. (hardcover).
Dr. Joan Nelson, a political economist, is a Senior Associate at the
Overseas Development Council, an organization affiliated with the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Agency for Interna-
tional Development. Intricate Links, however, does not shamelessly sup-
port any political agenda. As the title suggests, Nelson examines the cor-
relation between economic and political trends occurring over the past
twenty years in Latin America and Eastern Europe, with the collapse of
dictatorships and communism. The bulk of this book consists of four es-
says, written by Nelson and three other contributors: Jacek Kochanowics,
an associate professor of economic history at Warsaw University; Kalman
Mizsei, from the Institute for East-West Studies in New York; and Oscar
Munoz, from CIEPLAN, a research institute devoted to economic issues
in Latin America. Each essay is focuses on a different aspect of the re-
orientation that has occurred since the mid-70s. The authors focus on
specific country cases, comparing Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil in Latin
America, to Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland, in Eastern Europe, with the
initial understanding that the developments in both regions are attributa-
ble to the same dynamic. These countries were chosen because they re-
present "dual transformation," where free-market economic reforms oc-
curred simultaneously with democratization. And as Nelson states in the
Overview, "it is not at all clear that most simultaneous transitions will
reach their objectives." Intricate Links describes the experiences of six
very distinct countries engaged in economic and political reforms, but
very little else.
Munoz's "Toward Trade Opening: Legacies and Current Strategies,"
explores the economic and political effects of trade liberalization, from
protectionist state intervention schemes toward lower tariffs and manage-
ment of the exchange rate. To his credit, Munoz does not simply wave the
"free trade" banner; rather, he traces the logical consequences of trade
liberation to demonstrate that economic stabilization policies often cause
unemployment, lower wages, and inflation, contributing to political insta-
bility, anathema to democracy. His reluctant conclusion is, therefore, that
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economic "reforms" actually impair democratization because govern-
ments must impose economic austerity measures on an often unwilling
population, at least in the short-term.
The essay by Mizsei, "Property Rights Reform During Democratiza-
tion," examines the relationship between democratization and the devel-
opment of the private sector, especially in the areas of privatization pro-
grams, banking reform, bankruptcy regulations, and new business
stimulation. As with trade liberalization, Mizsei discovers the emerging
tension between short-term political goals and longer-term economic re-
form strategies, especially in Latin America, where privatization schemes
generally favor the wealthy. But the theory holds that, eventually, priva-
tization reduces special interest group influence over political entities,
paving the way for democracy.
In her contribution, "Labor and Business Roles in Dual Transitions:
Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?" Nelson notes how free market re-
forms and democratization alter the role of major interest groups, notably
labor and business. Labor unions have experienced a reduction of influ-
ence, while big business interests have grown even more powerful in both
regions, radically so in Eastern Europe. Unlike the other authors, Nelson
is more concerned with analyzing the relationship between the state and
major interest groups than the correlation between economic and political
reforms. Although Nelson concedes that a blanket approach to reforming
the state-interest group structure will not work in every "dual transition"
country, she nevertheless prescribes certain principles of achieving legiti-
mate consensus, a building block for democracy.
In Kochanowics's "Reforming Weak States and Deficient Bureaucra-
cies," he attributes the economic crisis in Latin America and Eastern Eu-
rope to the overextension of the dominant state, so any solution must
begin with reconstituting the state. Kochanowics is careful to avoid sim-
plistic suggestions (e.g. less government) while recognizing that the state
plays a critical role in economic success, citing the "Asian Miracle." His
prescriptions for restructuring the state are tailored to overcome the spe-
cific obstacles of each region, patronage and clientelism in Latin America,
and decades of communism in Eastern Europe.
Although each essay examines a purportedly different aspect of the
"dual transitions" phenomenon, the problem is that there is no there
there. Intricate Links treats the experiences of six remarkably different
countries as if they were more similar than different, capable of being
identified. As if it were not difficult enough to compare Bolivia to Argen-
tina, whose per capita GDP is six times greater, the authors attempt to
compare and contrast regions as historically, culturally, and politically
distinct as Latin America and Eastern Europe. Many of the conclusions,
therefore, end up merely describing six different scenarios, without a co-
herent thesis or common prescription for action.
Isabel P. Posso
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NASIR, JAMAL J., THE STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER ISLAMIC
LAW AND UNDER MODERN ISLAMIC LEGISLATION (2nd ed.);
Graham & Trotman, London and Boston (1994); ($58.00); ISBN 1-85966-
084-3; 159 pp. (hardcover).
The Status of Women Under Islamic Law is a comprehensive review
of how women are treated in Islamic tradition. Status is an appropriate
word to use in the title, as there is little manifestation in the work that
Islamic women have rights at all. Status of Women furnishes the reader
with an academic view of how women are treated under the existing Is-
lamic laws. It is divided into seven chapters detailing an Islamic woman's
relationship to a woman's traditional role in Islamic society: Marriage,
Dower, Maintenance, Dissolution of Marriage, the Iddat, Parentage and
Fosterage and Custody. There are a variety of differing sects in Islam,
and the author attempts to distinguish the differing sects in each of these
areas. This review examines only a couple of the concepts introduced by
this work.
From the first chapter, one realizes that men and women in Islamic
society are not treated as equals; rather women are persons whose status
is derived from the men in her life. Those male figures include, but are
not limited to, her father and her husband. An Islamic marriage follows
the traditional contract theory of marriage: an offer, an acceptance, and
consideration (dower). There must also be marital equality, and no im-
pediments to the marriage. Most Islamic sects perceive marital equality
to be through lineage, freedom from defects, religious piety, and property.
One of the most interesting aspects of the creation of a marriage is
the concept of polygyny. Mention an Islamic marriage and it conjures
scenes from old movies of a single man with his harem of women. Nasir
addresses the controversy which polygyny poses today, and remarks that
the modern trend favors restricted polygyny (marriage to only four wives)
or monogyny. The marriage contract itself provides that this man may
only marry this woman. The man must be able to provide adequately for
all of his wives, and a woman can sue in certain sects of Islam under a
breach of contract theory if he takes another wife. Whether case law ex-
ists in this area would have been a fascinating issue to address.
Status of Women also examines the payment of dower by the hus-
band to the wife, and the dower rights to which a woman's family is enti-
tled. The author states, contrary to Western belief, that a dower is not
required by modern Islamic laws, and has no effect on the contract of
marriage. The book does provide a thorough discussion of how a dower
works, and the legal problems which this concept poses to Islamic jurists.
Paternity and the parent-child relationship in an Islamic family is
one of the more engaging chapters in the book. The issues which are ad-
dressed in this area complement, but sometimes contradict Western ideas
of the familial relationship. Examples that are illustrated in these chap-
ters include adoption, paternity, and responsibilities of each parent to-
ward a child. Adoption is not recognized in many sects of Islam, and in
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some sects an adoption of a child not biologically of the parent is prohib-
ited outright. Status of Women contains a lengthy discussion of illegiti-
mate children, and the rights and obligations of the parties. And it exten-
sively addresses the effects of marital impediments on a child's paternity.
In conjunction which this, the author examines the concepts of fos-
terage and custody of the children. For example, a mother only has cus-
tody of her child until the child reaches a certain age, usually 7 for boys
and 9 for girls, when the child no longer needs a mother's guidance. The
chapter discusses the effects of divorce on these concepts, and the ability
of the father to play a role in their young child's life.
As a whole, the work provides a cursory view of Islamic laws. It fur-
nishes the reader with an introduction to a woman's role in Islamic soci-
ety, however without any real case history and very little modern inter-
pretations of those roles. The Islamic woman appears to be the very
object now that she was hundreds of years ago, with little personal power
independent of the men in her life. Status of Women provides a thor-
ough, but somewhat distressing overview of Islamic women in their role as
little more than chattels under these laws.
Ann Wei
THE OCEANS AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY: SHARED U.S.
AND RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES; Edited by James M. Broadus and
Raphael V. Vartanov; Island Press; Washington, DC (1994); ISBN 1-
55963-236-4; 328 pp. (pbk).
The distinction, and indeed, utility of The Oceans and Environmen-
tal Security lies largely in its source of origin. This book marks the culmi-
nation of research composed between scholars from the Institute for
World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of
Sciences, headed by Vartanov, and the Marine Policy Center of Woods
Hole Oceanographic Institution in the United States, directed by
Broadus.
The United States and Russia continue to function as the world's
foremost maritime presences. Furthermore, it is possible that the two na-
tions possess more scientific assets pertaining to the understanding of
ocean processes than all other nations combined, so viewing oceanic envi-
ronmental threats from a shared Russian-American perspective is appro-
priate. This book provides perhaps an unprecedented informational van-
tage point from which the reader may examine the scholastic thought of
two nations who jointly possess commanding potential to chart the post-
Cold War course for future oceanic activities and policies, but who none-
theless presently pose vexing concerns to oceanic security.
The term "environmental security" is used to connote "the reasona-
ble assurance of protection against threats to national well-being or the
common interests of the international community associated with envi-
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ronmental damage." Using this definition as a baseline, Oceans and Envi-
ronmental Security posits that the following practices constitute a threat
to oceanic environmental security: land-based marine pollution in the
Gulf of Mexico and the Black Sea; living resource problems in the North
Pacific; hazardous materials transport; and radioactivity in the oceans.
One chapter is devoted to each of these issues. Three additional chapters
are devoted to issues concerning: environmental protection for the Arctic
Ocean; the Southern Ocean; and the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea.
Chapter two asserts that land-based marine pollution constitutes the
gravest problem pertaining to oceanic environmental security. Though
land-based sources have been estimated to contribute more than 75% of
pollutants entering the sea, a comprehensive global legal regime for land-
based marine pollution is unfortunately lacking. This lack of a compre-
hensive legal regime stands in contrast to vessel-source pollution and
ocean dumping. The authors suggest that a regional framework would be
the most effective mechanism to control land-based marine pollution.
Chapter three discusses three practices concerning living resources which
have threatened environmental security in the North Pacific and the Ber-
ing Sea: (1) depletion of straddling fish stocks; (2) illegal and preemptive
take of anadromous fish species; and (3) incidental take of non-targeted
species.
The dangers associated with hazardous materials transport is dis-
cussed in chapter four. To promote safe transport of hazardous materials,
the authors suggest that a mechanism must be created whereby the ship-
owners would bear the full cost of environmental damages. Additionally,
insurance markets could contribute to this end not merely by spreading
risk, but also by "promoting cost-justified measures" to decrease such
risk.
Chapter five proclaims, counter-intuitively, that the presence of radi-
oactivity in the oceans constitutes a less severe threat than problems of
petroleum shipping, overfishing, and land-based sources of pollution. Yet,
the authors contend that a person who would find this proposition
counter-intuitive merely demonstrates the public's widespread (and
seemingly unjustified) anxiety about radioactivity caused by misinforma-
tion and an inadequate understanding of scientific findings.
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is thor-
oughly discussed in chapter eight. The Law of the Sea Convention is con-
sidered an invaluable addition to the legal repertoire of marine environ-
mental protection. The Law of the Sea Convention remains the only
global agreement which addresses the full spectrum of issues pertaining
to the oceans.
The well-versed reader should find this work cogent and comprehen-
sive while the novice will almost certainly find the scientific language
challenging. Oceans and Environmental Security presents a distinct and
expert insight into the current state of oceanic environmental security
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and it should be consulted by environmental lawyers, policymakers, and
persons interested in the present condition of the world's oceans.
Chad Weinstein

